Essays on beef cattle economics by McKendree, Melissa Gale Short
  
Essays on beef cattle economics 
 
 
by 
 
 
Melissa Gale Short McKendree 
 
 
 
 
B.S., University of Florida, 2011 
M.S., Purdue University, 2013 
 
 
 
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
College of Agriculture  
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2017 
 
  
  
Abstract 
The U.S. beef industry is comprised of multiple, vertically connected segments.  
Beginning at the cow-calf level, cattle move through the industry to backgrounding/stocker 
operations, feedlots, and then to beef packers.  The beef produced then continues to move 
through the marketing channel from beef packers to wholesalers and on to multiple final 
consumer outlets.  Each level of the beef industry has both distinct and related economic issues.  
This dissertation contains three essays on beef cattle economics.  Essay 1 focuses on price and 
animal health risk management at the feedlot level.  Essays 2 and 3 explore how upstream 
demand changes impact primary beef suppliers.  
 The objective of Essay 1 is to determine if feedlot operators manage price risk and 
animal health risk as two separate and independent risks or if they manage them jointly.  The 
animal health attribute of interest is purchasing feeder steers from a single known source versus 
an auction with unknown background.  The output price risk mitigation tools are futures 
contracts, forward contracts, other, and accept cash price at time of sale.  Primary data is 
collected using an online survey administered to feedlot operators.  Participants are placed in 
forward looking, decision making scenarios utilizing a split-sample block design.  Evidence of a 
relationship between animal health risk and output price risk management is mixed. 
Ricardian rent theory (RRT) is tested in Essay 2 to determine if complete pass-through 
occurs from fed cattle and corn prices to feeder cattle prices.  Monthly price data from December 
1995 to December 2016 is used.  Based on RRT, surplus rents should pass through the market to 
the holder of the scarcest resource.  In cattle markets, feeder calves are the scarcest, widely 
traded resource and thus gains and losses at the feedlot theoretically pass-through to feeder cattle 
prices. The hypothesized pass-through rates suggested by RRT is calculated using monthly 
  
production data from the Focus on Feedlots data series.  The regression pass-through estimates 
are tested against the hypothesized RRT pass-through.  In many models, the estimated pass-
through rate is statistically greater than the RRT hypothesized pass-through rate.  Thus, when fed 
cattle or corn prices change, these changes are more than fully passed to cow-calf producers 
through the feeder cattle price.  Evidence is found of asymmetric pass-through during times of 
herd expansion versus contraction.   
Essay 3 provides a quantification of how changes in retail and export beef demand are 
transmitted to different members of the beef industry.  Understanding how information is 
transmitted from primary consumer demand through the supply chain is key for long-term 
prosperity of the U.S. cattle industry. However, empirical applications quantifying how demand 
signals are transmitted through vertically connected industries are limited.  Using both naïve and 
forward looking price expectations, a four equation system of inverse demand and supply 
equations for live and feeder cattle is estimated.  Using retail and export beef demand indices, the 
impacts of 1% change in retail or export demand on live cattle and feeder cattle prices are 
quantified.  
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Abstract 
The U.S. beef industry is comprised of multiple, vertically connected segments.  
Beginning at the cow-calf level, cattle move through the industry to backgrounding/stocker 
operations, feedlots, and then to beef packers.  The beef produced then continues to move 
through the marketing channel from beef packers to wholesalers and on to multiple final 
consumer outlets.  Each level of the beef industry has both distinct and related economic issues.  
This dissertation contains three essays on beef cattle economics.  Essay 1 focuses on price and 
animal health risk management at the feedlot level.  Essays 2 and 3 explore how upstream 
demand changes impact primary beef suppliers.  
 The objective of Essay 1 is to determine if feedlot operators manage price risk and 
animal health risk as two separate and independent risks or if they manage them jointly.  The 
animal health attribute of interest is purchasing feeder steers from a single known source versus 
an auction with unknown background.  The output price risk mitigation tools are futures 
contracts, forward contracts, other, and accept cash price at time of sale.  Primary data is 
collected using an online survey administered to feedlot operators.  Participants are placed in 
forward looking, decision making scenarios utilizing a split-sample block design.  Evidence of a 
relationship between animal health risk and output price risk management is mixed. 
Ricardian rent theory (RRT) is tested in Essay 2 to determine if complete pass-through 
occurs from fed cattle and corn prices to feeder cattle prices.  Monthly price data from December 
1995 to December 2016 is used.  Based on RRT, surplus rents should pass through the market to 
the holder of the scarcest resource.  In cattle markets, feeder calves are the scarcest, widely 
traded resource and thus gains and losses at the feedlot theoretically pass-through to feeder cattle 
prices. The hypothesized pass-through rates suggested by RRT is calculated using monthly 
  
production data from the Focus on Feedlots data series.  The regression pass-through estimates 
are tested against the hypothesized RRT pass-through.  In many models, the estimated pass-
through rate is statistically greater than the RRT hypothesized pass-through rate.  Thus, when fed 
cattle or corn prices change, these changes are more than fully passed to cow-calf producers 
through the feeder cattle price.  Evidence is found of asymmetric pass-through during times of 
herd expansion versus contraction.   
Essay 3 provides a quantification of how changes in retail and export beef demand are 
transmitted to different members of the beef industry.  Understanding how information is 
transmitted from primary consumer demand through the supply chain is key for long-term 
prosperity of the U.S. cattle industry. However, empirical applications quantifying how demand 
signals are transmitted through vertically connected industries are limited.  Using both naïve and 
forward looking price expectations, a four equation system of inverse demand and supply 
equations for live and feeder cattle is estimated.  Using retail and export beef demand indices, the 
impacts of 1% change in retail or export demand on live cattle and feeder cattle prices are 
quantified. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The U.S. beef industry is composed of multiple, vertically connected segments with 
unique and related economic issues (Figure 1.1).  Cows mother and rear calves in the cow-calf 
sector.  The bovine gestation is nine months.  After the calf is born it remains with its mother 
until weaning, around six to ten months of age.  After weaning, steer calves are either retained by 
cow-calf operations, adding additional weight before being sold to a feedlot, or sold to a stocker 
and backgrounder operation.  Heifer calves can be also retained by cow-calf operations for 
breeding, either to expand herd size or replace existing breeding stock. 
At stocker and backgrounder operations, calves are put on pasture or may be introduced 
to a forage-based growing diet in a drylot.  Next, calves are sold to a feedlot operation at around 
12 to 18 months of age, and are considered yearlings.  The yearlings are fed a grain intensive 
diet, primarily composed of corn, at the feedlot and are housed in a pen with around 125 to 150 
other yearlings.  During the four to six months at the feedlot the animal will continue to gain 
weight until they are sold to a meat packing plant.  Historically, harvest weight has been between 
1,100 and 1,300 lbs, but has increased to around 1,400 lbs recently (Figure 1.2) (Livestock 
Marketing Information Center, 2017).  After harvest, the meat and byproducts are processed and 
sold through multiple outlets.  These outlets include domestic outlets such as grocery stores, 
restaurants, and institutions, as well as exports.   
This dissertation is a collection of three essays related to important economic issues in the 
beef industry.  Essay 1, “Management of multiple sources of risk in livestock production,” 
investigates if and what type of relationship (independent, substitutes, or complements) exists 
between feedlot operators’ decisions about output price and animal health risk mitigation 
strategies.  Primary data is collected using an online survey of feedlot operators.  The survey 
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places producers in a forward looking mindset.  Using a split-sample design, producers are either 
asked feeder cattle placement or output price hedging scenarios.  The animal health risk 
mitigation strategy of interest is single sourced feeder steers versus steers comingled from 
multiple sources with unknown backgrounds (auction).  The output price risk mitigation 
strategies considered are futures hedge, forward contract, accept cash price at time of sale, and 
other.  A complementary relationship between animal health risk and output price risk mitigation 
strategies is found in feeder cattle purchasing scenarios.  However, little evidence of a 
relationship is found between output price and animal health risk mitigation strategies in the 
output price risk hedging scenarios.  Persistence of past output pricing behavior is evident.  
Potentially, the complementary relationship in feeder cattle procurement questions but not output 
oriented questions stems from the structure of the beef industry; there are more options when 
buying feeder cattle than when selling finished cattle.   
Essay 2, “Testing Ricardian rent theory in the U.S. beef industry across time,” focuses on 
the idea of fed cattle and corn price transmission to feeder cattle price.  The objective is to 
determine if Ricardian rent theory holds in the U.S. beef industry by examining the pass-through 
rates from fed cattle to feeder cattle price and from corn to feeder cattle price.  Monthly feedlot 
production data (placement weight, finished weight, feed conversion ratio, etc.) from Focus on 
Feedlots is used to estimate pass-through rates hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory.  These 
hypothesized values are compared to actual pass-through rates from econometric regressions.  
Actual pass-through rates are investigated using futures prices and expected prices (incorporating 
basis).  Additionally, given the many changes in the U.S. beef industry (e.g., increased finishing 
weights, U.S. recession, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) discovery, etc.), the 
robustness of pass-through rates across time are investigated.  Pass-through asymmetry during 
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times of fed cattle price increases and decreases, and during times of herd expansion and 
contraction are explored.  Overall, pass-through rates are greater than 100%, and pass-through is 
asymmetric during times of herd expansion versus contraction.  This large pass-through can 
benefit cow-calf producers when fed cattle prices increase, potentially from retail demand 
increases, or corn price decreases.  However, adverse shocks, such as BSE, can be more than 
proportionally passed back to cow-calf operations.  
Essay 3, “Impacts of retail and export demand on U.S. cattle producers,” explores how 
changes in retail and export beef demand impact upstream members in the beef supply chain, in 
particular, feedlot operators and feeder cattle producers.  Using both naïve and forward looking 
price expectations, a four equation system of inverse demand and supply equations for live cattle 
and feeder cattle is estimated.  Using retail and export beef demand indices, the impacts of a 1% 
change in retail or export demand on live cattle and feeder cattle prices are quantified.  A “what-
if” analysis is completed to demonstrate how one index point and one standard deviation changes 
in retail and export demand impact these prices.  Additionally, decompositions of predicted 
values demonstrates how quantity of live cattle supplied, retail demand, and export demand 
impacted the live cattle price during key time periods.  Overall, essays 2 and 3 demonstrate the 
importance of understanding conceptually and numerically how changes in vertically and 
horizontally connected markets impact primary beef suppliers.  
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Figure 1.1 U.S. beef marketing chain 
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Figure 1.2 Historical live cattle harvest weight in lbs 
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Chapter 2 - Management of multiple sources of risk  
in livestock production 
This issue of managing multiple types of risk is prevalent in agriculture.  For example, 
Du, Ifft, Lu, and Zilberman (2015) look at the relationship between crop producers’ use of 
marketing contracts and crop insurance.  Similar to crop producers, cattle feedlot operators face 
multiple types of risk, which can impact profitability.  Such risks include price, production, 
animal health, disease outbreaks, weather, business, and financial risk.  How do feedlot operators 
and their team of experts make decisions in this risky environment?  Researchers have largely 
focused on the role of futures and options markets to mitigate price risk from feeder cattle, live 
cattle, and corn prices (Tonsor & Schroeder, 2011; Hart, Babcock, & Hayes, 2001; Mark, 
Schroeder, & Jones, 2000; Schroeder & Hayenga, 1988).  However, little work has examined 
relationships between different types of risk feedlot operators face and available risk mitigation 
strategies.  In an example of the limited research on both price and animal health risk, Belasco, 
Taylor, Goodwin, and Schroeder (2009) developed an ex-ante model of price and yield risks 
associated with cattle feeding.  They determined that both animal health and price risk have 
statistically significant impacts on the conditional mean and variability of profits.  However, no 
study has investigated how feedlot producers actually view the management of multiple types of 
risk.  To better understand tradeoffs and relationships between risk management decisions, our 
analysis will focus on the relationship between output price and animal health risk management.   
Our objective is to determine if feedlot producers view/manage output price risk and 
animal health risk as two separate and independent risks or if they view them jointly.  To 
accomplish this, we conduct a survey that places feedlot operators in forward looking, decision 
making scenarios.  If producers approach risk jointly, understanding if mitigation strategies for 
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output price risk and animal health risk are substitutes or complements is important.  Knowing if 
and what kind of relationship exists between animal health and output price risk mitigation can 
inform the development of more complete risk mitigation strategies so producers can better 
manage their risk portfolio.  As part of meeting this objective, we will also map out use of price 
risk and animal health risk mitigation strategies in the feedlot industry.   
Whether cattle feedlot operators view output price and animal health risk independently 
or jointly is unknown.  Operations have a fixed budget.  Therefore, feedlot operators could 
decide to implement increased animal health risk mitigation strategies instead of hedging using 
futures market contracts (substitute relationship).  Conversely, animal health and output price 
risk mitigation strategies could be complements.  Animal health practices could decrease the 
uncertainty in production and therefore operators could better match their production to futures 
contracts, increasing the use of futures contracts.  This could possibly help explain past 
“surprises” by analysts when producers have hedged price risk less than “expected” (Goodwin & 
Schroeder, 1994). 
Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) and Belasco et al. (2009) state that price risk is one of the 
largest risks faced by producers.  Feedlot operators face price risk for inputs, primarily feeder 
cattle and corn, and output prices, live cattle.  Hedging alternatives, including forward contracts 
and futures contracts, exist to allow feedlot operators to manage price risk.  However, feedlot 
operations do not hedge as much as many academic studies suggest they should (Moschini & 
Hennessy, 2001; Goodwin & Schroeder, 1994).  There are likely multiple factors which 
contribute to lower than expected participation in hedging.  One potential explanation examined 
in this study is if operators are making tradeoffs in their risk management decisions.  For output 
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price risk management we will focus on hedging of live cattle price using futures contracts, 
forward contracts, other programs, and accepting cash (spot market) price at time of sale.  
In addition to output price risk, feedlot operators face animal health risks that extend 
beyond feed conversion and average daily gain. For instance, animal disease events may be rare 
but are often damaging if not devastating to operations that experience drastic reductions in 
output or spikes in production costs (Schroeder, Pendell, Sanderson, & McReynolds, 2015). 
Many factors contribute to the potential disease risk of cattle coming into a feedlot including 
“source, age, distance transported, previous health management, amount of comingling, shrink, 
and weather conditions” (Rambo, 2014).  When feedlot operators are looking to place a lot of 
feeder cattle, they can buy the number of head desired from a single seller (i.e. a single farm) or 
assemble the required number of head from multiple sources (i.e. an auction).  When placed in 
feedlots, cattle are faced with adapting to new environments, establishing a social hierarchy, and 
adjusting to a new diet (Rambo, 2014).  Due to these and other factors, lots composed of feeder 
cattle purchased from multiple sources are considered a higher risk for animal disease than 
feeder cattle purchased from a single source (Rambo, 2014).  Single source of origin will be the 
animal health risk mitigation practice of interest.  
 Conceptual model  
Feedlot operator 𝑖 will make decisions to maximize their expected utility, 𝐸𝑈𝑖:  
 𝐸𝑈𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑈𝑖(𝑤0,𝑖 + 𝜋?̃?)] (1) 
where 𝑤0,𝑖 is initial wealth and ?̃?𝑖 is profit, a random variable (Moschini & Hennessy, 2001).
1 
Profit for the total operation is the sum of profit per pen (𝑏 pens),  
                                                 
1 Subscript 𝑖 is dropped hereafter for notational convenience.  A time subscript is omitted.  
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 ?̃? = ∑ 𝜋?̃?
𝑏
. (2) 
Profit per pen of cattle is a function of input and output prices and quantities.  However, when 
feedlot operators place cattle there is uncertainty about both prices and quantities.  This 
uncertainty makes profit a random variable.  Following Moschini and Hennessy (2001), profit 
can be written as:  
 ?̃? = 𝑃𝐺(𝑥; ?̃?) − 𝑟𝑥 − 𝐾 (3) 
where P is output price, 𝐺(𝑥; ?̃?) is a stochastic production function where realized output 
depends on the input vector 𝑥 and a random variable ?̃?, 𝑟 is a vector of input prices, and 𝐾 is 
fixed costs.  This framework can be adapted to feedlot operators’ decision making under price 
and animal health risk.  We consider two scenarios, allowing one risk type to vary while holding 
the other fixed.  
First, consider how animal health production practices impact profit, holding live cattle 
price constant.  A relationship between feeder cattle quantity placed, 𝑄𝐹𝐶, and live cattle quantity 
produced,  𝑄𝐿𝐶, exists.  Additionally, the relationship between feeder cattle pounds placed and 
live cattle pounds at finishing will be a function of animal health production practices, 𝑧 =
{𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝐴𝐻), 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (𝑆𝑇)}.  For example, an 
additional animal health practice might be purchasing cattle from a single, known source.  While 
cattle are being fed they can potentially get sick and therefore their final finish weight is 
uncertain.  Additionally, due to death loss, the total number of finished head is uncertain.  Thus, 
the production function depends on the specific practices used,    
 𝑄𝐴𝐻
𝐿𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑄𝐴𝐻
𝐹𝐶 , 𝑥𝐴𝐻; ?̃?) (4) 
 𝑄𝑆𝑇
𝐿𝐶 = 𝑔(𝑄𝑆𝑇
𝐹𝐶 , 𝑥𝑆𝑇; ?̃?). (5) 
11 
 
Potentially, due to factors such as seasonality and other feedlot characteristics, 𝑓(. ) and 𝑔(. ) 
could be related.  Therefore, profit functions can be written as:   
 𝜋𝐴?̃? = 𝑃𝐿?̃? ∗ 𝑓(𝑄𝐴𝐻
𝐹𝐶 , 𝑥𝐴𝐻; ?̃?) − 𝑃𝐴𝐻
𝐹?̃? ∗ 𝑄𝐴𝐻
𝐹𝐶 − 𝑟𝑥𝐴𝐻 − 𝐾 (6) 
 𝜋𝑆?̃? = 𝑃𝐿?̃? ∗ 𝑔(𝑄𝑆𝑇
𝐹𝐶 , 𝑥𝑆𝑇; ?̃?) − 𝑃𝑆𝑇
𝐹?̃? ∗ 𝑄𝑆𝑇
𝐹𝐶 − 𝑟𝑥𝑆𝑇 − 𝐾 (7) 
where 𝑃𝐿𝐶 is live cattle price per hundred weight (cwt) (finished cattle, output), 𝑃𝑧
𝐹𝐶  is feeder 
cattle price per cwt, 𝑄𝑧
𝐿𝐶 is total cwts of cattle produced (output lbs),  𝑄𝑧
𝐹𝐶 is total cwts of feeder 
cattle purchased (input lbs), and 𝑥𝑧 is a vector of other input quantities.  Other inputs costs, 
including feed costs, veterinary costs, and labor, will vary by pen and production practices used 
specifically for that pen.  Therefore, additional animal health practices impact profit through 
differences in premiums paid for feeder cattle, production costs, and live cattle lbs produced.  
Now, consider how price risk management strategies impact profitability, assuming 
animal health practices remain constant.  We assume operators are price takers.  However, they 
can have some control over if/when they lock in input and output prices through hedging.  A 
feedlot operator can hedge feeder cattle, live cattle, and corn prices using futures contacts, 
forward contracts, or other tools.  Alternatively, the operator can decide to not hedge prices and 
accept cash prices at time of sale.  Hedging allows producers to decrease price risk (uncertainty 
about prices) compared to accepting cash price at time of sale.  Consider the formula,   
 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠. (8) 
Hedging using futures contracts locks in the futures price component of equation (8) and only 
allows basis risk.  Basis risk is usually less than cash price risk.  Hedging using forward contracts 
often locks in both futures price and basis, eliminating all price risk.2  Hedging protects 
                                                 
2 Third party default risk is ignored. 
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producers from adverse price movements.  However, one downfall of hedging with futures or 
forward contracts is producers cannot benefit from price movements in their favor.  Thus, price 
risk management strategies impact input and output prices that directly impact profitability.  For 
simplicity, assume feedlot operators only hedge live cattle (output price) and feeder cattle prices, 
or use cash markets, ℎ = {ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (𝐻), 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝐶)}.  Then profit can be written as:  
 𝜋?̃? = 𝑃𝐻
𝐿?̃? ∗ 𝐺(𝑄𝐹𝐶 , 𝑥; ?̃?) − 𝑃𝐻
𝐹?̃? ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝐶 − 𝑟𝑥 − 𝐾 (9) 
 𝜋?̃? = 𝑃𝐶
𝐿?̃? ∗ 𝐺(𝑄𝐹𝐶 , 𝑥; ?̃?) − 𝑃𝐶
𝐹?̃? ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝐶 − 𝑟𝑥 − 𝐾. (10) 
Therefore, profit can vary based on differences in prices paid for inputs and received for outputs 
when using cash markets only versus hedging.    
Futures contracts are standardized meaning they have a set delivery date, quality, and 
quantity.  The CME live cattle contract is for 40,000 lbs of finished cattle.  Assume that, on 
average, the operator expects finished steers to weigh 1,400 lbs each.  To almost fully hedge a 
pen of 150 steers (210,000 lbs) the feedlot operator would sell five live cattle contracts (covering 
approximately 143 steers) for six months in the future.  However, what happens if cattle in the 
pen get sick and only finish at 1,250 lbs each?  Now the five live cattle contracts cover 160 cattle 
each weighing 1,250 lbs.  The pen is “over-hedged.”  The operator is now a speculator on ten 
cattle.  A similar thought exercise can be completed for other hedging alternatives such as 
forward contracts.  
One link between hedging output price risk and animal health production practices could 
be the expectation of total pounds of finished cattle.  If there is a large variance in pounds 
produced per pen, then feedlot operators may be less likely to hedge because they cannot 
properly assess the number of futures contracts they should use or specifications they should 
agree to in a forward contract.  If animal health production practices decrease the variability in 
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finishing weight and death loss, then operators can make more informed output price hedging 
decisions.  Thus, operators avoid adding risk associated with becoming a futures market 
speculator or not being able to meet forward contract agreements.  
There can be a substitution, complementary, or no relationship between output price risk 
and animal health risk mitigation strategies.  Risk mitigation strategies are not free and feedlot 
operations have a limited budget.  A feedlot operator could decide the feedlot should only invest 
in animal health mitigation strategies instead of also managing output price risk.  This would be 
an example of substitution.  Alternatively, operators could view output price and animal health 
risk mitigation strategies as complements.  Certain animal health risk mitigation strategies can 
decrease uncertainty about the pounds of animals produced.  This decreased uncertainty will 
allow producers to make more informed hedging decisions.  Additionally, there could be no 
relationship between feedlot operators’ decisions regarding price risk mitigation and animal 
health risk mitigation strategies.  Determining this relationship is a core component of our 
analysis.  We hypothesize there is some relationship between output price risk and animal health 
risk mitigation strategies.  However, to investigate this hypothesis we need to look at the 
individual feedlot operators’ decision making process and past risk management behavior.   
 Data collection  
Primary data was collected from feedlot operators using online surveys sent out via an 
anonymous email link.  See Appendix A for full survey instrument.  The survey was 
programmed using Qualtrics.  Feedlots in Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas were 
targeted.  These states comprise five of the eight states in the five market average price reported 
by the USDA and are home to 80% of cattle on feed at feedlots with 1000+ head capacity (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2017a).  Survey links were emailed to members/subscribers 
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by the Colorado Livestock Association, Iowa Cattlemen’s Association, Kansas Livestock 
Association, Nebraska Cattleman, Texas Cattle Feeders Association, and Feedlot Magazine.  The 
authors did not have access to the email lists of the participants as the organizations sent the link 
themselves.  Therefore we do not know the total number of operations who received an invitation 
to complete the survey.  Additionally, an operation could have received an invitation from 
multiple sources (i.e. their state association and Feedlot Magazine).  However, the “prevent 
ballot box stuffing” option was used in Qualtrics to prevent participants from taking the survey 
more than once.  The survey launched on January 19, 2017 and ended on February 14, 2017.3  In 
addition to the core choice experiment, data on operator and operation demographics, past risk 
management, and views on risk were collected. 
There were 588 responses.4  However, 232 participants whose operation did not include a 
feedlot and/or who did not make price risk or animal health risk management decisions were 
dismissed from the survey after questions 1 and 2.  Additionally, 75 participants who qualified to 
continue, but did not answer any questions past question 13 were considered not usable.  Thus, 
only 281 were usable responses for this analysis. 
Summary statistics for all the useable responses are shown in Table 2.1.  The average 
respondent age is 49 years old, with a minimum and maximum age of 23 and 85 years, 
respectively.  Nearly half of the participants have at least a Bachelor’s degree.  Feedlot operators 
from Iowa comprise 50% of the sample, Nebraska 19%, Texas 10%, Kansas 6%, and Colorado 
                                                 
3 Colorado Livestock Association sent survey link on February 8. Feedlot Magazine sent survey link on January 19 
and 26.  Iowa Cattlemen’s Association sent survey link on January 19 and 26. Kansas Livestock Association sent 
link on January 19 and 30.  Nebraska Cattleman sent survey link on January 23 and 30.  Texas Cattle Feeders 
Association sent survey link on January 24 and 30. 
4 Total distribution numbers are not known and therefore a response rate is not given.  
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5%.  Nineteen percent of respondents are from medium sized operations (defined as having sold 
between 8,000 and 31,999 fed cattle in the last 12 months) and 16% from large operations 
(defined as having sold more than 32,000 fed cattle in the last 12 months).  Just over 20% of 
participants are considered custom feeders owning less than 40% of their cattle.   
To better understand participant’s price expectations they were asked if they believed the 
August CME live cattle contract price would settle higher, lower or the same as today.  Nearly 
29% of participants think the August CME contract price will increase.  Participants were asked 
a series of questions to gauge their risk aversion following the Global Risk-Attitude Construct 
(Pennings & Garcia, 2001).  These variables collapse down to one factor via a factor analysis.  
Therefore, only one question, Q13.1, is included in our analysis.  Participants are considered risk 
averse if they somewhat agree, agree, or strongly agree with the statement, “I usually like 
“playing it safe” (for instance, “locking in a price”) instead of taking risks for market prices for 
fed cattle.”  Since single source feeder cattle purchases and fed cattle price hedging are of key 
interest, participants were asked about their past behaviors.  Nearly 65% of participants have 
purchased single source calves before.  On average, participants hedge 19% and 18% of their 
finished cattle using futures and forward contracts, respectively.  However, these hedging 
percentages range from 0 to 100%. 
 Research methodology: Past behavior 
Past feeder cattle procurement and output price hedging behavior can be used as a simple 
test of if a relationship between animal health risk (single source feeder cattle) and output price 
risk mitigation exists.  Participants were asked the following questions:  
Question 4: On average, what percentage of feeder cattle does your operation source from 
(should sum to 100%): 
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______ Traditional auction  
______ Satellite/video auction 
______ Purchased direct from seller (ranch) 
______ Home raised from own cow-herd 
______ Custom fed, so I did not buy or own animals 
______ Other (please describe):  
 
Question 8: In the past 12 months, what percentage of the following pricing methods did 
your operation use for marketing finished cattle (should sum to 100%): 
______ Spot cash market 
______ Forward contract or marketing agreement 
______ Futures hedge 
______ Options hedge 
______ Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) Insurance 
______ Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) Insurance 
______ Other (please describe): 
Using the answers to these two questions, Tobit models can be estimated to test if a relationship 
between past purchasing of feeder animals direct from seller and past output price hedging 
exists.  Specifically, purchased direct from seller and spot cash market (no output price hedging) 
will be the main variables of interest.  The two latent variables of interest (indicated with a * 
subscript), the percent of feeder cattle purchased direct from seller (𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗) and the 
percent of finished cattle marketed on the spot cash market (𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗), can be modeled as:  
 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ = 𝛿1𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖 + 𝑿𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡,𝑖
′ 𝜷𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡,𝑖 (11) 
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 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝛿2𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝑿𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑖
′ 𝜷𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑖 (12) 
where the relationships between the latent variables and the observed variables are:  
 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖 = {
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗  
0 
 100 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ ≤ 100
𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ > 100  
 (13) 
 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖 = {
𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗  
0 
 100 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 100
𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ > 100.
 (14) 
In equations (11) and (12), 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 are the key coefficients of interest.  𝑿𝑆,𝑖
′  (where 𝑆 =
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡) is a vector of explanatory variables for each individual 𝑖 (e.g. operation size, risk 
preferences, etc.) and an intercept, 𝜷𝑆 are coefficient estimate vectors, and 𝜀𝑆,𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑆
2).  
Equations (11) and (12) are modeled individually with maximum likelihood.  The cmp command 
in Stata is used to estimate all models (Roodman, 2011). 
 Results and discussion: Past behavior 
Tobit coefficient estimates and average marginal effects for the historical purchase of 
single source feeder cattle are shown in Table 2.2.  Model 1 is the base model, including only an 
intercept and past percent of finished animals marketed on the spot market.  Model 2 adds large 
operation, risk aversion, and custom feeder dummy variables as additional controls.  The spot 
marketing coefficients and average marginal effects are statistically significant and similar in 
models 1 and 2.  The 0.09 spot market average marginal effect in model 2 means that when 
finished cattle marketed on the spot market increases by 1%, the percent of feeder cattle 
purchased directed from seller decreases by 0.09%.  Thus, those who purchase single source 
feeder animals were more likely to also use some sort of output price risk hedging instead of not 
hedging (accepting the spot cash price at time of sale).  Additionally, in model 2, larger 
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operations purchased 8.73% more of their feeder animals direct from the seller than smaller 
operations.   
A relationship is also present between purchasing feeder cattle direct from seller and 
output price risk in models 3 and 4 (Table 2.3).  The direct from seller marginal effect in model 
4, -0.17, indicates that a 1% increase in feeder animals purchased direct from seller decreases the 
number of head sold in the spot market by 0.17%.  This is the similar to the relationship found in 
models 1 and 2, however, larger in magnitude.  Additionally, larger operations and risk averse 
producers marketed about 22% less of their finished animals on the spot market only.  
These simple regressions of past behavior and average marginal effects confirm that a 
relationship exists between animal health risk (purchasing feeder animals directly from seller) 
and output price risk mitigation strategies (spot market versus hedging).  Overall, there is a 
negative relationship between single source feeder animal purchases and spot marketing.  
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between single source procurement and using some 
sort of output price risk mitigation strategy (the opposite of spot market only).  Additionally, the 
relationship is larger in magnitude when explaining output price risk mitigation by direct from 
seller feeder cattle procurement than when explaining feeder cattle procurement by past output 
price risk mitigation.  Therefore, this relationship is worth further investigating and the decision 
under consideration (feeder cattle procurement or output price hedging) is important when 
documenting the relationship.  
 Research methodology: Choice experiment  
The simple regressions of past behavior suggest a relationship between animal health and 
output price risk mitigation might exist.  However, these simple regressions do not control for 
other factors that might be considered in producers risk mitigation decisions.  For example, 
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source premium (cost of input control), basis (cost of output price control), CME price (cost of 
output price control), and the type of output price risk hedging strategy (forward contracts, 
futures hedge, spot market, etc.) were not accounted for.  In order to better understand feedlot 
operators’ decision making regarding risk and to control for other information that might enter 
into a producers’ decision making a choice experiment was conducted.  Past studies of cattle 
producers that utilized surveys, including choice experiments, were successful in finding results 
consistent with market observations (Schulz & Tonsor, 2010; Schumacher, Schroeder, & Tonsor, 
2012).  In order to assess if price risk and animal health risk mitigation strategies are viewed as 
independent and separate or jointly, a split-sample choice design was utilized as the core 
information source for this study.  
To assess individual feedlot operators’ decision making process, operators were placed in 
a realistic decision making mindset where they were making decisions and forming expectations 
around events that will happen in the future.  They were asked to make decisions as if it were 
February 15, 2017 for feeder animals being placed in March 2017 with an expected August 2017 
closeout. A seven-block design (Table 2.4) was utilized to test key hypotheses by comparing 
responses across scenarios to isolate differences of central interest, similar to Tonsor, Schroeder, 
and Lusk (2013).  The animal health, feeder cattle procurement practice of interest was known 
single source feeder steers versus feeder steers of unknown background. The live cattle output 
price risk management strategies were futures hedge, forward contract, other, or accept cash 
price at sale.  An additional difference across designs is how the expected hedge basis was 
presented.  The futures hedge basis was unambiguous (e.g. -$1.00/cwt) or ambiguous (e.g. 35% 
chance of being less than -$1.00/cwt and a 65% chance of being greater than -$1.00/cwt) (Di 
Mauro & Maffioletti, 2004).  Basis ambiguity was included to try to understand how producers 
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form their price expectations and to see how basis uncertainty might alter their risk mitigation 
decisions.  
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the seven blocks.5  Blocks fall into two 
broad categories consistent with the initial assessment of past behavior: feeder placement or 
output price hedging oriented.  Blocks 1-2 consisted of two scenarios about placing a lot of 
feeder steers, one where no output pricing information is given (question 11; Q11) and one 
where potential output pricing information is provided as an information shock (question 12; 
Q12).  Responses from Q11 and Q12 can be compared to test our core hypothesis.  See Figure 
2.1 for an example of block 2 where information about forward contracts being offered is shown 
in Q12.   
Blocks 4-7 include one scenario were the participant was asked how many of the 150 
head purchased they would place in each of the four output pricing strategies.  Blocks 4 and 5 are 
the base blocks were no information on the source of feeder cattle was given.  However, in 
blocks 6 and 7 participants were told the steers were purchased from a single source and given a 
random premium paid (information shock).  See Figure 2.2 for an example of block 7.  
Additionally, blocks 5 and 7 have ambiguous fed cattle basis for futures hedges.  By comparing 
responses across blocks we can gain an understanding of if/how producers alter decisions when 
animal health and price risks are individually versus jointly examined.  In particular, marginal 
effects across blocks 4 and 6 (non-ambiguous basis), and blocks 5 and 7 (ambiguous basis) can 
be compared.  
Hypothetical bias is a concern when collecting data using surveys.  Tonsor and Shupp 
(2011) found that including cheap talk scripts yield more reliable willingness to pay results in 
                                                 
5 Blocks 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 will be the primary focus of this study.  Block 3 is not used.  
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consumer surveys.  Therefore, before answering the choice questions participants were presented 
with these instructions, “The following two questions look similar but importantly are different.  
Please complete both questions carefully.  Research studies have found people overstate their 
willingness to pay in hypothetical situations, such as a survey.  It is important that you make 
your selection as if you were actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.” for 
blocks 1 to 2 and, “Research studies have found people overstate their willingness to participate 
in hypothetical situations, such as a survey.  It is important that you make your selection as if 
you were actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.” for blocks 4 to 7.  Lusk 
and Schroeder (2004) found that although total willingness to pay was overstated in hypothetical 
choice experiments, marginal willingness to pay was not statistically different across 
hypothetical and actual payment scenarios.  Thus, hypothetical bias concerns are mitigated since 
our core hypotheses tests depend on net differences across blocks.  
 Values of key variables n the choice design were randomly drawn for each participant 
from a range selected to match current market conditions.  The source premium shown ranged 
from $1.00 to $10.00/cwt, the CME live cattle contract price from $95.00 to $110.00/cwt 
(consistent with the market as of January 9th, 2017), all basis numbers ranged from $-5.00 to 
$5.00/cwt (consistent with historical basis numbers from Livestock Marketing Information 
Center (LMIC) (2017)), and the random percent for the ambiguous basis scenario ranged from 1 
to 99%.   
 Econometrically, systems of Tobit models are utilized because the dependent variables 
(either quantity of feeder head purchased, or quantity of head placed in each output price risk 
strategy) are continuous but censored between 0 and 150.  Using these methods, coefficient 
estimates, and, of more central interest, marginal effects can be calculated and compared across 
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designs to identify if relationships exist between animal health risk mitigation and output price 
risk mitigation. 
 Feeder cattle placement scenarios (blocks 1-2)  
For blocks 1 and 2, the two latent variables of interest (indicated with a * subscript), the 
number of head purchased when output pricing information is not shown (𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗) and the 
number of head purchased when potential output price information is shown (𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗), can be 
modeled as:  
 𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑄11,𝑖
′ 𝜷𝑄11 + 𝜀𝑄11,𝑖 (15) 
 𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑄12,𝑖
′ 𝜷𝑄11 + 𝜀𝑄12,𝑖 (16) 
where the relationships between the latent variables and the observed variables are:  
 𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = {
𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗  
0 
 150 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ ≤ 150
𝑖𝑓 𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝑄11ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ > 150  
 (17) 
 𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = {
𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗  
0 
 150 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ ≤ 150
𝑖𝑓 𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝑄12ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖
∗ > 150.
 (18) 
In equations (15) and (16), 𝑿𝑄𝑘,𝑖
′  (where 𝑘 = 11, 12) is a vector of information given in the 
question (e.g., source premium, CME price, basis) and explanatory variables for each individual 
𝑖 (e.g. operation size, risk preferences, etc.), 𝜷𝑄𝑘 are coefficient estimate vectors, and 
𝜀𝑄𝑘,𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑄𝑘
2 ).6  Equations (15) and (16) are modeled jointly with maximum likelihood.  The 
                                                 
6 Therefore, we are assuming that participants used the information given to them in the question for the source 
premium, CME price, expected basis, etc. when they answered the question and did not bring in their own expert 
information.  For example, a participant could have been given a -$3.50/cwt expected basis in the question.   
However, their historical local basis could be $1.50/cwt.  We assume that the producers used -$3.50/cwt given when 
responding.  
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error terms 𝜀𝑄11,𝑖 and 𝜀𝑄12,𝑖 are specified following a bivariate normal distribution with a zero 
mean, standard deviations 𝜎𝑄11
2  and 𝜎𝑄12
2 , and correlation 𝜌.  By estimating these equations 
jointly we can test if unobservable factors are impacting the number of head purchased in each 
question.  If 𝜌 is zero then the equations can be estimated independently (Cornick, Cox, & 
Gould, 1994).  
 Output price risk hedging scenarios (blocks 4 to 7) 
For blocks 4 to 7 the latent variables of interest are the number of head placed in each 
output price risk management strategy out of the 150 feeder steers purchased: futures hedge 
(𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗), forward contract (𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗), other (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗), and spot market at time of 
sale (𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗).  The number of head in the four output price risk management tools must sum to 
150.  A multivariate system can be modeled as:  
 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (19) 
 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃ForwardCont + 𝜀𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑖 (20) 
 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃Other + 𝜀𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟,𝑖 (21) 
 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃Spot + 𝜀𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑖 (22) 
where the relationships between the observed and latent variables are:  
 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
 = {
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗  
0 
 150 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗ ≤ 150
𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗ > 150  
 (23) 
 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
 = {
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗ 
0 
 150 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 150
𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗ > 150  
 (24) 
 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
 = {
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ 
0 
 150 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ ≤ 150
𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖
∗ > 150  
 (25) 
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 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
 = {
𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ 
0 
 150 
  
𝑖𝑓 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 150
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ < 0   
𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ > 150.
 (26) 
In equations (19), (20), (21), and (22), 𝑿𝑖
′ is a vector of information given in the scenario (e.g., 
source premium, CME price, expected basis) and explanatory variables for each individual 𝑖 (e.g. 
past output pricing behavior, etc.), 𝜷𝑚 (where 𝑚 =
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡)  are coefficient estimate vectors, and 𝜀𝑚,𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑚
2 ).  
Since the four dependent variables sum to 150, only three equations (19, 20, and22) are 
estimated jointly.  When modeled jointly, the error terms 𝜀𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒,𝑖, 𝜀ForwardCont,𝑖 and 𝜀Spot,𝑖 
are specified following a multivariate normal distribution with a zero mean, standard deviations 
𝜎𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒
2 , 𝜎ForwardCont
2  and 𝜎𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
2 , and correlation 𝜌𝑚𝑛. 
 Feedlot operators vary in their experience with alternative marketing methods as well as 
in relationships with entities who buy their finished cattle.  These factors likely not only effect 
observed selections in our survey, but are endogenous to our decisions of central interest.  
Accordingly, the system of equations above can be extended as:  
 
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾1,𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖  
+ 𝛾2,𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝐹𝑢𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒,𝑖 
(27) 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖
∗
= 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃ForwardCont + 𝛾1,ForwardCont𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖  
+ 𝛾2,ForwardCont𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑖 
(28) 
 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖
′𝛃Spot + 𝛾1,Spot𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖  + 𝛾2,spot𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑖 (29) 
 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝒁𝑖
′𝛅PastHedge + 𝜀𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (30) 
 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 = 𝒁𝑖
′𝛅𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝜀𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑖 (31) 
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where 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 and 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 are variables indicating percent of past fed cattle that 
were marketed using futures hedge and forward contracts (question 8 in the survey).  𝒁𝑖
′ is a 
vector explanatory variables, and 𝛾 and 𝛿 are parameter vectors to be estimated.   
 Results and discussion: Choice experiment  
  Summary statistics by block are shown in Table 2.1.  There were 40 responses for block 
1, 41 for block 2, 42 for block 3, 36 for block 4, 42 for block 5, 41 for block 6 and 38 for block 
7.  
 Purchasing feeder cattle (CV1 and CV2) 
Bivariate model results from block 1 (CV1) are in Table 2.5.  There are 40 respondents in 
CV1.  Recall, the difference between Q11 and Q12 is participants were presented additional 
information (an information shock) on potential output pricing information (live cattle CME 
price and expected local basis) in Q12.  The statistically significant 𝜌 indicates there is a 
relationship between Q11 and Q12 residuals in each model.  Thus, Q11 and Q12 should be 
estimated jointly.  Model A is the base model with explanatory variables only for the information 
shown.  The source premium coefficients in Q11 and Q12 are negative and statistically 
significant as expected indicating that the willingness to purchase feeder cattle decreases as the 
source premium increases.  Additionally the source premium coefficient in Q12 is smaller in 
absolute terms than in Q11, indicating that sensitivity to the source premium is smaller whenever 
output hedging information is given.   
Other alternative models with additional explanatory variables (e.g. dummy variables for 
operation size, custom feeder, if the August CME price is expected to increase, risk aversion, and 
if they have purchased single source cattle before) and interaction terms (CME * source premium 
and basis * source premium) are explored.  Based on likelihood ratio tests, the preferred model 
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for CV1 is model B, which includes additional interaction terms in Q12.  The source premium 
and CME price, and the source premium and expected basis interaction terms are statistically 
significant indicating a relationship between incoming cattle purchasing and the potential output 
price hedging information mentioned.  Interaction terms make the coefficients difficult to 
interpret, therefore, feeder cattle demand curves (using mean values for included explanatory 
variables) from model B are plotted for Q11 and Q12 in Figure 2.3.  When output pricing 
information is shown the demand for feeder cattle is more inelastic (steeper).  Thus operators are 
less sensitive to an increase in the source premium when output hedging information is given. 
Models C and D combine the CME price and basis into an expected price (expected 
price=expected basis + CME price).  Model C is the base model and model D is the preferred 
model when using expected price.  Overall, the results from models C and D are similar to 
models A and B.  
When using Tobit models, the marginal effects within the censored bounds are of main 
interest.  Average marginal effects for models A to D are shown in Table 2.6.  Focusing on 
model B, the source premium marginal effect in both Q11 and Q12 are negative.  A $1.00/cwt 
increase in the source premium decreases the number of feeder steers purchased (from a 
maximum of 150) by 13.52 head and 6.41 head in Q11 and Q12, respectively.  These marginal 
effects are statistically different from zero and from each other (𝜒2(1) = 9.33, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
0.002).  Thus, whenever the CME price and expected basis information are shown, participants 
are less sensitive to single source premiums.  The CME price and expected basis marginal effects 
are both positive with the expected basis marginal effect being statistically different than zero.  
When the expected basis increases by $1.00/cwt, head purchased increases by approximately 
five.   
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Plots of the marginal effects with 95% confidence bands for model B are shown in Figure 
2.4 to Figure 2.9.  Q11 and Q12 source premium marginal effects at different values are shown 
in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5.  In both Q11 and Q12, the marginal effect of a $1.00/cwt increase 
in the source premium decreases in absolute terms as the source premium increases, but is 
statistically different from zero.  Additionally, the Q11 source premium marginal effect is greater 
in absolute terms than the Q12 source premium marginal effects.  The decreased sensitivity to 
the source premium with the output hedging information shock aligns with the demand curve in 
Q12 being more inelastic than in Q11.   
Marginal effect plots are also needed because of continuous interaction terms.  At lower 
values of CME price ($96.00/cwt to around $99.00/cwt) the source premium marginal effect is 
not different than zero (Figure 2.6).  However, as the CME price increases, the source premium 
marginal effect increases in absolute terms.  This could suggest that at lower CME prices, 
feedlots are not purchasing single source cattle due to tighter profit margins or potentially not 
even placing cattle at all.  However at higher CME prices, and thus more appealing profit 
margins, more cattle are placed overall and a $1.00/cwt increase in the source premium has a 
larger effect on head placed.  The same general story is also evident in source premium’s 
marginal effect at different levels of expected basis (Figure 2.7).   
CME price’s marginal effect at different levels of source premium is shown in Figure 2.8.  
At lower source premiums, a $1.00/cwt increase in the CME price increases the number of head 
purchased.  However, at premiums greater than $4.00/cwt, a $1.00/cwt increase in the CME 
price does not increase the feeder steers purchased.  The expected basis marginal effect at 
different values of source premium is greater than the CME price marginal effect, but still 
exhibits a decreasing pattern (Figure 2.9).  Potentially, this difference exists because the CME 
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price is generally more variable than basis.  In other words, a $1.00/cwt change in the CME price 
is more likely to occur than a $1.00/cwt increase in the expected basis.  Overall, the marginal 
effect plots indicate a relationship between source premium and shown fed cattle futures hedging 
information. 
Model results for block 2 (CV2) are shown in Table 2.7.  There are 41 respondents in 
CV2.  Forward contract information (CME live cattle price and offered basis) is the information 
shock in Q12.  Model E is the base model with CME price and forward contract information as 
two separate variables and model G is the base model when using expected price.  Based on 
likelihood ratio tests, models F and H are preferred to models E and G, and interaction terms are 
not needed.  The statistically significant 𝜌 indicates there is a relationship between the errors of 
Q11 and Q12 in each model and thus Q11 and Q12 should be estimated jointly.  Focusing on 
model F, the source premium coefficient is negative and significant in Q11 and Q12.  
Furthermore, these two coefficients are statistically different from one another (𝜒2(1) =
5.11, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.02).  The forward contract basis coefficient is positive and significant.  The 
effect of explanatory variables are somewhat different across Q11 and Q12.  In Q11, medium 
and large feedlots purchase fewer single source steers relative to smaller feedlots.  Additionally, 
custom feeders purchase more single source steers.  In Q12, those who think the August CME 
live cattle contract price is going to increase purchased more single source feeder steers. 
The coefficient estimates from model F are used to plot single source feeder cattle 
demand curves for Q11 and Q12 (Figure 2.10).  As in CV1, the Q11 demand curve, when no 
output price hedging information is given, is more elastic, while the Q12 demand curve, when 
output price hedging information is given, is more inelastic.  Therefore, producers are less 
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sensitive to an increase in source premium when forward contracting information is given than 
when it is not.  
The average marginal effects accounting for censoring in models E, F, G, and H are 
shown in Table 2.8.  The source premium marginal effect is negative in all equations and 
models.  The source premium marginal is statistically different across Q11 and Q12 in models F 
(𝜒2 = 4.80, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.03) and H, but not models E and H.  In the preferred model, model 
F, the source premium average marginal effect is nearly 13 head in Q11, but six head in Q12 
when forward contract information is given.  This is consistent with the Q12 demand curve being 
more inelastic.  In Q12, the average marginal effect on the forward contract basis is 6.50 and 
statistically different from zero.  The CME average marginal effect is not significant.  If 
participants believe the August CME live cattle contract price will increase, they purchase almost 
35 more head than those who believe the price will decrease or stay the same.   
The average marginal effect plots for model F are shown in Figure 2.11 to Figure 2.14.  
The source premium average marginal effects plots for Q11 and Q12 are different (Figure 2.11 
and Figure 2.12).  The 95% confidence bands do not cross zero in Q11 (Figure 2.11).  
Additionally, the source premium marginal effect has a decreasing effect as source premium 
increases.  In Q12, the 95% confidence bands are wide at lower values of source premium 
(Figure 2.12).  However, the same decreasing marginal effect as in Q11 is generally exhibited.  
The CME marginal effects are not different than zero at all CME values investigated (Figure 
2.13).  On the other hand, the forward contract basis average marginal effect is different than 
zero for all basis numbers investigated (Figure 2.14).  At weaker basis levels, the average 
marginal effect of increasing basis by $1.00/cwt is smaller than at stronger basis levels.  
However, the marginal effect increases at a decreasing rate.   
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To determine if the effects of source premium, CME price, and basis are different when 
information is given on futures hedge versus forward contracts, the 95% confidence intervals for 
similar models can be compared.  For example, the source premium marginal effect confidence 
interval from model B can be compared to the source premium marginal effect confidence 
interval from model F.  When comparing the confidence intervals on source premium, CME 
price, and expected basis across CV1 and CV2, all confidence intervals overlap.  Therefore, the 
marginal effects when the information is presented as a futures hedge are the same as when the 
information is presented as a forward contract.  
 Discussion of core hypotheses  
The coefficient estimates, demand curve plots, and average marginal effects in CV1 and 
CV2 can collectively be used to discuss the relationship between incoming cattle risk and output 
price risk.  First, the significant interaction terms in models B and D suggest there is a 
relationship between single source premium and output hedging information shown.   
Economists often classify the relationship between goods as substitutes or complements.  
Generally, substitutes have a positive cross price elasticity and complements have a negative 
cross price elasticity.  In consumer literature, increasing consumption of either good decreases 
income.  However, in this case, source premium and expected basis or CME price have opposite 
impacts on the feedlot profitability.  Therefore, the traditional notions of substitutes and 
complements have to be revised in this application.   
Investigating the demand curves and average marginal effects,  there is evidence of a 
complementary relationship.  Finding that the demand curves for Q11, when no output pricing 
information is given, are more elastic than when output price hedging information (Q12) is given 
supports this conclusion.  Additionally, the marginal effects plots point to a complementary 
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relationship.  Consider the impact of an increase in the CME price and source premium on 
profitability.  An increase (decrease) in the CME price or a decrease (increase) in the source 
premium would increase (decrease) profit per head.  Given that the marginal effect of source 
premium increases in absolute terms when the CME price increases suggests a complementary 
relationship between animal health risk and output price risk management for futures hedging 
and forward contracting.  The same thought exercise can be completed for an increase in 
expected basis.  Overall, the output hedging information shocks decrease the sensitivity to an 
increase in source premium.   
In consumer choice studies, willingness to pay estimates vary depending on the number 
and mix of attributes shown (Pozo, Tonsor, & Schroeder, 2012; Gao & Schroeder, 2009).  
Therefore, we recognize that simply having more information presented in Q12 (potential output 
price hedging information) than Q11 could influence the source premium coefficients and 
marginal effects.  However, the identified relationship between source premium and output price 
hedging information is rational.  If output prices are considered strong, then more feedlots will 
be interested in placing feeder steers and then potentially consider paying a premium for single 
source steers.  By purchasing single source steers, producers reduce uncertainty on the animals’ 
performance which in turn increases the likelihood of actually receiving higher output prices.  
Conversely, if output prices are weak, then feedlots will place fewer cattle and potentially ignore 
single source cattle premiums.  The significant interaction terms in block 1 Q12 and marginal 
effect interaction plots support this conclusion.   
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 Output pricing (CV4 to CV7) 
In the output oriented blocks, blocks 4 and 5 are the base blocks where no information is 
given on feeder cattle source.  Blocks 6 and 7 include an information shock that the feeder steers 
are from a single source and give a random source premium.  
 No sourcing information given (CV4 and CV5) 
In CV4 and CV5, feedlot operators are asked which output pricing strategies they would 
implement for a lot of 150 steers purchased on February 15th for March placement.  No 
information is given on the feeder cattle source.  The difference between CV4 and CV5 is the 
way basis information was presented for futures hedging.  In CV4 a non-ambiguous basis is 
given, while an ambiguous basis is given in CV5.   
Pooled model results with a block dummy variable and interaction terms are shown in 
Table 2.9.  There are 78 usable responses when the two blocks are combined.  The CV4 block 
dummy and interactions are jointly insignificant (𝜒2(12) = 13.01, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.37).  
Therefore the ambiguous basis (versus non-ambiguous presentation) did not impact head placed 
under each output pricing strategy in blocks 4 and 5.  Looking at the 𝜌 estimates, the equations 
need to be estimated jointly, including the past behavior (𝜌3,4, 𝜌2,5, 𝜌3,5, 𝜌4,5).  This confirms 
expectations of past hedging behavior endogeneity.  In the past hedging and forward contracting 
equations, custom feeders place fewer head under futures hedges, and risk averse producers 
place more head under both futures hedging and forward contracts.   
For the main three equations, the average marginal effects for each block are of main 
interest (Table 2.10).  The margins are decomposed margins for each block.  For example, the 
margins for block 4 come only from treating those in block 4 as if they were in block 4 and those 
who were in block 5 only as if they were in block 5.  Comparing the decomposed marginal 
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effects across blocks 4 and 5, none of the average marginal effects across CV4 and CV5 are 
statistically different from each other.  For example, in the futures hedge equation, the CME 
price marginal effect confidence interval is [-3.40, 3.36] for CV4 and [-2.08, 4.57] for CV5.  
Since these two confidence intervals overlap, they are considered not statistically different.   
Many of the average marginal effects are insignificant.  A $1.00/cwt increase in forward 
contract basis increases head placed under a forward contract by 2.53 head in CV4.  For spot 
market, an increase in the CME price by $1.00/cwt decreases head sold by about two.  Past 
forward contract percentage has a significant positive impact on the head placed in forward 
contracts and a significant negative impact on head sold in the spot market.  For each 1% 
increase in cattle placed under a forward contract in the past, almost one more head is placed 
under a forward contract in CV4 and CV5, and over one head less in the spot market.   
Since feedlot operators are professionals, they are likely very familiar with current 
market conditions.  Therefore, participants could use their outside knowledge when answering 
the survey questions.  No information is given in the survey about base feeder cattle price.  Thus, 
the CME feeder cattle futures price, sourced from LMIC (2017), for the day the participant took 
the survey is added as an explanatory variable.7  Model J results including feeder cattle futures 
price are in Table 2.11.  Overall, model J results are similar to model I results.  The feeder cattle 
coefficients are significant in the futures hedge and spot market equations.  Additionally, the 
feeder cattle futures price marginal effect is significant and positive for futures hedging and spot 
market (Table 2.12).  The other decomposed average marginal effects are robust to model I.  
                                                 
7 Likelihood ratio tests were used to determine that the current CME feeder futures price was not significant in CV1 
and CV2.  
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However, the CME marginal effect is significant and positive for forward contract usage and 
negative for spot market.  Persistence of past output pricing behavior is still present.  
 Single source information given (CV6 and CV7)  
In CV6 and CV7, participants are informed that feeder steers came from a single source 
and gave the premium paid (information shock).  As with CV4 and CV5, the difference between 
CV6 and CV7 is the ambiguous expected futures hedge basis in CV7.  The pooled model results 
for CV6 and CV7 (model K) are found in Table 2.13.  There are 78 participants combined in 
these two blocks.  Unlike CV4 and CV5, the CV6 block dummy variable and interactions are 
jointly significant (𝜒2(15), 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.003).  The significant 𝜌 coefficients confirms the five 
equations need to be estimated jointly.   
Decomposed average marginal effects (treating CV6 as CV6 and CV7 as CV7) for CV6 
and CV7 are shown in Table 2.14.  Except for the forward contract basis marginal effect in the 
spot market equation, the marginal effects in CV6 and CV7 are not statistically different from 
one another. Therefore, the ambiguous versus not ambiguous basis presentation had little impact 
on marginal effects.  A $1.00/cwt increase in the forward contract basis decreases head sold in 
the spot market by three.  Past output pricing behavior has the largest impact.  A 1% increase in 
past futures hedging percent increases the head placed under a futures hedge by over one, and 
decreases spot market head by over one.  Additionally, a 1% increase in past forward contracting 
percent increases head placed under a forward contract by about one head and decreases head 
under spot market pricing by about one head.   
The source premium marginal effects can be used as a within block test of the 
relationship between animal health and output price risk mitigation.  A $1.00/cwt increase in 
source premium increases head placed in a futures hedge by 2.55 and decreases head sold in the 
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spot market by 2.69.  Therefore, there is some evidence of a relationship between animal health 
and output price risk mitigation.  However, all of the source premium marginal effects 95% 
confidence intervals overlap.   
Feeder cattle futures price on the day the participant took the survey is an additional 
explanatory variable in model L (Table 2.15).  The coefficient estimates are fairly robust across 
models K and L.  However, of the new variables, only the feeder futures and CV6 interaction in 
the futures hedge equation is statistically significant.  Decomposed marginal effects for model L 
are in Table 2.16 and are robust to average marginal effects from model K.  Of the additional 
feeder cattle futures marginal effects, the marginal effect in CV7 for the futures hedge equation 
is statistically significant and negative.  Thus, a $1.00/cwt increase in the feeder cattle futures 
price decreases the number of head placed under a futures contract by over two head.  The source 
premium marginal effect is positive and significant in CV6 futures hedge, and negative and 
significant in CV7 spot market.  
 Discussion of core hypotheses 
To test the core hypothesis that a relationship between incoming cattle risk and output 
price risk exists, the 95% confidence intervals from the decomposed average marginal effects are 
compared across the base blocks and those with the single source information shock.8  
Specifically, CV4 decomposed average marginal effects are compared to analogous CV6 
decomposed average marginal effects (both blocks have non-ambiguous basis), and CV5 to CV7 
(both blocks have ambiguous basis).  Only one difference in confidence intervals for the CME 
                                                 
8 Schenker and Gentleman (2001) found that comparison of 95% confidence intervals is more conservative than 
standard methods of significance testing when the null hypothesis is true and falsely rejects the null hypothesis more 
frequently when the null hypothesis is false. 
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price, expected hedge basis, forward contract basis, past futures hedging percent, and past 
forward contracting percent in parallel equations is found (compare model I marginal effects to 
model K marginal effects).  The marginal effects for forward contract basis in the spot market 
equation in CV5, [0.02, 6.36], and CV7, [-5.65,-1.00] are different.  Therefore, there is little 
evidence that the single source information shock changes the marginal effects of the output 
hedging information.  However, recall that the source premium marginal effect is significant in 
the futures hedge and spot market equations in models K and L.  These source premium marginal 
effects indicate that when source premium increases more cattle are placed under futures hedges 
and fewer cattle marketed on the cash market.  However, the marginal effect is only around 2.50 
head for a $1.00/cwt increase in source premium in select blocks. 
Multiple explanations for little evidence of a relationship between incoming cattle health 
risk and output pricing strategies could exist.  First of all, the hypothetical nature of the survey 
and small sample cannot be ignored.  Our findings would suggest that incoming cattle 
characteristics do not impact output hedging decision much (at least the source of cattle in our 
experiment).  Potentially, feedlot operators largely ignore incoming cattle characteristics because 
the decision is already made, likely reflecting pre-existing business relationships, and cannot be 
changed.  Thus, it is a sunk decision and not considered moving forward.  Alternatively, 
persistence of past behavior and existing relationships with fed cattle buyers was present.  There 
could be a high cost in switching output pricing or output risk management strategies.  This 
could be a reason for little evidence of animal health risk mitigation information impacting 
output hedging decisions.  In the U.S. there are approximately 734,000 operations with beef 
cows (LMIC, 2017), nearly 30,000 feedlots (just over 2,000 with 1,000+ head capacity) (USDA, 
2017a), and 650 beef packing plants, 179 of which harvest more than 1,000 head (USDA, 
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2017b).  Therefore, there are more options to buy feeder cattle than to sell these cattle once 
finished. This would support our finding of a relationship between incoming cattle and output 
pricing risk in the feeder cattle purchasing equations but a minimal relationship in the output 
pricing questions. 
 Conclusion and implications 
To the best of our knowledge, this was the first study seeking to understand feedlot 
operators’ decision making regarding both animal health and output price risk management.  The 
objective was to determine if feedlot operators view/manage these two risks jointly or 
independently.  The animal health practice of interest was single source steers while the output 
price risk hedging strategies were futures contacts, forward contracts, other, and accept cash 
price at time of sale.  An online survey was utilized to collected primary data from feedlot 
operators about their use of risk management tools, operation characteristics, views on risk 
mitigation, and demographic characteristics. A split-sample choice experiment was core to our 
analysis, placing feedlot operators in a forward-looking mindset to better understand their risk 
management decision making.  Blocks 1 to 2 asked operators feeder steer procurement oriented 
questions.  Blocks 4 to 7 were output pricing oriented scenarios.  
Simple Tobit models of past feeder cattle procurement and output hedging identified a 
negative relationship between past purchases of feeder animals from a single source and use of 
spot markets.  Therefore, a positive relationship is implied between animal health risk and output 
price risk mitigation.  The split-sample choice experiment allows for a deeper understanding of 
this relationship.  
 Using blocks 1 and 2 evidence of a complementary relationship between willingness to 
pay a source premium and output pricing information was found.  Willingness to purchase single 
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source cattle was more inelastic when output pricing information was shown, for both futures 
hedging and forward contracts.  Additionally, interaction terms between source premium and 
output pricing information were significant in block 1.  The average marginal effect plots 
indicate a higher sensitivity to increases in source premium at higher output prices.  Additionally, 
the CME and basis marginal effects were more sensitive at lower values of source premium.  
Given that the source premium marginal effect increases in absolute terms when the CME price 
or expected basis increases suggests a complementary relationship between animal health risk 
and shown output price risk information.  This complementary relationship could be one reason 
why producers do not hedge output price risk as much as academics think they should.  
Potentially, if more single source cattle were available, or offered at a lower premium, producers 
would increase their use of output price hedging.  Potentially, since there is less uncertainty in 
single source feeder steers performance in the feedlot (e.g., finish weight, death loss, etc.), 
producers can more confidently match their production to futures and forward contract 
specifications.  
 Little evidence of a relationship was found between information on feeder cattle source 
and output pricing risk mitigation strategies in blocks 4 to 7.  Most of the average marginal 
effects for the hedging variables were the same across blocks that did and did not include single 
source information.  However, some of the source premium marginal effects were significant in 
blocks that included single source information.  A $1.00/cwt increase in source premium 
increased head placed under a futures hedge by about 2 head, and decreased head placed in the 
spot market by about 2 head. Potentially, these findings suggests that feedlot operators view the 
feeder cattle purchase as a “sunk decision” when deciding how to manage output price risk.  
Therefore, producers only consider another risk mitigation strategy when that decision is still 
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applicable.  Additionally, there was strong evidence of persistent behavior in output price 
hedging.  This could be the result of existing relationships with cattle buyers and the relatively 
limited number of outlets to sell finished cattle.  Potentially this persistence also stems for 
unfamiliarity with other output pricing strategies and high switching cost.  The small relationship 
between single source information and output pricing strategies could also be a function of the 
hedging strategies considered.  In the hedging options, no distinction was made regarding cattle 
quality.  Conceivably, single source cattle might grade better at harvest and receive quality 
premiums (for those using grid pricing), however, this was not accounted for in our hedging 
scenarios.   
 Moving forward, there are multiple potential extensions of this study.  Other animal 
health practices such as weaning and preconditioning certifications could be investigated instead 
of single source premium.  Furthermore, other members of the beef marketing chain, like cow-
calf producers, could approach mitigation of multiple risks differently than feedlot operators.  
Additionally, the concept of tradeoffs between input and output types of risk mitigation can be 
extended to any livestock species and non-livestock crops.  
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Figure 2.1 Block 2 example 
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Figure 2.2 Block 7 example 
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Figure 2.3 Single source feeder cattle demand curves for model B 
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Figure 2.4 CV1 Q11 (Model B) source premium marginal effect 
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Figure 2.5 CV1 Q12 (Model B) source premium marginal effect 
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Figure 2.6 CV1 Q12 (Model B) source premium marginal effect at different values of CME 
price  
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Figure 2.7 CV1 Q12 (Model B) source premium marginal effect at different values of expected 
basis 
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Figure 2.8 CV1 Q12 (Model B) CME price marginal effect at different values of source 
premium   
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Figure 2.9 CV1 Q12 (Model B) expected basis price marginal effect at different values of source 
premium 
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Figure 2.10 Single source feeder cattle demand curves from model F 
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Figure 2.11 CV2 Q11 (Model F) source premium marginal effect 
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Figure 2.12 CV2 Q12 (Model F) source premium marginal effect 
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Figure 2.13 CV2 Q12 (Model F) CME price marginal effect 
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Figure 2.14  CV2 Q12 (Model F) expected basis marginal effect 
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
 
 
  
Full sample V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7
Number of observations 281 40 41 42 36 42 41 38
Age (years) 49.16 51.60 49.17 46.31 49.58 49.59 50.83 46.75
Bachelor's degree 49.47% 40.00% 60.98% 45.24% 44.44% 42.86% 56.10% 57.89%
TX 10.32% 12.50% 14.63% 7.14% 8.33% 11.90% 12.20% 5.26%
NE 18.86% 22.50% 17.07% 19.05% 22.22% 14.29% 21.95% 15.79%
IA 49.47% 47.50% 51.22% 40.48% 44.44% 61.90% 46.34% 55.26%
CO 5.34% 5.00% 7.32% 4.76% 5.56% 2.38% 4.88% 7.89%
KS 6.41% 2.50% 4.88% 11.90% 11.11% 0.00% 9.76% 5.26%
Cattle sold- medium 18.51% 10.00% 29.27% 16.67% 19.44% 14.29% 14.63% 26.32%
Cattle sold- large 15.66% 15.00% 14.63% 21.43% 16.67% 14.29% 14.63% 13.16%
Custom feeders 21.35% 12.50% 19.51% 26.19% 22.22% 23.81% 17.07% 26.32%
August contract increase 28.83% 35.00% 34.15% 23.81% 25.00% 23.81% 34.15% 26.32%
Purchased single source 
before 56.58% 52.50% 56.10% 57.14% 61.11% 69.05% 51.22% 50.00%
Risk averse 64.77% 70.00% 63.41% 66.67% 63.89% 66.67% 63.41% 60.53%
Past futures hedge 
percent 18.50% 19.00% 20.98% 17.41% 15.83% 17.62% 20.20% 18.68%
Past forward contract 
percent 17.78% 14.23% 21.76% 24.86% 17.50% 14.88% 14.08% 15.92%
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Table 2.2 Historical direct from seller coefficient estimates and average marginal effects 
(N=278) 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors in (). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
  
Model 1 
coefficient
Model 1 
average 
marginal 
effects
Model 2 
coefficient 
estimates
Model 2 
average 
marginal 
effects
Spot marketing percent -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.14** -0.09**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Cattle-sold large 14.20*** 8.73***
(5.36) (3.22)
Risk averse -4.02 -2.47
(4.61) (2.83)
Custom feeder -5.88 -3.61
(5.50) (3.37)
Intercept 20.86*** 21.37***
(3.78) (5.86)
Sigma 34.64*** 34.30***
(2.05) (2.05)
SBC 1955.37 1964.70
Log- likelihood -969.24 -965.47
Predicted correlation 0.15 0.18
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Table 2.3 Historical spot marketing of finished cattle coefficient estimates and average marginal 
effects (N=278) 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors in (). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Model 3 
coefficient 
estimates
Model 3 
average 
marginal 
effects
Model 4 
coefficient 
estimates
Model 4 
average 
marginal 
effects
Direct seller percent -0.29** -0.21** -0.23** -0.17**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
Cattle-sold large -31.39*** -22.69***
(7.10) (4.97)
Risk averse -30.80*** -22.26***
(4.90) (3.30)
Custom feeder 3.46 2.50
(6.68) (4.82)
Intercept 57.67*** 77.75***
(3.64) (4.07)
Sigma 45.20*** 40.96***
(1.73) (1.85)
SBC 2554.13 2522.27
Log- likelihood -1268.62 -1244.25
Predicted correlation 0.15 0.44
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Table 2.4. Split-sample design 
 
 
  
Block 4 5 6 7
Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12
Placement oriented X X X X X X
Output pricing oriented X X X X
Single source premium X X X X X X X X
Output pricing options shown 
CME price X X X X X X X
Expected local basis X X X
Ambiguous local basis X X X X X
Forward contract basis X X X
1 2 3
58 
Table 2.5 CV1 model coefficient estimates 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors in (). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Model 
Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12
Source premium -33.00*** -25.58*** -36.22*** 224.52* -32.57*** -27.00*** -34.52*** 232.45*
(7.89) (6.08) (7.42) (123.28) (8.30) (6.27) (7.69) (127.87)
CME price -0.47 16.05**
(3.10) (8.00)
Expected hedge basis 13.97*** 31.18***
(4.56) (9.59)
Source premium * CME price -2.38**
(1.19)
Source premium * Expected hedge basis -2.60*
(1.55)
Expected price- hedge 4.91** 21.75**
(2.43) (8.88)
Source premium * Expected price-hedge -2.48**
(1.22)
Intercept 206.30*** 179.18 223.10*** -1545.77* 203.94*** -378.57 214.08*** -2134.64**
(35.81) (317.71) (32.81) (834.54) (37.65) (255.71) (34.29) (940.84)
Sigma 122.87*** 108.32*** 125.76*** 96.8*** 121.85*** 120.89*** 123.19*** 111.88***
(18.43) (16.96) (19.21) (15.90) (18.13) (18.78) (18.27) (18.86)
Rho 
N
SBC/BIC
Pseudo-loglikelihood 
40
515.36
-241.08
0.72***
(0.12)
0.74***
(0.11)
40
C D
-240.07
40
515.78
-237.60
B
0.75***
(0.08)
0.78***
(0.08)
A
40
513.33 515.04
-242.76
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Table 2.6 CV1 average marginal effects 
 
Table notes: Standard errors are reported in ().  95% confidence intervals reported in [].  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Yes in statistically different line 
means that the source premium marginal effect in Q11 is statistically different than the source premium marginal effect in Q12 at the .10 level.   
 
Model 
Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12
Source premium -12.75*** -7.77*** -13.52*** -6.41*** -12.68*** -7.83*** -13.19*** -6.71***
(2.19) (1.49) (1.88) (1.44) (2.34) (1.52) (2.05) (1.58)
[-17.04, -8.46] [-10.68, -4.85] [-17.21, -9.83] [-9.24, -3.59] [-17.26, -8.10] [-10.81, -4.84] [-17.20, -9.18] [-9.80, -3.62]
Statistically different
CME price -0.14 0.88
(0.94) (0.94)
[-1.99, 1.70] [-0.95, 2.72]
Expected hedge basis 4.24*** 5.11***
(1.35) (1.11)
[1.59, 6.89] [2.94, 7.28]
Expected price- hedge 1.42** 2.51***
(0.69) (0.72)
[0.06, 2.78] [1.11, 3.91]
Yes Yes Yes Yes
A B C D
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Table 2.7 CV2 model coefficient estimates 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors in (). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Model 
Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12
Source premium -25.10*** -14.12 -35.06*** -14.86* -24.42*** -15.27* -34.93*** -14.65*
(6.84) (9.69) (6.34) (7.64) (7.34) (9.22) (7.21) (7.89)
CME price -3.09 -5.38
(4.86) (4.55)
Forward contract basis 12.63** 16.01***
(5.61) (4.93)
Expected price-forward contract 3.85 4.64
(3.30) (3.45)
Cattle sold- medium -126.36*** 41.01 -133.87*** 26.97
(35.93) (45.73) (40.68) (41.27)
Cattle sold- large -134.91** -32.16 -133.34** -14.54
(53.33) (48.04) (55.15) (52.29)
Custom feeders 161.27*** 32.91 164.79*** 46.52
(34.57) (43.49) (37.00) (41.47)
August contract increase -18.22 84.00** -21.10 62.44*
(31.75) (37.19) (31.28) (35.91)
Risk adverse 10.18 21.31 16.52 9.81
(29.63) (35.46) (29.67) (37.36)
Purchased single source before -14.33 33.93 -15.90 35.77
(33.86) (39.05) (32.41) (40.46)
Intercept 151.78*** 406.24 237.10*** 567.27 149.70*** -310.87 237.29*** -460.68
(31.54) (500.28) (42.73) (471.38) (33.76) (341.77) (43.03) (365.10)
Sigma 111.82*** 108.84*** 93.41*** 103.47*** 109.72*** 110.95*** 89.65*** 103.42***
(16.91) (15.03) (17.17) (16.03) (15.94) (14.61) (16.34) (14.43)
Rho 
N
SBC/BIC
Pseudo-log likelihood 
(0.18)
41
625.26
-275.50
0.41**
(0.17)
41
605.50
-287.89
(0.17)
41
605.34
-285.96 -271.23
(0.12)
41
620.45
G HE F
0.52*** 0.61***0.76***
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Table 2.8 CV2 average marginal effects 
 
Table notes: Standard errors are reported in ().  95% confidence intervals reported in [].  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Model 
Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12 Q11 Q12
Source premium -9.65*** -6.12 -12.80*** -6.04** -9.59*** -6.79* -13.03*** -6.45*
(1.73) (3.85) (1.33) (2.90) (1.93) (3.72) (1.49) (3.31)
[-13.03, -6.27] [-13.67, 1.43] [-15.41, -10.19] [-11.73, -0.34] [-13.36, -5.81] [-14.08, 0.50] [-15.94, -10.11] [-12.94, 0.04]
Statistically different
CME price -1.34 -2.19
(2.09) (1.78)
[-5.43, 2.75] [-5.68, 1.30]
Forward contract basis 5.47** 6.50***
(2.15) (1.73)
[1.26, 9.68] [3.11, 9.90]
Expected price-forward contract 1.71 2.04
(1.42) (1.47)
[-1.08, 4.51] [-0.84, 4.93]
Cattle sold- medium -39.19*** 16.93 -41.46*** 12.09
(10.08) (19.19) (10.24) (18.83)
[-58.95, -19.42] [-20.67, 54.54] [-61.52, -21.39] [-24.81, 48.98]
Cattle sold- large -40.94*** -12.63 -41.38*** -6.30
(11.88) (18.10) (12.11) (22.21)
[-64.22, -17.65] [-48.11, 22.85] [-65.11, -17.64] [-49.83, 37.24]
Custom feeders 59.93*** 13.86 61.94*** 21.54
(12.69) (18.90) (12.36) (19.57)
[35.06, 84.80] [-23.17, 50.90] [37.72, 86.17] [-16.83, 59.90]
August contract increase -6.54 34.81** -7.71 28.55*
(11.41) (14.65) (11.42) (16.31)
[-28.90, 15.82] [6.09, 63.52] [-30.08, 14.67] [-3.41, 60.52]
Risk averse 3.69 8.65 6.09 4.32
(10.80) (14.43) (10.93) (16.54)
[-17.46, 24.85] [-19.62, 36.93] [-15.33, 27.51] [-28.09, 36.73]
Purchased single source before -5.25 13.74 -5.95 15.55
(12.45) (15.65) (12.20) (17.32)
[-29.65, 19.15] [-16.93, 44.42] [-29.87, 17.97] [-18.40, 49.49]
E F G H
No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.9 Model I coefficient estimates 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors are reported in ().  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
  
Futures 
Hedge
Forward 
Contract Spot
Past hedging 
percent 
Past forward 
contract percent 
CME price 2.96 -1.22 -1.51
(4.02) (5.51) (2.91)
CME price * CV4 -3.02 11.07 -4.40
(6.01) (8.12) (4.15)
Expected hedge basis 2.54 -6.84 1.22
(5.88) (7.96) (4.01)
Expected hedge basis * CV4 -0.12 16.72 2.55
(8.47) (11.39) (5.18)
Forward contract basis -3.62 -0.75 8.57**
(5.21) (6.79) (4.28)
Forward contract basis * CV4 6.51 11.92 -4.17
(7.82) (8.86) (5.79)
Past futures hedging percent 1.26 0.37 -2.05
(1.66) (3.08) (1.69)
Past forward contract percent 0.57 3.79* -3.60***
(1.38) (2.27) (0.99)
CV4 297.10 461.41 461.41
(612.38) (424.90) (424.90)
Cattle sold- large 4.07 10.17
(12.97) (10.35)
Risk averse 11.07* 17.66***
(5.74) (5.40)
Custom feeder -16.89*** 12.70
(4.55) (8.91)
Intercept -329.20 -3.02 267.47 11.69*** 1.08
(406.53) (556.82) (291.52) (3.64) (3.25)
Sigma 94.27*** 143.45*** 109.13*** 24.93*** 28.5***
(10.95) (38.96) (23.11) (2.78) (3.02)
Rho m2 Rho m3 Rho m4 Rho m5
Rho 1n -0.56** -0.04 0.14 -0.06
(0.25) (0.35) (0.54) (0.51)
Rho 2n -0.67*** 0.00 -0.66*
(0.18) (0.66) (0.37)
Rho 3n 0.06 0.77***
(0.46) (0.20)
Rho 4n -0.31***
(0.07)
Rho 5n
N 78
SBC/BIC 2950.75
Pseudo-loglikelihood -1359.92
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Table 2.10 Model I decomposed average marginal effects 
 
Table notes: Standard errors are reported in ().  95% confidence intervals reported in [].  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
  
Spot
CV4 CV5 CV4 CV5 CV4 CV5
CME price -0.02 1.24 2.23 -0.25 -2.22** -0.56
(1.72) (1.70) (1.39) (1.12) (1.02) (1.09)
[-3.40, 3.36] [-2.08, 4.57] [-0.49, 4.95] [-2.44, 1.94] [-4.22, -0.21] [-2.70, 1.58]
Expected hedge basis 0.97 1.07 2.24 -1.40 1.41 0.46
(2.54) (2.47) (1.70) (1.75) (1.36) (1.49)
[-4.00, 5.94] [-3.78, 5.92] [-1.11, 5.58] [-4.83, 2.02] [-1.24, 4.07] [-2.46, 3.37]
Forward contract basis 1.16 -1.52 2.53* -0.16 1.65 3.19**
(2.27) (2.23) (1.47) (1.40) (1.52) (1.62)
[-3.30, 5.61] [-5.89, 2.85] [-0.36, 5.41] [-2.91, 2.60] [-1.34, 4.63] [0.02, 6.36]
Past futures hedging percent 0.50 0.53 0.08 0.08 -0.77 -0.76
(0.62) (0.64) (0.71) (0.65) (0.52) (0.57)
[-0.71, 1.72] [-0.72, 1.78] [-1.30, 1.47] [-1.20, 1.35] [-1.79, 0.26] [-1.88, 0.35]
Past forward contract percent 0.23 0.24 0.86** 0.78*** -1.35*** -1.34***
(0.57) (0.60) (0.35) (0.26) (0.44) (0.37)
[-0.89, 1.35] [-0.94, 1.42] [0.16, 1.55] [0.27, 1.28] [-2.21, -0.49] [-2.06, -0.62]
Futures Hedge Forward Contract
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Table 2.11 Model J coefficient estimates 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors are reported in ().  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
Futures 
Hedge
Forward 
Contract Spot
Past hedging 
percent 
Past forward 
contract percent 
Feeder futures 9.45* -4.54 8.81*
(5.20) (7.51) (4.69)
Feeder futures * CV4 -0.21 -2.37 -11.44*
(7.84) (9.56) (5.92)
CME price 3.14 -1.64 -0.81
(3.95) (5.32) (3.01)
CME price * CV4 -3.97 11.82 -4.37
(5.74) (8.03) (4.24)
Expected hedge basis 3.54 -7.69 3.25
(5.73) (7.76) (4.06)
Expected hedge basis * CV4 -0.55 17.04 0.12
(8.09) (11.60) (5.14)
Forward contract basis -4.71 -0.87 8.74**
(4.97) (6.71) (4.24)
Forward contract basis * CV4 10.20 10.36 -5.41
(7.72) (9.14) (6.02)
Past futures hedging percent 1.43 0.59 -1.77
(1.92) (3.18) (1.77)
Past forward contract percent 0.26 3.91* -3.91***
(1.58) (2.36) (1.06)
CV4 418.29 -895.27 1918.61**
(1174.51) (1468.34) (843.65)
Cattle sold- large 3.04 10.44
(13.42) (9.98)
Risk averse 11.42* 17.54***
(5.86) (5.35)
Custom feeder -16.73*** 12.78
(4.96) (8.78)
Intercept -1548.66* 614.07 -928.34 11.59*** 1.10
(838.00) (1081.62) (704.84) (3.69) (3.23)
Sigma 90.03*** 144.33*** 112.41*** 24.93*** 28.49***
(9.48) (40.15) (26.79) (2.78) (3.02)
Rho m2 Rho m3 Rho m4 Rho m5
Rho 1n -0.62** 0.01 0.06 0.06
(0.27) (0.46) (0.67) (0.63)
Rho 2n -0.68*** -0.03 -0.66*
(0.22) -0.66* (0.38)
Rho 3n -0.04 0.83***
(0.46) (0.16)
Rho 4n -0.31***
(0.07)
Rho 5n
N 78
SBC/BIC 2967.00
Pseudo-loglikelihood -1354.98
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Table 2.12 Model J decomposed average marginal effects 
 
Table notes: Standard errors are reported in ().  95% confidence intervals reported in [].  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
  
CV4 CV5 CV4 CV5 CV4 CV5
Feeder futures 3.71 3.95* -1.55 -0.93 -0.99 3.27*
(2.37) (2.14) (1.33) (1.56) (1.48) (1.76)
[-0.93, 8.34] [-0.25, 8.15] [-4.16, 1.06] [-3.98, 2.13] [-3.88, 1.91] [-0.17, 6.71]
CME price -0.33 1.31 2.28* -0.34 -1.94* -0.30
(1.62) (1.67) (1.35) (1.08) (1.01) (1.12)
[-3.52, 2.85] [-1.96, 4.58] [-0.37, 4.92] [-2.44, 1.77] [-3.92, 0.04] [-2.49, 1.89]
Expected hedge basis 1.20 1.48 2.09 -1.57 1.26 1.21
(2.34) (2.41) (1.73) (1.75) (1.30) (1.48)
[-3.38, 5.78] [-3.24, 6.20] [-1.31, 5.49] [-5.00, 1.86] [-1.29, 3.81] [-1.70, 4.11]
Forward contract basis 2.20 -1.97 2.13 -0.18 1.25 3.24**
(2.31) (2.16) (1.51) (1.38) (1.67) (1.59)
[-2.33, 6.74] [-6.20, 2.27] [-0.84, 5.09] [-2.88, 2.52] [-2.02, 4.51] [0.13, 6.35]
Past futures hedging percent 0.58 0.60 0.13 0.12 -0.66 -0.66
(0.68) (0.69) (0.72) (0.68) (0.57) (0.61)
[-0.76, 1.91] [-0.75, 1.95] [-1.29, 1.55] [-1.22, 1.46] [-1.79, 0.46] [-1.85, 0.54]
Past forward contract percent 0.10 0.11 0.88** 0.80*** -1.46*** -1.45***
(0.65) (0.68) (0.37) (0.26) (0.46) (0.39)
[-1.17, 1.37] [-1.22, 1.43] [0.28, 1.32] [0.15, 1.60] [-2.37, -0.56] [-2.22, -0.68]
Futures Hedge Forward Contract Spot
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Table 2.13 Model K coefficient estimates 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors are reported in ().  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
Futures 
Hedge
Forward 
Contract Spot
Past hedging 
percent 
Past forward 
contract percent 
Source premium 2.73 5.51 -8.17**
(8.03) (8.60) (3.94)
Source premium *CV6 7.77 -21.98 4.14
(10.12) (16.44) (5.62)
CME price -2.28 10.91*** 3.24
(3.69) (3.92) (2.20)
CME price * CV6 3.64 -13.67** -4.67
(4.75) (6.01) (2.87)
Expected hedge basis 11.23* -0.00 2.52
(6.17) (6.52) (3.44)
Expected hedge basis * CV6 -2.07 -31.51** 0.08
(8.93) (12.85) (5.00)
Forward contract basis 11.09 7.40 -10.10***
(7.87) (7.27) (3.53)
Forward contract basis * CV6 -22.50** 3.70 11.61**
(10.07) (11.81) (5.56)
Past futures hedging percent 4.88* -0.68 -4.08***
(2.51) (3.70) (1.50)
Past forward contract percent -0.85 4.36 -3.26
(3.45) (6.53) (2.54)
CV6 -417.46 1444.65** 494.53*
(500.92) (632.04) (296.38)
Cattle sold- large 16.02* 14.26
(8.43) (15.56)
Risk averse 16.87*** 4.83
(6.43) (9.18)
Custom feeder -6.99 9.08
(5.55) (8.65)
Intercept 150.33 -1286.97*** -132.84 5.83** 13.47***
(376.41) (451.47) (233.02) (2.60) (4.61)
Sigma 138.17 132.77 111.48*** 23.46*** 31.71***
(85.51) (171.49) (37.85) (2.79) (2.98)
Rho m2 Rho m3 Rho m4 Rho m5
Rho 1n -0.36 -0.38 -0.76*** 0.41
(1.02) (0.70) (0.22) (0.69)
Rho 2n -0.59 0.25 -0.73
(0.45) -0.73 (0.84)
Rho 3n 0.41 0.55
(0.66) (0.67)
Rho 4n -0.36***
(0.06)
Rho 5n
N 78
SBC/BIC 2939.14
Pseudo-loglikelihood -1341.05
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Table 2.14 Model K decomposed average marginal effects 
 
Table notes: Standard errors are reported in ().  95% confidence intervals reported in [].  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
  
Spot
CV6 CV7 CV6 CV7 CV6 CV7
Source Premium 2.55* 0.69 -2.41 0.92 -1.35 -2.69**
(1.38) (2.00) (1.78) (1.83) (1.51) (1.31)
[-0.15, 5.25] [-3.23, 4.61] [-5.90, 1.08] [-2.68, 4.51] [-4.30, 1.60] [-5.25, -0.13]
CME price 0.33 -0.58 -0.40 1.82 -0.48 1.07
(0.80) (0.99) (0.71) (2.63) (0.73) (0.74)
[-1.23, 1.90] [-2.52, 1.37] [-1.79, 0.98] [-3.33, 6.97] [-1.90, 0.95] [-0.39, 2.52]
Expected hedge basis 2.22 2.84 -4.61 -0.00 0.87 0.83
(1.58) (1.75) (3.57) (1.09) (1.24) (1.15)
[-0.88, 5.33] [-0.59, 6.27] [-11.60, 2.39] [-2.13, 2.13] [-1.56, 3.30] [-1.43, 3.09]
Forward contract basis -2.77 2.80 1.62 1.23 0.50 -3.33***
(1.81) (2.34) (1.41) (2.23) (1.61) (1.19)
[-6.31, 0.77] [-1.77, 7.38] [-1.15, 4.39] [-3.14, 5.60] [-2.64, 3.65] [-5.65, -1.00]
Past futures hedging percent 1.18*** 1.23*** -0.10 -0.11 -1.36** -1.34**
(0.34) (0.30) (0.47) (0.49) (0.68) (0.55)
[0.52, 1.85] [0.65, 1.82] [-1.03, 0.83] [-1.07, 0.84] [-2.70, -0.03] [-2.42, -0.27]
Past forward contract percent -0.21 -0.21 0.64 0.73*** -1.09* -1.07
(0.79) (0.82) (0.44) (0.11) (0.61) (0.72)
[-1.75, 1.34] [-1.81, 1.38] [-0.22, 1.50] [0.51, 0.94] [-2.29, 0.11] [-2.48, 0.33]
Futures Hedge Forward Contract
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Table 2.15 Model L coefficient estimates 
 
Table notes: Robust standard errors are reported in ().  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Futures 
Hedge
Forward 
Contract Spot
Past hedging 
percent 
Past forward 
contract percent 
Feeder futures -10.47 -5.80 7.54
(6.48) (8.63) (4.79)
Feeder futures * CV6 17.04** 1.40 -5.99
(7.90) (10.59) (5.88)
Source premium -1.13 4.16 -8.22**
(7.95) (7.85) (3.64)
Source premium *CV6 11.67 -19.08 3.81
(9.94) (15.15) (5.41)
CME price -2.82 11.33*** 3.34
(3.57) (4.02) (2.25)
CME price * CV6 3.89 -13.76** -4.83
(4.62) (5.91) (2.96)
Expected hedge basis 9.89* -0.49 4.05
(5.81) (6.63) (3.42)
Expected hedge basis * CV6 -1.39 -30.06** -1.65
(8.87) (13.55) (4.94)
Forward contract basis 12.95 6.88 -10.60***
(8.32) (7.21) (3.64)
Forward contract basis * CV6 -24.48** 2.84 12.35**
(10.26) (11.47) (5.64)
Past futures hedging percent 5.22 -0.60 -4.24***
(3.50) (3.10) (1.56)
Past forward contract percent -1.96 3.94 -3.10
(5.16) (5.17) (2.69)
CV6 -2632.32** 1261.65 1277.65
(1060.11) (1411.89) (779.64)
Cattle sold- large 17.45** 14.69
(7.24) (13.36)
Risk averse 15.84*** 4.98
(5.99) (8.26)
Custom feeder -7.96 8.70
(6.11) (8.75)
Intercept 1577.01* -576.37 -1105.62* 6.35** 13.41***
(953.99) (1239.84) (663.22) (2.61) (4.56)
Sigma 163.43 121.14 109.45*** 23.51*** 31.7***
(157.93) (125.71) (34.34) (2.87) (2.95)
Rho m2 Rho m3 Rho m4 Rho m5
Rho 1n -0.44 -0.28 -0.79*** 0.60
(1.09) (0.77) (0.14) (0.62)
Rho 2n -0.55 0.21 -0.68
(0.55) -0.68 (0.84)
Rho 3n 0.47 0.49
(0.70) (0.77)
Rho 4n -0.36***
(0.06)
Rho 5n
N 78
SBC/BIC 2957.95
Pseudo-loglikelihood -1337.38
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Table 2.16 Model L decomposed average marginal effects 
 
Table notes: Standard errors are reported in ().  95% confidence intervals reported in [].  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
  
CV6 CV7 CV6 CV7 CV6 CV7
Feeder futures 1.47 -2.32* -0.66 -1.05 0.53 2.48
(1.19) (1.34) (0.85) (2.54) (1.10) (1.56)
[-0.86, 3.80] [-4.95, 0.31] [-2.32, 1.00] [-6.02, 3.92] [-1.63, 2.68] [-0.58, 5.53]
Soure premium 2.36* -0.25 -2.24 0.75 -1.49 -2.70**
(1.30) (1.78) (1.66) (1.56) (1.53) (1.24)
[-0.19, 4.90] [-3.74, 3.24] [-5.50, 1.01] [-2.31, 3.82] [-4.49, 1.51] [-5.13, -0.27]
CME price 0.24 -0.63 -0.37 2.05 -0.50 1.10
(0.72) (0.83) (0.71) (2.55) (0.76) (0.76)
[-1.18, 1.65] [-2.25, 1.00] [-1.76, 1.02] [-2.95, 7.05] [-2.00, 1.00] [-0.39, 2.59]
Expected hedge basis 1.90 2.19 -4.59 -0.09 0.81 1.33
(1.35) (1.47) (2.99) (1.19) (1.24) (1.15)
[-0.75, 4.55] [-0.68, 5.06] [-10.45, 1.27] [-2.43, 2.25] [-1.62, 3.25] [-0.92, 3.58]
Forward contract basis -2.58 2.87 1.46 1.25 0.59 -3.48***
(1.66) (2.14) (1.30) (2.08) (1.61) (1.24)
[-5.83, 0.67] [-1.34, 7.07] [-1.09, 4.01] [-2.84, 5.33] [-2.57, 3.75] [-5.92, -1.04]
Past futures hedging percent 1.17** 1.16*** -0.09 -0.11 -1.43* -1.39**
(0.48) (0.40) (0.42) (0.46) (0.74) (0.62)
[0.24, 2.10] [0.38, 1.93] [-1.01, 0.80] [-0.91, 0.73] [-2.89, 0.02] [-2.60, -0.19]
Past forward contract percent -0.44 -0.43 0.59 0.71*** -1.05 -1.02
(1.05) (1.01) (0.38) (0.12) (0.67) (0.74)
[-2.49, 1.61] [-2.41, 1.54] [-0.16, 1.34] [0.48, 0.94] [-2.36, 0.26] [-2.46, 0.43]
Futures Hedge Forward Contract Spot
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Chapter 3 - Testing Ricardian rent theory in the U.S. beef 
industry across time 
The U.S. cattle markets are characterized by extreme highs and lows.  Recently, record 
high prices throughout the beef industry began in 2014 lasting through mid-2015 before quickly 
moving downward.  This resulted in mixed short-run profitability outcomes between cow-calf 
and feedlot operations in 2015.  Some economists estimate losses to feedlots of around 
$500/head while cow-calf producers experienced historically high margins (Tonsor, 2016).  
Beyond immediate profitability implications, understanding how information from primary 
consumer demand is transmitted through price, throughout the supply chain is key for longer-
term prosperity of the industry (Marsh, 2003; chapter 4).  Furthermore, understanding these price 
transmissions from one part of the beef industry to another are key for long-term investment 
decisions.  How do investments in generic advertising or prevention of food safety recalls geared 
towards enhancing retail beef demand impact cow-calf producers and feedlot operators?  Is one 
group affected differently than another?  How do changes in feed prices impact cattle prices?  
Ricardian rent theory can be used to understand these price transmissions.   
According to Ricardian rent theory, rents are bid up so the holder of the scarcest resource 
extracts the surplus (Ricardo, 1821).  In Ricardo’s application to land, land is in fixed supply 
(perfectly inelastic) and necessary for crop production, while farmers are plentiful.  When corn 
price increases, farmers can benefit by harvesting more crops.  However, to do this with fixed 
technology, farmers need more land.  Thus, competitive farmers bid up land rental rates until the 
level of zero economic profit.  Consequently, the benefits of crop price increases pass from the 
farmer to the land owner through higher rental rates. Additionally, although not called Ricardian 
rent theory, the economic incidence of government subsidies between landowners and farmers 
74 
has been studied using a one output and two input framework (Floyd, 1965; Alston & James, 
2002).  In order for rents to fully accrue back to the landowner (or holder of the scarce resource), 
strict conditions must be met including a perfectly inelastic supply of the scare resource, and 
perfectly elastic supply of additional inputs or fixed proportions technology.   
Studies such as Kirwan (2009), Kirwan and Roberts (2016), and Du, Hennessey, and 
Edward (2008) have empirically tested Ricardian rent theory in farmland rental rates or 
incidence of agricultural subsidies.  Generally, less than 100% pass-through has been found.  
Although originally applied to land rental rates, the core notions of Ricardian rent theory and 
adjustments in valuations of the scarcest resource can be used to examine how price changes are 
transmitted through beef industry sectors.  
The main objective of this study is to determine if Ricardian rent theory holds in the beef 
industry by examining the pass-through rates from fed cattle price to feeder cattle price, and from 
corn price to feeder cattle price.  Given the conditions needed for Ricardian rent theory to hold, 
there are potential reasons why Ricardian rent theory may hold in the beef industry and 
competing reasons why it may not hold.  In terms of the cattle industry, the supply of breeding 
stock and calves (young feeder cattle) are nearly fixed in the short run; the cattle gestation-period 
is nine months and steers are 18 to 22 months of age when harvested.  Additionally, many feeder 
calves are sold at competitive auction markets where (at least in the long-term) feeder cattle 
buyers will likely not be willing to pay more than the difference between expected fed cattle 
(output) price and feedings costs (Zhao, Du, & Hennessey, 2011).  Given that feeder cattle are in 
fixed supply, necessary for fed cattle production, and sold in competitive markets, sellers of 
feeder animals (cow-calf, backgrounder, and stocker operations) could receive “Ricardian rents” 
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when changes in fed cattle and corn prices occur.9  However, Ricardian rent theory might not 
hold in the beef industry because the cattle herd can expand and contract in the long run.  Using 
annual data, Marsh (2003) estimated a long-run feeder cattle supply elasticity of 2.82.  Therefore, 
in the very short run (month to month), feeder cattle supply is perfectly inelastic, but is not 
perfectly inelastic in the long-run.  Furthermore, the corn market might not be perfectly elastic, 
so some rents could accrue to corn producers.  Finally, a large amount of capital is required and 
asset fixity exists at the feedlot level.  Additionally, feedlots have historically had excess 
capacity.  For these reasons, feedlot operators may not behave as perfectly competitive profit 
maximizers.  As an example, given entry-exit costs feedlots may rationally bid up feeder cattle 
prices as long as they are covering variable costs even if doing so results in an expected 
economic loss.  
Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011) first tested if Ricardian rent theory held in the U.S. beef 
industry using time-series data from January 1979 to April 2004.  Zhao, Du, and Hennessy 
(2011) found fed cattle futures price passes through 93% to feeder cattle futures price and corn 
price changes have a negative effect of 87% pass-through to feeder cattle futures price.  
In the past decade, the U.S. cattle and agriculture industries have changed in many ways.  
These changes could influence the feedlot profit function or the objective function employed by 
feedlot operators, changing the beef industry price transmission and subsequently alter Ricardian 
rent theory conclusions.  Technological introductions, such as beta-agonists, into the feedlot 
sector could influence tradeoffs made regarding feeder cattle and corn input decisions (Schroeder 
& Tonsor, 2011).  Finishing weights of fed steers have increased from approximately 1225 lbs in 
                                                 
9 Potentially, Ricardian rents could be held by seed stock owners rather than cow-calf producers.  While data 
constraints may limit such assessments, future research is encouraged. 
76 
the 1990s to 1375 lbs since 2010 (Livestock Marketing Information Center [LMIC], 2016).  
Increased finishing weight means more pounds are added per animal translating to increased 
corn consumption per head.  Thus, this increased finished weight and increased corn 
consumption changes the relative importance of feeder cattle and corn costs in the feedlot profit 
function and thus pass-through conclusions. At the same time, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 increased ethanol demand and hence 
corn demand (McPhail, 2011).  In 2012, the nominal corn price reached over $7.00/bushel.   
The beef industry has been increasingly affected by globalization.  The bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) case in 2004 reduced U.S. beef trade to near zero for a period 
of time.  Since the threat of BSE has declined, approximately 10% of beef is now being exported 
(Westcott, Hansen, & Stallings, 2016).  Additionally, mandatory country of origin labeling for 
beef, requiring country of birth, raising, and processing to be labeled, took effect in 2009, but 
was repealed in 2015 (Schroeder, Tonsor, & Parcell, 2016).  The macroeconomic effects of the 
U.S. recession from 2008 to 2009 also cannot be ignored.  Due to these and other 
transformations throughout the industry, further investigation into Ricardian rent theory and 
price transmission is warranted.  Given the aforementioned changes, the feedlot profit function 
could have changed over time, impacting Ricardian rent theory pass-through rates.  
Beyond updating past work, the first contribution of this study is endogenously 
identifying structural breaks over time in the feeder cattle, fed cattle, and corn price relationships 
to see if conclusions about Ricardian rent theory are robust across time.  Zhao, Du, and Hennessy 
(2011) found a structural break in the data in 2004 and hence did not use data past 2004.  
Therefore, an analysis of recent data and study of structural change is warranted.  Data from the 
Focus on Feedlots series (LMIC, 2017) is used to update production assumptions used to 
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calculate hypothesized pass-through rates from Ricardian rent theory.  Specifically, the fixed 
weights of feeder and finished cattle, death loss percent, discount rate, and bushels of corn 
needed for feed are updated to reflect industry practices across time (Herrington & Tonsor, 
2013). This is important as underlying price data reflect changing market supply and demand 
conditions that need to be accounted for in identifying appropriate hypothesized pass-through 
rates. 
The second major contribution is incorporating basis into price expectations (analysis 
B).10  Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011) used fed cattle and feeder cattle futures prices for price 
expectations.  Using futures prices only assumes a zero expected basis.  However, Kastens, 
Jones, and Schroeder (1998) found incorporating historical basis results in more accurate 
forecasts.  The zero basis assumption is relaxed using cash Kansas feeder cattle price and 
expected fed cattle price, calculated using deferred futures contract values, Kansas cash fed cattle 
prices, and four-year historical average basis.  
Ricardian rent theory is based on an inelastic short-run supply of feeder calves, but can 
potentially be used to draw long-run implications, since in the longer run, the cow herd, and 
hence feeder cattle supply, can expand and contract. The feedlot industry has excess capacity 
(Allen, 2014).  Thus, feedlot operators could potentially try to incentivize cow-calf producers to 
increase the calf inventory through price transmissions.  The third major contribution is 
investigating pass-through asymmetry in two ways.  Pass-through from fed cattle and corn prices 
to feeder cattle prices could be different when fed cattle prices are increasing versus decreasing 
(analysis C).  Second, pass-through rates from the feedlot sector to the cow-calf sector could be 
different during times of herd expansion and contraction (analysis D).   
                                                 
10 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
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Given these contributions, four analyses are completed. First, analysis A is conducted 
using feeder futures, fed cattle futures, and cash corn price data while simultaneously testing for 
structural breaks.  Second, pass-through rates are examined using cash feeder cattle prices and 
expected fed cattle prices based upon deferred future contract values and historical basis patterns 
while also testing for structural breaks (analysis B).  In analysis C, pass-through asymmetry in 
the fed cattle to feeder cattle price is studied during times of expected fed cattle price increases 
and decreases.  Lastly, in analysis D, pass-through asymmetry during herd expansion and 
contraction is explored.  
 Applying Ricardian rent theory to the beef industry 
Similar to Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011), the net present value of expected profit per 
head for a finished steer sold from a representative feedlot at time of placement (𝜋𝑡) is:  
 𝜋𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑]𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑑(1 − 𝐷)
1 + 𝑟
− 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟]𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 −  𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 − 𝑂𝐶. (32) 
Subscript 𝑡 is time of placement and 𝑇 represents the expected finishing time.  A five month 
feeding horizon is assumed, and thus 𝑇 = 𝑡 + 5.  𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] is expected feeder cattle price at 
time 𝑡 in dollars per hundredweight (cwt).  𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] is expectation at time 𝑡 of time 𝑇 fed cattle 
price in dollars per cwt.  𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑑 are the steer’s weight at placement and finishing in 
cwt, respectively.  𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛] is the expected corn price at time 𝑡 in dollars per bushel (bu) and 
𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 is total corn bu fed.11  All corn is assumed to be purchased at placement.  𝐷 is death loss 
percent and 𝑟 is the discount rate.  𝑂𝐶 represents other costs such as veterinary costs, marketing, 
transportation, etc.  𝑂𝐶 is assumed to be constant and relatively small.   
                                                 
11 𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 =
(𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑑−𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟)∗(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) 
𝑙𝑏𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙
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Assuming profit is equal to a fixed 𝐾, the following hypotheses can be derived to test if 
Ricardian rent theory holds in the beef industry (Zhao, Du, & Hennessy, 2011).  If Ricardian rent 
theory holds, then feeder cattle prices will be bid up or down when economic changes occur in 
cattle finishing. The first testable hypothesis, the 100% fed cattle to feeder cattle pass-through, 
is:  
𝐻0
𝐹𝑒𝑑: a dollar increase in expected fed cattle price, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑], affects the feeder cattle 
price, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] by:  
 𝜙1 =
𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑑(1 − 𝐷)
𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟(1 + 𝑟)
 . (33) 
The second testable hypothesis, the 100% corn to feeder cattle pass-through, is: 
𝐻0
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛: a dollar increase in corn price, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛], affects the feeder cattle price, 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] by: 
 𝜙2 = −
𝐵𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛
𝑊𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟
. (34) 
Multiple assumptions are used to estimate equations (33) and (34).  Monthly data, from 
December 1995 to December 2016, of feeder cattle weight, fed cattle weight, death loss percent, 
and feed conversion ratio are obtained from the Kansas State University Focus on Feedlots series 
(LMIC, 2017).  Through the entire analysis, 56 lb of corn per bu is assumed.  Quarterly 
observations from Q4 1995 to Q4 2016 for average annual interest rate for feeder livestock, non-
real estate bank loans from the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank, were used as the discount rate 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2017).12  The effective semi-annual discount rate is 
calculated using [(1 + 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)1/2 − 1].  The pass-through values hypothesized by 
                                                 
12 To get monthly observations, quarterly values were assumed for each month in the quarter.  For example, quarter 
1 values were used for January, February, and March. 
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Ricardian rent theory, 𝜙1 and 𝜙2, are calculated for each month and averaged for the whole 
period under investigation.  The hypothesized 𝜙1 and 𝜙2 from Ricardian rent theory (henceforth 
called RRT 𝜙1 and RRT 𝜙2) are tested against the pass-through estimates from the regression 
analyses.  See Table 3.1 for the average values of assumptions and RRT 𝜙1 and 𝜙2 values.  See 
Appendix B for RRT 𝜙1 and 𝜙2 descriptive statistics and plots.   
 Methodology and data 
The static empirical model can be written as (similar to Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011)):  
 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] + 𝛾0𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛] + ∑ 𝑑𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜏𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
+ 𝜀𝑡 (35) 
where 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] is the expected feeder cattle price at placement time 𝑡, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] is the 
expectation at placement time 𝑡 of the fed cattle price at time of sale 𝑇, and 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛] is the 
expected corn price at time 𝑡.  𝑚𝑘 are monthly placement dummies for January to November 
with 𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … 11}.  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a time trend allowing up to 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤, where 𝑤 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, to be 
included in the model to capture other unobservable factors.  𝜀𝑡 is the estimated error term.  
𝛼0,  𝛽0,  𝛾0, 𝑑𝑘 and 𝜏𝑤 are parameters. The values of 𝛽0 and 𝛾0 are compared to the hypothesized 
RRT 𝜙1 and 𝜙2 to test for 100% pass-through.   
 Data are monthly averages and prices are discovered and reported in the market with 
noise, thus a model specification allowing for possible dynamic effects is estimated.  Equation 
(35) is extended dynamically as follows:  
 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑]
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑑𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜏𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
+ 𝜀𝑡 
(36) 
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where 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛾𝑗 are the pass-through rate from a change in fed cattle and corn prices 𝑖 or 𝑗  
periods earlier (Zhao, Du, & Hennessy, 2011).  Following Campa and Goldberg (2006) and 
Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011), the instantaneous effect is given by the coefficient in the same 
period and the total effect of fed cattle and corn changes are the sum of the respective 
coefficients.  These values are tested against hypothesized pass-through threshold values to see if 
Ricardian rent theory holds in the cattle industry.  Therefore, RRT 𝜙1 is compared to ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0  and 
RRT 𝜙2 is compared to ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 .  Lag lengths (p and q) and trends included are determined by 
minimizing the SBC value in models that included consecutive lags and all monthly dummy 
variables.  For the dynamic models, up to six lags of fed cattle and corn prices were considered. 
Monthly data from December 1995 to December 2016 were collected from the Livestock 
Marketing Information Center (LMIC) (LMIC, 2017).  After considering up to six possible lags 
in the models and data availability, data from May 1996 to December 2016 are used to facilitate 
comparisons across the analyses.  All prices are deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI; 
1982-1984=100; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). 
Using feeder and fed cattle futures prices (analysis A) 
Following Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011), 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] is the nearby Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) feeder cattle futures contract price at time 𝑡, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] is the appropriate 
deferred CME fed cattle futures contract price at time 𝑡, and 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛] is the cash corn price. 13   
A five month feeding period is assumed throughout.  Accordingly, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] is the nearby 
fed cattle contract price for the contract corresponding to five months in the future.  For example, 
if a steer is placed in January, it is assumed to finish feeding in June, so the June futures price in 
                                                 
13 This assumes a zero basis for both feeder and fed cattle prices.  
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January is used.  However, if a steer is placed in February, it will finish feeding in July.  There is 
no July futures contract and hence the August futures contract price in February is used.14    
Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.3 graph the real nearby feeder cattle futures, deferred fed cattle 
futures, and cash corn price series from December 1995 to December 2016.  Descriptive 
statistics of the deflated price series are in Table 3.2.  The real feeder cattle futures price 
generally increased from 1994 to 2016 (Figure 3.1).  The real feeder cattle futures price averaged 
$46.43/cwt between 1996 and 2003, $51.40/cwt between 2004 and 2010, and $70.07/cwt 
between 2011 and 2016.  A major increase in price and subsequent fall is evident between 2012 
and 2016, reaching $100.88/cwt at its peak.  The real fed cattle futures price follows the same 
general pattern as the feeder futures price (Figure 3.2).  Fed cattle futures deflated price was 
relatively consistent from 1994 to 2001, but began to vary more in 2002.  A substantial price 
increase occurred from around $40.00/cwt in early 2009 to just over $71.00/cwt in November 
2014 before continually falling to nearly $42.00/cwt in 2016.  Real corn price also generally 
increased from 1994 to 2016 (Figure 3.3).  The largest run up in the real corn price, from 
$1.56/bu to $3.31/bu, occurred between June 2010 and August 2012. 
Incorporating basis into expected fed cattle price (analysis B) 
Using feeder and fed cattle futures prices for price expectations assumes an expected 
basis of zero.  Assuming a zero basis, as in Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011), when forecasting is 
usually not accurate (Kastens, Jones, & Schroeder, 1998).  This assumption is relaxed in two 
ways. Kansas feeder steer cash prices by weight and fed cattle prices were obtained from LMIC 
(2017).  Kansas cash feeder steer prices are available beginning January 1992 for 500 to 599 lb, 
                                                 
14 Live cattle future contracts are traded for February, April, May, June, August, September, October, and 
December.   
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600 to 699 lb, 700 to 799 lb, and 800 to 899 lb animals.  Feedlot placements by weight class (less 
than 600 lb, 600 to 699 lb, 700 to 799 lb, 800 lb plus) for Kansas are available beginning 
December 1995.  Using the four steer prices and the percent of cattle placed by weight in that 
month, a real weighted feeder cattle cash price is constructed for 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] (Figure 3.1).   
Alternatively, 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] can be calculated using historical Kansas fed cattle basis and fed 
cattle futures price using: 
 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   (37) 
and  
 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠. (38) 
Kansas fed cattle cash prices are available beginning January 1990.  Kastens, Jones, and 
Schroeder (1998) found that the most accurate method to use for price forecasting is deferred 
futures plus historical basis.  A four year historical average basis for fed cattle is used for 
expected basis as suggested by Tonsor, Dhuyvetter, and Mintert (2004).  Figure 3.2 shows the 
real expected fed cattle price series.  The average real expected basis is -$0.09/cwt (t-test against 
0=-1.93), with a minimum and maximum of -$1.37/cwt and $3.07/cwt, respectively.  Expected 
basis is seasonal with the highest basis usually occurring in December.   
Using the weighted cash feeder cattle price for 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] and expected fed cattle price 
for 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑], equations (35) and (36) are estimated again and used to test Ricardian rent theory 
when considering basis.  
Exploring pass-through asymmetry (analyses C and D) 
Asymmetric pass-through is investigated in two ways: increasing versus decreasing fed 
cattle price and herd expansion versus contraction.   
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 Asymmetric pass-through in times of fed cattle price increase versus decrease  
To investigate pass-through asymmetry in times of fed cattle price increases versus 
decreases equation (36) can be rewritten as  
 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] = 𝛼0 + 𝜔0𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑]
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝜄𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑] ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑑𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜏𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 
(39) 
Two types of fed cattle price increases will be investigated. The first is a month-to-month change 
in 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑], therefore 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 1 if 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] > 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑃𝑇−1
𝐹𝑒𝑑] and 0 otherwise.  The second is year-
over-year change in 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] where 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 1 if 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇
𝐹𝑒𝑑] > 𝐸𝑡−12[𝑃𝑇−12
𝐹𝑒𝑑 ] and 0 otherwise.  
See Figure 3.4 for a plot of the two fed cattle price increase dummy variables.  Joint tests are 
conducted to determine if the increase interaction terms and intercept shifter are statistically 
significant.  
 To test Ricardian rent theory, RRT 𝜙1 is compared to ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0  for the base (price 
decrease) fed cattle pass-through and to ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝜄𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0  for the price increase pass-through.  
RRT 𝜙2 is compared to ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0  since there are no fed cattle price increase interactions with corn 
price.  
 Asymmetric pass-through in times of herd expansion versus contraction  
Given the biological considerations in the beef industry, the cattle herd is fixed in the 
short run, but can expand and contract in the long-run.  Therefore, signals of herd expansion and 
contraction may impact the short-run pass-through conclusions.  The heifer percentage of feedlot 
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placements can be used to measure herd expansion and contraction.15  A lower than average 
heifer percent is considered a signal of herd expansion because more heifers are being held back 
by cow-calf producers as breeding stock.  From 1996 to 2016, on average 37% of animals placed 
in U.S. feedlots were heifers.  The percent of heifers placed is used instead of the number of 
heifers placed because the number placed confounds changes in herd size and seasonality.  
To investigate asymmetry in pass-through during times of herd expansion versus 
contraction equation (36) can be rewritten as: 
 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] = 𝛼0 + 𝜓0𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑]
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑] ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝜅𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜒𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡. 
(40) 
Two different expansion variables will be investigated.  The first is a measure of expansion over 
the last year where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 1 if 
∑ % ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡−𝑘
11
𝑘=0
12
< 37% and 0 otherwise.  The second is 
the year-over-year change in the percent of heifers placed where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 1 if 
% ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡 < % ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡−12 and 0 otherwise.  See Figure 3.5 for plots of the 
two expansion dummy variables.  Joint tests are conducted to determine if the expansion 
interaction terms and intercept shifter are statistically significant.  
                                                 
15 Percent heifers placed =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑+ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑑
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 To test Ricardian rent theory, RRT 𝜙1 is compared to ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0  for the base (contraction) 
fed cattle pass-through and to ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0  for the expansion fed cattle pass-through.  RRT 
𝜙2 is compared to ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0  for the base (contraction) pass-through and ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝜅𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0  for the 
expansion corn pass-through.  
 Augmented Dickey Fuller tests 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests with and without accounting for seasonality were 
conducted to test for nonstationary and unit roots (Table 3.3) (Dickey & Fuller, 1979).  The null 
hypothesis of the ADF test is the data display one unit root.  The minimum Schwarz Bayesian 
criteria (SBC) was used to select the appropriate lag length in all ADF tests.16,17  ADF tests with 
seasonality include 11 monthly dummy variables.  After accounting for seasonality all feeder and 
fed cattle prices are stationary, however, cash corn price is not stationary.  To further investigate 
the non-stationarity of corn price, Zivot and Andrews (2002) unit root test was conducted which 
allows for one break in the intercept, linear trend or both at an unknown date (Pfaff, Zivot & 
Stigler, 2016) (Table 3.4).  If seven or eight lags are used, the corn price is stationary.  However, 
this result is not robust across all potential lag lengths.  In the analysis, a model of mixed level 
and stationary variables does not make sense.  Including variables with unit root does not bias 
coefficient estimates, but may impact standard errors (Pouliot and Sumer, 2014).  All models are 
conducted with level variables, but residuals are checked for stationarity using ADF tests.   
                                                 
16 𝑆𝐵𝐶 = 𝑛 ∗ ln (
𝑆𝑆𝐸
𝑛
) + 𝑘 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(𝑛) where 𝑛 is the number of observations, SSE is sum of squared errors, and 𝑘 is the 
number of independent variables (including the intercept).  
17 Using simulated data Beal (2007) found the SBC measure out performed both Akaike’s Information Criteria 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) by correctly choosing the true model most consistently. 
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Misspecification tests 
Models are initially estimated using ordinary least squares and then misspecification tests 
are conducted to check for normality, homoscedasticity, and independence following McGuirk, 
Driscoll and Alwang (1993). The D’Agostino third sample moment tests, the Anscombe and 
Glynn fourth sample moment test, and D’Agostino-Pearson 𝐾2 omnibus tests are used to test for 
normality (Anscombe & Glynn, 1983; D’Agostino, Belanger, & D’Agostino, 1990).  Static and 
dynamic homoscedasticity are examined using a RESET2 test and autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test, respectively.  Independence is checked using the following 
auxiliary regression: 
 𝜀?̂? = 𝛽0
′ 𝑿𝑡 + Λ
′𝜀𝑡−1̂ + 𝜐𝑡  (41) 
 where 𝑿𝑡 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of independent variables, 𝜀𝑡 is the residual from the original model 
and 𝜐𝑡 is the estimated residuals from the auxiliary regression (McGuirk, Driscoll & Alwang, 
1993).  If Λ is significant then independence is rejected.  If homoscedasticity and/or 
independence are rejected, then generalized method of moments with the Newey-West correction 
on the errors terms is completed (Greene, 2003).18   
 Results and discussion 
Analysis A: Using feeder and fed cattle futures prices 
The static and dynamic model results when using feeder and fed cattle futures prices and 
cash corn are found in Table 3.5.  The misspecification tests indicate that non-normality, 
                                                 
18 See http://support.sas.com/kb/40/098.html.  The Newey-West standard error correction in SAS can be completed 
using proc model specifying GMM and kernel=(Bartlett, L+1, 0) in the fit statement.  L is the maximum lag length 
determined by the researcher.  We use L=12 because monthly data are used.      
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heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are concerns in both models.  Thus, Newey-West 
corrected standard errors are used and reported.  
In the static model, the fed cattle pass-through is estimated to be 1.86.  Thus, when the 
fed cattle futures price increases by $1.00/cwt, the feeder cattle futures price increases by 
$1.86/cwt, ceteris paribus.  A pass-through greater than one is expected.  The feeder steer price 
per cwt is generally higher than the fed steer price per cwt because of the differences in 
placement weight versus finished weight.  In other words, the feeder animal weighs less so the 
feeder steer price per cwt is often higher because overall less pounds are being purchased than 
when purchasing a finished steer.  The corn price pass-through estimate is -8.49, meaning when 
the corn price increases by $1.00/bu the feeder cattle futures price decreases by $8.49/cwt, 
ceteris paribus.  The monthly dummy variables are also jointly statistically significant 
confirming seasonality in feeder cattle prices.  
By minimizing the SBC value, the dynamic model with one fed cattle lag, zero corn lags 
and a linear time trend is preferred amongst all dynamic models examined and to the static 
model.  The contemporaneous fed cattle pass-through is $1.44/cwt with a total pass-through of 
$1.88/cwt.19  The corn pass-through is -$8.45/cwt.  Both the fed cattle and corn pass-through to 
the feeder cattle price are robust across the static and dynamic models.  The seasonal dummy 
variables are also jointly significant confirming seasonality in feeder cattle prices.   
The tests of RRT 𝜙1, 1.59, and 𝜙2, -7.16, against the pass-through estimates from the 
regression analysis are in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7.  First, p-values are reported from Chi- square 
tests of the coefficient estimates against the average pass-through value (a fixed value).  The 
second tests are one-sided complete combinational tests (Poe, Giraud, & Loomis, 2005) which 
                                                 
19 Estimates may seem off because of rounding.  Note only two decimal places are reported. 
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utilize the mean and standard deviation of the monthly 𝜙 calculations, relaxing the assumption of 
the hypothesized pass-through being fixed.20   
The 𝜙1 pass-through is 117% and 118% of that hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory in 
the static and dynamic models, respectively.  For all tests, we reject that the regression fed cattle 
pass-through is equal to that suggested by Ricardian rent theory, at a five percent significance 
level.  Therefore, fed cattle futures price changes at the feedlot level are being passed onto cow-
calf producers through the feeder cattle futures price at rates higher than suggested by Ricardian 
rent theory.  The fed cattle pass-through calculations contrast those of Zhao, Du, and Hennessy 
(2011) from 1979 to 2004 that failed to reject 100% pass-through of fed cattle futures.   
If fed cattle prices are increasing then this higher pass-through would be beneficial for 
cow-calf producers (harmful for feedlot producers), but if fed cattle prices are decreasing this is 
negative for cow-calf producers (beneficial to feedlot producers).  Looking at fed cattle price 
changes in Figure 3.2, price generally increased, benefiting cow-calf producers.  However, there 
are notable times of price decrease, especially from 2014 to 2016, where the greater than 100% 
pass-through benefited feedlot operators.   
The 𝜙2 regression pass-through for the static and dynamic models are 119% and 118% of 
that hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory, respectively. For both the static and dynamic model, 
when using a fixed RRT 𝜙2, we reject that the pass-through values are the same as RRT 𝜙2, at a 
five percent significance level.  When examining the combinational tests, at the five percent 
level, the estimated pass-through is greater than the RRT pass-through for the static model.  
However, we marginally fail to reject that the regression pass-through is different than the RRT 
                                                 
20 1,000 Krinsky-Robb bootstrapped estimates of each of the hypothesized 𝜙 and estimated pass-through values 
from the regression were completed. 𝐻0: 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ > 𝑅𝑅𝑇 𝜙    
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pass-through for the dynamic model.  Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011) failed to reject 100% corn 
pass-through.  
Over the past few decades, changes in technology, globalization and international trade 
such as MCOOL and BSE, macroeconomic events such as the U.S. recession, and competing 
feed corn uses such as ethanol, have likely impacted relationships between the feeder cattle, fed 
cattle, and corn prices.  These changes can potentially alter pass-through conclusions.  Therefore 
it is important to examine if structural breaks in the relationships between feeder cattle, fed 
cattle, and corn prices occur.  If structural breaks are not considered, results for the full period 
may mask important industry changes, potentially making Ricardian rent theory conclusions 
inaccurate.  
Two methods can be used to test for structural change.  The Chow test is used if break 
dates are known (Chow, 1960).  However, if breaks dates are not known and multiple break 
dates are possible, the Bai Perron (BP) test is used to simultaneously determine the number and 
timing of structural breaks  (Bai & Perron, 2003; Twine, Rude, & Unterschultz, 2015). The BP 
test with a 15% trimming factor and a maximum of five possible structural breaks is utilized (Bai 
& Perron, 2003; Twine, Rude, & Unterschultz, 2015).  The dynamic model BP test results are 
shown in Table 3.8.  Based on the SupF(l+1|l) test, two structural breaks are not rejected in favor 
of three structural breaks and thus we conclude two breaks.  The three regimes (R) are May 1996 
to October 2006 (R1), November 2006 to April 2011 (R2), and May 2011 to December 2016 
(R3).  Structural break 1 occurs after the breaks identified by Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011) in 
2004.  However, Zhao, Du, and Hennessy (2011) conducted structural change tests on each 
individual data series, whereas the BP test is testing for differences in the whole coefficient 
vector of the model.  The second regime corresponds with changes in the corn market due to 
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ethanol demand, which may have impacted the relationship between corn and feeder cattle 
prices, and the U.S. recession.  The second break date and initiation of the third regime 
correspond with the drought conditions experienced throughout portions of the U.S. from 2010 
to 2012.  Droughts result in higher corn prices, poor pasture conditions, and limitations on when 
feeder cattle can be retained outside of feedlots, thus potentially impacting feedlot input use and 
substitutions.   
Given the results of the BP tests, a model with interaction terms and a shifter variable for 
the regimes is estimated as:  
 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟] = 𝛼0 + 𝜓0𝑅2𝑡 + 𝜆0𝑅3𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑]
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑] ∗ 𝑅2𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝐸𝑡−𝑖[𝑃𝑇−𝑖
𝐹𝑒𝑑] ∗ 𝑅3𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝜅𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
∗ 𝑅2𝑡  + ∑ 𝜚𝑗𝐸𝑡−𝑗[𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛]
𝑞
𝑗=0
∗ 𝑅3𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝜒𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
∗ 𝑅2𝑡
+ ∑ Γ𝑘𝑚𝑘
11
𝑘=1
∗ 𝑅3𝑡 + ∑ 𝜏𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
∗ 𝑅2𝑡
+ ∑ 𝜗𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑤
𝑊
𝑤=0
∗ 𝑅3𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(42) 
where R1 is the base case, R2=1 if the date is between November 2006 and April 2011 and 0 
otherwise, and R3=1 if the date is between May 2011 and December 2016 and 0 otherwise.  See 
Table 3.9 for estimation results.  The joint Chi-square tests indicated that each group of regime 
specific variables (interactions and shifters) are jointly statistically significant.  Additionally, the 
relevant pass-through variables (fed cattle and corn coefficients) are jointly statistically 
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significant for each regime.  The misspecification tests reject normality, homoscedasticity, and 
independence.  Thus, Newey-West standard errors are reported.  The lower SBC value indicates 
that this model is preferred to both the static and dynamic models without structural break 
shifters.  
In R1, the contemporaneous fed cattle pass-through is $1.38/cwt with the total R1 pass-
through being $1.79/cwt.  For R2, the contemporaneous pass-through is $0.99/cwt (1.38-0.39) 
and the total R2 pass-through is $1.45/cwt (1.38-0.39+0.40+0.05), the smallest fed cattle pass-
through of the three regimes.  The R3 contemporaneous fed cattle pass-through is $1.47/cwt 
(1.38 + 0.08) with a total R3 pass-through of $1.91/cwt (1.38+0.08+0.40+0.05).  However, the 
R3 fed-cattle interactions are not individually statistically different from zero.   
Test results comparing the pass-through regression estimates to RRT 𝜙1 for the specific 
regime are shown in Table 3.6 (the regime specific RRT 𝜙1s are in Table 3.1).  For R1 and R3, 
tests reject 100% pass-through.  Therefore, from May 1996 to October 2006 and from May 2011 
to December 2016 fed cattle prices changes were being passed from feedlots to cow-calf 
producers through the feeder cattle futures price at levels greater than Ricardian rent theory 
suggests.  During R1, the fed cattle price varied, but generally increased.  Thus, the larger than 
hypothesized pass-through benefited cow-calf producers.  During R3, there was an upward 
movement in price from 2011 to 2014, however, the price fell in 2015 and 2016.  Therefore, the 
117% pass-through benefited cow-calf producers initially, but then benefited feedlot operators in 
2015 and 2016 who passed on more of the fed cattle price decrease.  The R2 pass-through is 90% 
of the RRT 𝜙1, but is not statistically different from 100% in either the fixed or one-sided 
combinational tests.  Therefore, during R2 price transmission between the cow-calf producers 
and feedlot operators was consistent with Ricardian rent theory.   
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The estimated corn pass-through is statistically different across regimes.  The corn pass-
through is -$5.35/cwt, -$7.80/cwt, and -$8.47/cwt in R1, R2, and R3.  These estimates are 77%, 
105% and 114% of the pass-through values suggested by Ricardian rent theory (Table 3.7).  The 
R1 coefficient is statistically less than (in absolute terms) the RRT 𝜙2, while the R2 and R3 pass-
through estimates are not statistically different than the RRT 𝜙2.  In R1, the corn price generally 
decreased.  Accordingly, a smaller percent of this cost saving was passed from the feedlot to the 
cow-calf producer than hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory.    
Those who are skeptical of structural breaks tests may argue that the break(s) might be 
caused by omitted variables or an incorrectly specified model.  Due to the misspecification test 
concerns and structural breaks in analysis A we consider different price expectations in analysis 
B. 
Analysis B: Using weighted Kansas cash feeder and expected fed cattle prices 
This analysis relaxes the zero basis assumptions in both feeder cattle and live cattle 
prices.  In analysis 3, weighted Kansas cash feeder cattle and expected live cattle prices are used 
instead of futures prices.21  Misspecification tests and estimation results from the static and 
dynamic model are shown in Table 3.10.   
 Misspecification tests indicate residuals are normal and stationary, but dynamic 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are present in both the static and dynamic models.  
Therefore, Newey-West standard errors are reported.  Estimated fed cattle and corn pass-through 
from the static model are $1.97/cwt and -$9.59/cwt, respectively.  Seasonality is also present in 
the feeder cattle price.  The feeder cattle price from January to September is higher than in 
                                                 
21 A four year historical basis was used as expected fed cattle basis. 
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December (the base month), while October and November feeder cattle prices are discounted 
relative to December.  Additionally, the linear trend is statistically significant and positive, 
indicating a continual increase in the weighted Kansas cash feeder cattle price over time.  
 The lower SBC value indicates the dynamic model is preferred to the static model.  The 
preferred dynamic model includes one lag of the expected fed cattle price but no corn price lags.  
Seasonality and a positive linear trend are present in the feeder cattle price.  The instantaneous 
fed cattle pass-through is $1.58/cwt and the total pass-through is $1.99/cwt.  The total fed cattle 
estimated pass-through is compared to the RRT 𝜙1 in Table 3.6.  The estimated pass-through is 
125% of and statistically significantly greater than the hypothesized RRT pass-through.  From 
1996 to 2014 the expected fed cattle price generally increased (Figure 3.2). The fed cattle price 
increase combined with pass-through greater than 100% benefited cow-calf producers because 
feedlots were passing back a larger share of this price increase than hypothesized by Ricardian 
rent theory.  However, from 2015 to 2016, fed cattle prices sharply declined, hurting cow-calf 
producers through lower than hypothesized feeder cattle prices.  
 The estimated corn pass-through from the dynamic model is -$9.56/cwt (Table 3.10), 
which is 134% of the RRT 𝜙2 (Table 3.7).  Both the Chi-square test against the fixed RRT 𝜙2 
and the combinational tests, which allow for statistical variation in RRT 𝜙2, confirm the 
estimated pass-through is statistically larger than the hypothesized pass-through.  From 1996 to 
2006 and 2013 to 2016, corn price generally decreased (Figure 3.3) benefitting cow-calf 
producers through higher than expected feeder cattle prices.  From 2006 to 2013, corn price 
increased harming cow-calf producers with lower than expected feeder cattle prices.   
 The BP test did not identify any structural breaks (𝑠𝑢𝑝𝐹(1|0) = 31.91,
𝑃𝑟 >  𝑠𝑢𝑝𝐹(1|0) = 0.58).  This contrasts the results in analysis A where two structural breaks 
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were identified.  Therefore, accounting for local supply and demand conditions and basis 
expectations using a cash feeder cattle price and expected fed cattle basis in analysis B 
potentially eliminates some of the omitted variable and misspecification concerns from analysis 
A.  Given that no breaks were identified and errors are normal in analysis B, it is preferred to 
analysis A.  Weighted Kansas cash feeder and expected fed cattle prices will be used to 
investigate pass-through asymmetry in analyses C and D.   
Analysis C: Asymmetric pass-through in times of fed cattle price increase versus 
decrease  
Pass-through asymmetry when the fed cattle price increases versus decreases is 
investigated in two ways, month-to-month and year-over year price changes. 
 Month-to-month changes in fed cattle price 
Estimation results for the static model including interaction terms for month-to-month fed 
cattle price increase are shown in Table 3.11.  The static model was preferred to all other 
dynamic specifications.  The errors are normal and stationary, however they are not 
homoscedastic or independent, so Newey-West standard errors are reported.  The base case is fed 
cattle price decrease.  All price increase interactions and shifters are jointly significant.   
The fed cattle pass-through is $2.04/cwt when fed cattle price decreases and $1.96/cwt 
when prices increases.  These estimates are 128% and 123% of the pass-through hypothesized by 
Ricardian rent theory (Table 3.6).  Tests against a fixed and variable RRT 𝜙1 indicate the 
estimated pass-through for both price increase and decrease are statistically greater than the RRT 
𝜙1.  However, the fed cattle pass-through during price increases and price decreases are not 
statistically different from one another (Chi-square statistic=2.14, p-value= 0.14).  Therefore, 
month-to-month changes in the fed cattle price do not impact the fed cattle pass-through.  
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The corn pass-through is -$9.65/cwt which is 135% of the RRT 𝜙2 and statistically larger 
than the RRT 𝜙2 (Table 3.7).  The pass-through is similar to that found in both the static and 
dynamic models presented in analysis B.   
Seasonality is present and different when the fed cattle price decreases versus when it 
increases.  The price increase and seasonality interactions are jointly significant, at a five percent 
significance level.  All monthly dummy interactions with price increase except May and July are 
negative, indicating the price differences in these months relative to December are lower during 
price increases than price decreases.   
 Year-over-year changes in fed cattle price 
Another potential way to investigate pass-through asymmetry is using year-over-year 
(YOY) changes in fed cattle price.  The static and dynamic model results are shown in Table 
3.12 and Table 3.13.  The pass-through point estimates are similar across the two models.  All 
increase variables are jointly significant at a five percent significance level. However, this 
conclusion seems to be driven by the trend and increase interactions; the pass-through and 
increases interactions, and the seasonality and increase interactions are not jointly significant at 
the five percent level. 
 Investigating the estimated fed cattle pass-through conclusions in Table 3.6, the base case 
estimated fed cattle pass-through is 118% of and statistically greater than RRT𝜙1 for both the 
dynamic and static models.  For fed cattle price increases, the estimated pass-through is 112% in 
both static and dynamic models, but not statistically different from RRT𝜙1, at a five percent 
significance level.  However, the estimated fed cattle pass-through during price increases and 
decreases are not statistically different from each other (Chi-square statistic=0.58, p-value=.45). 
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 The corn pass-through conclusions are mixed across the static and dynamic models.  
When comparing the -$8.62/cwt and -$8.68/cwt estimated pass-through estimates to a fixed RRT 
𝜙2, both are statistically different from RRT 𝜙2 (Table 3.7).  However, in the combinatorial tests 
where RRT 𝜙2 has statistical variability, the estimated corn pass-through in the static model is 
not statistically different from the RRT 𝜙2. Conversely, the estimated pass-through from the 
dynamic model is statistically greater than RRT 𝜙2, at a five percent significance level.  Overall, 
the evidence is mixed regarding pass-through asymmetry during fed cattle price increases versus 
decreases.   
Analysis D: Asymmetric pass-through in times of herd expansion versus contraction 
Pass-through asymmetry during herd expansion versus contraction is investigated in two 
ways, average expansion over the last year and year-over year changes in heifer percentage. 
 Average expansion over the last year 
The static and dynamic estimation results with expansion over the last 12 months 
interactions (expansion A12) are shown in Table 3.14 and Table 3.15.  Errors in both models are 
normal and stationary.  Newey-West errors are reported due to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation concerns. 
 The dynamic model is preferred to the static model due to the lower SBC value, with 
conclusions being similar. In the dynamic model, the expansion A12 interactions and shifter are 
jointly significant (Table 3.15).  The fed cattle contraction instantaneous pass-through is 
$1.38/cwt with a total pass-through of $1.92/cwt.  During expansion, the instantaneous pass-
through is $1.42/cwt with a total pass-through of $1.94/cwt.  These pass-through estimates are 
121% and 122%, and are both statistically greater than the RRT 𝜙1 (Table 3.6).  However, the 
contraction and expansion estimates are not statistically different from each other (Chi-square 
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statistic=0.04, p-value=0.84).  Additionally, the expansion and contract fed cattle pass-through 
values are similar to the dynamic pass-through in Analysis B ($1.99, 125%).   
 The contraction and expansion corn pass-through estimates are -$7.43/cwt (104%) and -
$12.55/cwt (175%), which are statistically different from each other (Chi-square statistic=6.44, 
p-value=0.01) (Table 3.7).  The contraction pass-through is not statistically different than RRT 
𝜙2, however, the expansion pass-through is statistically greater than the RRT 𝜙2.  Thus, there is 
evidence of asymmetry in corn pass-through during herd expansion versus contraction.  
Potentially, this indicates that during times of expansion when there are fewer heifers in the 
feedlot, different input substitutions are being made by feedlot operators between corn and feeder 
cattle in the production of fed cattle.   
In order to assess who benefits and who loses during times of expansion or contraction 
we need to understand price changes in fed cattle and corn over these time periods.  Figure 3.6 
plots the expansion A12 dummy against fed cattle and corn prices.  Using the expansion A12 
measure, the most recent contraction phase was from July 2009 to December 2012.  Over this 
period both the fed cattle and corn price increased.  The fed cattle price increase was positive for 
cow-calf producers because the 121% pass-through means that the feeder cattle price increased 
more than hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory. During contraction the corn pass-through is not 
different than that hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory.  Therefore, this increased corn cost is 
passed to cow-calf producers through lower feeder cattle prices at expected rates.  Overall, cow-
calf producers benefited over this time period relative to what Ricardian rent theory would 
suggest. 
Since January 2013 the cattle herd has been expanding when using the expansion A12 
measure.  From January 2013 to November 2014, fed cattle prices increased and then fell 
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through 2016.  The 122% pass-through would have benefited cow-calf producers and harmed 
feedlots during 2013 and 2014.  The opposite would be true during 2015 and 2016.  From 2013 
to 2016 the corn price generally decreased.  Coupled with the expansion A12 corn pass-through 
of 175%, this corn price decrease benefits cow-calf producers.  Overall, from 2013 to 2014, cow-
calf producers benefited from the larger than expected pass-through at feedlot operators expense.  
The impact from 2015 to 2016 is ambiguous.  
 Year-over-year change in heifer percentage as measure of expansion 
The static and dynamic models with expansion year-over-year (expansion YOY) 
interactions are shown in Table 3.16 and Table 3.17.  Errors in both models are stationary, but 
they are not normal, homoscedastic, or independent.  Newey-West standard errors are reported.  
All expansion YOY variables are jointly significant in the static and dynamic models.   
 The conclusions across the static and dynamic models are similar.  The dynamic model is 
preferred to the static model because of the lower SBC value.  In the dynamic model, the total 
contraction fed cattle pass-through is $1.73/cwt (instantaneous pass-through is $1.47/cwt) and 
the total expansion pass-through is $2.17/cwt (instantaneous pass-through is $1.55/cwt).  The 
contraction 109% fed cattle pass-through is not statistically different from the RRT 𝜙1, but the 
expansion 137% pass-through is statistically greater than the RRT 𝜙1.  The contraction and 
expansion fed cattle pass-through estimates are also statistically different from each other (Chi-
square statistic=11.16, p-value=0.0008).  Thus, the fed cattle pass-through is asymmetric in the 
expansion YOY model.  
 The corn pass-through is -$7.93/cwt during contraction and -$10.05/cwt during expansion 
(Table 3.17). As with the fed-cattle pass-through, the estimated corn pass-through is not 
statistically different than the RRT 𝜙2 during contraction, but is statistically different during 
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expansion (Table 3.7).  The contraction and expansion pass-through estimates are also 
statistically different from one another (Chi-square statistic=4.41, p-value=0.04).  Therefore, in 
times of YOY expansion more of fed cattle and corn price changes are being passed back to the 
cow-calf producers through the feeder cattle price than in YOY contraction. 
Figure 3.7 plots the expansion YOY dummy against fed cattle and corn prices.  During 
contraction YOY, the most recent and longest was July 2006 to June 2010, both the fed cattle 
and corn price changes passed through to the feeder cattle price as expected.  However, during 
expansion YOY the fed cattle and corn pass-through estimates are greater than 100%.  Generally 
from July 2010 to March 2016, the cattle herd was expanding based on the expansion YOY 
variable.  During this time the real fed cattle price increased until November 2014, benefiting 
cow-calf producers.  However, from November 2014 to March 2016 the real fed cattle price 
decreased substantially, hurting cow-calf producers through lower than hypothesized feeder 
cattle prices. Over this expansion time period the real fed cattle price generally increased, from 
$43.51/cwt in July 2010 to $51.57/cwt in March 2016, benefiting cow-calf producers.  Real corn 
price varied from $1.60/bu in July 2010 up to $3.31/bu in August 2012 and down to $1.50/bu in 
March 2016.  The more than 100% pass-through from corn to feeder cattle prices benefited 
feedlot producers from July 2010 to August 2012, but cow-calf producers from September 2012 
to March 2016.  However, over the whole 2010 to 2016 expansion period the corn price 
decreased, benefiting cow-calf producers.  Therefore, over this expansion time period cow-calf 
producers benefited from the corn and fed cattle price changes more than Ricardian rent theory 
suggests.   
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 Conclusion 
This study examines whether Ricardian rent theory holds in the U.S. beef industry by 
investigating how changes in fed cattle and corn prices are transmitted to the feeder cattle price.  
Based on Ricardian rent theory, surplus rents should pass through the market to the holder of the 
scarcest resource.  In the cattle markets, feeder calves are the scarcest, widely traded resource 
and thus gains and losses at the feedlot should be passed through to feeder cattle prices.  Monthly 
data from 1996 to 2016 were used in four analyses.  In analysis A, CME futures market feeder 
and fed cattle prices were used.  Two structural breaks were found.  Thus a model with regime 
specific pass-through interactions was estimated.  In analysis B, the strong zero basis expectation 
was relaxed by using weighted Kansas cash feeder cattle price and an expected fed cattle price 
incorporating a four-year historical average basis.  In analyses C and D asymmetric pass-through 
was explored.  Asymmetry in pass-through when fed cattle price increases was introduced in 
analysis C using two different price increase interaction terms, month-to-month and year-over-
year.  In analysis D, testing for pass-through asymmetry was conducted when the cattle herd was 
expanding versus contracting using an average expansion variable for the past year and a year-
over-year expansion variable.   
One-hundred percent pass-through suggested by Ricardian rent theory between fed cattle 
and corn with feeder cattle prices were calculated using monthly production data primarily from 
the Focus on Feedlots data series.  The regression pass-through estimates were tested against a 
fixed RRT pass-through, and against a pass-through with statistical variation.  In many models, 
the estimated pass-through was statistically greater than the RRT hypothesized pass-through.  
Thus, when fed cattle or corn prices change, these changes are more than fully passed to cow-
calf producers through the feeder cattle price.  The larger than expected pass-through estimates 
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are consistent with the divergent profitability outcomes between cow-calf operations and feeding 
operations recently.  Both cow-calf producers and cattle feeders experienced historically high 
returns in 2014.  However, in 2015 and 2016, average net returns for finished steers ranged from 
-$100 to -$500 per head (Tonsor, 2016).  At the same time, cow-calf returns were around $300 
per cow (LMIC, 2016).  However, these divergent returns cannot be sustained long term.  Near 
zero long run economic profit in the cow-calf and feedlot sectors is expected in a competitive 
market (Mark, Schroeder, & Jones, 2000; Pendell, Kim, & Herbel, 2015).   
Conclusions regarding whether cattle markets are “broken” is sensitive to the 
assumptions in the model and the approach used to test Ricardian rent theory.  For example, in 
analysis A, Ricardian rent theory was not rejected in all regimes tests while in analysis B 
Ricardian rent theory was rejected.  Thus, an important contribution of our study is that the 
incorporation of basis into price expectations is key for accurate analysis.  When a zero basis was 
assumed (analysis A), two structural breaks were found.  However, when using weighted cash 
feeder cattle and expected fed cattle price with a four-year historical average basis (analysis B), 
no structural breaks were found.  Potentially, the differing structural break conclusions are being 
driven by basis and expectations, instead of differences in true underlying feeder cattle, fed 
cattle, and corn price relationships.   
Pass-through asymmetry was tested for fed cattle price increases and decreases, and for 
cattle herd expansion and contraction.  Overall, there was little evidence for asymmetric pass-
through when fed cattle price is increasing or decreasing.  However, there was evidence that 
pass-through was asymmetric during times of herd expansion versus contraction.  Corn pass-
through was different for expansion and contraction in both the average expansion over the last 
12 months and the year-over year models.  The pass-through was not statistically different then 
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that hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory during herd contraction, when calves are more 
plentiful.  Conversely, during expansion when there are fewer heifers in the feedlot, the corn 
pass-through was statistically greater than the hypothesized Ricardian rent theory pass-through.  
This could be a signal of different input substitutions during expansion and contraction.  The fed 
cattle pass-through in expansion and contraction was only different from each other in the year-
over-year model, but not in the average over the last 12 months model.  However, in the average 
herd expansion model, both during times of expansion and contraction the fed cattle pass-
through was statistically greater than the Ricardian rent theory pass-through. 
Overall, our results suggest that Ricardian rent theory does not perfectly hold in the U.S. 
beef industry.  Oftentimes a pass-through greater than 100% was found.  Potential reasons for 
this include:  
1. The production data from Focus on Feedlots is from a small survey of feedlots in KS.  
Thus, if this data is not representative of actual feedlot production then the 
hypothesized Ricardian rent theory conclusions would be incorrect and bias our 
conclusions. 
2. Expected prices are used that assume nothing about risk preferences or alternative 
marketing of fed cattle.  Therefore, if producers forward contract their cattle, for 
example, our expected prices could not reflect the producers’ actual expected prices 
and would bias pass-through conclusions.  
3. There is a biological lag in beef production.  Therefore, there might be differences in 
short run versus long run pass-through values.   
4. Feedlot operations may not be behaving as perfectly competitive profit maximizers 
because of excess capacity and asset fixity.  Therefore, the feedlot profit function 
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used to derive the hypothesized pass-through conclusions and subsequent pass-
through conclusions would be incorrect.  In the original application to farmland, 
landowners owned the only scarce resource (land).  However, potentially both cow-
calf producers (calves, genetics) and feedlots (feedlots are only used for one purpose, 
finishing livestock) own scarce resources.    
Cow-calf producers should consider the potential implications of greater than 100% pass-
through from fed cattle and corn prices.  In vertical markets, anything that increases retail beef 
demand will subsequently increase fed cattle price.  These benefits will be more than 
proportionally passed to cow-calf producers.  However, if retail demand decreases, potentially 
from a change in tastes and preferences or a food safety shock, price decreases would also be 
more than proportionally passed to cow-calf producers.  Considering the horizontal corn and 
feeder cattle markets, the large corn pass-through, especially during expansion, could indicate a 
higher degree of input substitutability between corn and feeder cattle.  Potentially, if corn price 
increases and these higher feed costs result in adversely lower feeder cattle prices, cow-calf 
producers could consider delaying sale or even retaining ownership of the steer through 
slaughter.  Generally, cow-calf producers cannot react as quickly to shocks.  Therefore, cow-calf 
producers should not only follow current events and changes at the retail beef demand level but 
also the horizontal feed markets to understand the potential ramifications on feeder cattle prices, 
and ultimately revenue, they receive. 
Moving forward, other sectors of the beef complex, such as seed stock (bulls, cow-calf 
pairs and bred heifers), can be included if data are available.  An additional extension would be 
examining other key beef production states to see if conclusions hold across states.  Future work 
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could also look into a more complex feedlot profit functions due to asset fixity and excess 
capacity.  
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Figure 3.1 Monthly real nearby feeder cattle futures price ($/cwt) and real Kansas cash weighted 
feeder cattle price ($/cwt) from December 1995 to December 2016 
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Figure 3.2 Monthly real fed cattle futures price (zero basis) ($/cwt) and real expected Kansas fed 
cattle price ($/cwt) from December 1995 to December 2016 
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Figure 3.3 Monthly real cash corn price ($/bu) from December 1995 to December 2016 
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Figure 3.4 Fed cattle price increase month-to-month and year-over-year (YOY) dummy variables 
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Figure 3.5 Expansion average over last year (A12) and expansion year-over-year (YOY) dummy variables 
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Figure 3.6 Plots of fed cattle and corn prices during expansion and contraction average over last 12 months (A12) 
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Figure 3.7 Plots of fed cattle and corn prices during year-over-year (YOY) expansion and contraction  
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Table 3.1 Hypothesized 100% pass-through estimates and assumptions from Focus on Feedlots 
data 
 
  
Full Time Period Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Assumption 12/95 to 12/16 12/95 to 10/06 11/06 to 04/11 05/11 to 12/16
Feeder weight (lbs.) 787.19 767.74 792.11 820.75
Finish weight (lbs.) 1308.74 1257.75 1331.87 1388.62
Pounds of gain 521.55 490.01 539.76 567.86
Feed conversion ratio 6.05 6.07 6.08 5.99
Total lbs of corn needed 3155.88 2974.56 3280.33 3402.84
Pounds of corn per bu 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00
Corn needed (bu.) 56.35 53.12 58.58 60.76
Deathloss (%) 1.28% 1.21% 1.33% 1.38%
Discount rate 3.21% 3.86% 3.02% 2.13%
RRT 1.59 1.56 1.61 1.63
RRT -7.16 -6.93 -7.41 -7.41
𝜙1
𝜙2
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics from December 1995 to December 2016 
 Variable Mean St Dev Min  Max 
Real corn price ($/bu) 1.65 0.59 0.88 3.31 
Real nearby feeder futures price ($/cwt) 54.63 12.77 33.54 100.88 
Real fed cattle futures price ($/cwt) 46.18 7.32 36.29 71.27 
Real KS cash weighted feeder price ($/cwt) 56.47 13.68 33.71 106.63 
Real KS four year historical average basis ($/cwt) -0.09 0.78 -1.37 3.07 
Real KS expected fed cattle price ($/cwt) 46.09 7.50 35.54 71.91 
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Table 3.3 Augmented Dickey Fuller tests 
 
Variable
Optimal 
Lags
Test 
Statistic
10% Critical 
Value
Optimal 
Lags
Test 
Statistic
10% Critical 
Value
Optimal 
Lags
Test 
Statistic
10% Critical 
Value
Real corn price 1 -0.93 -1.61 1 -2.11 -2.57 1 -2.34 -3.13 Fail to reject unit root
Real nearby feeder futures price 1 -0.14 -1.61 1 -2.13 -2.57 11 -4.28 -3.13 Reject unit root
Real fed cattle futures price 0 -0.17 -1.61 1 -1.84 -2.57 2 -2.58 -3.13 Fail to reject unit root
Real KS cash weighted feeder price 1 -0.11 -1.61 1 -2.21 -2.57 1 -2.53 -3.13 Fail to reject unit root
Real KS expected fed cattle price 3 -0.08 -1.61 1 -2.11 -2.57 1 -2.80 -3.13 Fail to reject unit root
Real corn price 1 -0.46 -1.61 1 -1.88 -2.57 1 -2.11 -3.13 Fail to reject unit root
Real nearby feeder futures price 1 -1.90 -1.61 1 -1.97 -2.57 11 -4.44 -3.13 Reject unit root
Real fed cattle futures price 1 -8.06 -1.61 1 -1.68 -2.57 1 -1.90 -3.13 Reject unit root
Real KS cash weighted feeder price 1 -1.72 -1.61 1 -2.06 -2.57 1 -2.34 -3.13 Reject unit root
Real KS expected fed cattle price 1 -3.74 -1.61 1 -1.70 -2.57 1 -2.11 -3.13 Reject unit root
Constant Drift Trend
Conclusion
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
Augmented Dickey-Fuller with seasonal dummy variables
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Table 3.4 Zivot and Andrews (2002) unit root test for real cash corn price (December 1995 to 
December 2016) 
  
Lag length Model Test statistic 0.10 critical value Potential break Conclusion 
0 intercept -2.96 -4.58 9 Fail to reject unit root
trend -2.61 -4.11 11 Fail to reject unit root
both -3.43 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
1 intercept -3.45 -4.58 8 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.27 -4.11 10 Fail to reject unit root
both -3.87 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
2 intercept -3.59 -4.58 129 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.28 -4.11 10 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.14 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
3 intercept -3.52 -4.58 129 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.30 -4.11 10 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.11 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
4 intercept -3.89 -4.58 212 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.68 -4.11 204 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.52 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
5 intercept -4.06 -4.58 212 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.80 -4.11 204 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.64 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
6 intercept -4.08 -4.58 212 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.77 -4.11 204 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.65 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
7 intercept -4.67 -4.58 212 Reject unit root
trend -4.32 -4.11 204 Reject unit root
both -5.25 -4.82 177 Reject unit root
8 intercept -4.53 -4.58 212 Fail to reject unit root
trend -4.07 -4.11 203 Fail to reject unit root
both -5.06 -4.82 177 Reject unit root
9 intercept -3.79 -4.58 212 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.36 -4.11 200 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.40 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
10 intercept -3.37 -4.58 212 Fail to reject unit root
trend -2.91 -4.11 200 Fail to reject unit root
both -3.99 -4.82 177 Fail to reject unit root
11 intercept -3.49 -4.58 211 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.18 -4.11 200 Fail to reject unit root
both 4.30 -4.82 176 Fail to reject unit root
12 intercept -3.54 -4.58 211 Fail to reject unit root
trend -3.27 -4.11 200 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.33 -4.82 176 Fail to reject unit root
13 intercept -3.35 -4.58 211 Fail to reject unit root
trend 3.12 -4.11 201 Fail to reject unit root
both -4.01 -4.82 176 Fail to reject unit root
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Table 3.5 Estimation results when using feeder and fed cattle futures and cash corn prices 
(analysis A) 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ). 
Full Period 
Static
Full Period 
Dynamic
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Fed futures price 1.86*** 1.44***
(0.04) (0.09)
Fed futures price lag 1 0.43***
(0.09)
Cash corn price -8.49*** -8.45***
(0.52) (0.49)
January 0.003 0.95***
(0.31) (0.32)
February -0.12 0.62*
(0.30) (0.33)
March 0.69* 1.51***
(0.39) (0.44)
April -0.64 0.71 
(0.45) (0.51)
May -0.16 0.78 
(0.45) (0.49)
June -0.12 1.07*
(0.52) (0.64)
July -0.47 0.55 
(0.49) (0.60)
August -1.29*** -0.21 
(0.47) (0.56)
September -1.65*** -0.86**
(0.38) (0.40)
October -2.91*** -1.89***
(0.40) (0.39)
November -3.75*** -2.76***
(0.26) (0.25)
Trend 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.003) (0.004)
Intercept -18.26*** -19.76***
(1.59) (1.60)
SBC 365.66 349.18
Joint Chi- square test p-values
Seasonality <.0001 0.0003
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.44 0.28
Kurtosis 0.01 0.01
Omnibus 0.02 0.02
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.72 0.85
Dynamic <.0001 <.0001
Independence: <.0001 <.0001
Errors stationary: YES YES
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Table 3.6 Testing 𝝓𝟏 pass-through 
 
 
  
Model
RRT pass-
through 
Regression 
pass-through 
Percent pass-
through P-value Conclusion 
Regression pass-
through < 100% 
p-value
Regression pass-
through > 100% 
p-value Conclusion
Analysis A
Static 1.59 1.86 117% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0002 0.9998 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic 1.59 1.88 118% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic- Regime 1 1.56 1.79 115% 0.0002 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0025 0.9975 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic- Regime 2 1.61 1.45 90% 0.1341 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.9237 0.0763 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Dynamic- Regime 3 1.63 1.91 117% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Analysis B
Static 1.59 1.97 124% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic 1.59 1.99 125% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Analysis C
Month-to-month
Static 1.59 2.04 128% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Increase 1.59 1.96 123% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Year-over-year
Static 1.59 1.88 118% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0006 0.9994 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Increase 1.59 1.77 112% 0.1066 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.0772 0.9228 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Dynamic 1.59 1.87 118% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0005 0.9995 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Increase 1.59 1.78 112% 0.1121 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.0705 0.9295 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Analysis D
Average 12 months
Static 1.59 1.89 119% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0003 0.9997 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Expansion 1.59 2.02 127% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic 1.59 1.92 121% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Expansion 1.59 1.94 122% 0.0025 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0024 0.9976 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Year-over-year
Static 1.59 1.72 108% 0.7844 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.1609 0.8391 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Expansion 1.59 2.05 129% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic 1.59 1.73 109% 0.6991 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.1317 0.8683 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Expansion 1.59 2.17 137% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Presuming fixed RRT     RRT       as a distribution 𝜙1 𝜙1
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Table 3.7 Testing 𝝓𝟐 pass-through 
 
Model
RRT pass-
through 
Regression 
pass-
through 
Percent pass-
through P-value Conclusion 
Regression pass-
through < 100% 
p-value
Regression pass-
through > 100% 
p-value Conclusion
Analysis A
Static -7.16 -8.49 119% 0.0104 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0412 0.9588 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic -7.16 -8.45 118% 0.0091 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0539 0.9461 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Dynamic- Regime 1 -6.93 -5.35 77% 0.0008 Reject 100% pass-through 0.9830 0.0170 Regression pass-through less than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic- Regime 2 -7.41 -7.80 105% 0.7378 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.3802 0.6198 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Dynamic- Regime 3 -7.41 -8.47 114% 0.3288 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.1957 0.8043 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Analysis B
Static -7.16 -9.59 134% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0008 0.9992 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic -7.16 -9.56 134% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0017 0.9983 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Analysis C
Month-to-month
Static -7.16 -9.65 135% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0005 0.9995 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Year-over-year
Static -7.16 -8.62 120% 0.0231 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0772 0.9228 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Dynamic -7.16 -8.68 121% 0.0175 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0366 0.9634 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Analysis D
Average 12 months
Static -7.16 -7.20 101% 0.9662 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.4977 0.5023 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Expansion -7.16 -10.11 141% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0004 0.9996 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic -7.16 -7.43 104% 0.8266 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.4095 0.5905 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Expansion -7.16 -12.55 175% 0.0007 Reject 100% pass-through 0.0007 0.9993 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Year-over-year
Static -7.16 -7.87 110% 0.454 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.247 0.753 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Expansion -7.16 -10.03 140% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Dynamic -7.16 -7.93 111% 0.4151 Fail to reject 100% pass-through 0.2413 0.7587 Regression pass-through not different from RRT pass-through
Expansion -7.16 -10.05 140% <.0001 Reject 100% pass-through <.0001 >.9999 Regression pass-through greater than RRT pass-through 
Presuming fixed RRT RRT        as a distribution 𝜙2 𝜙2 
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Table 3.8 Bai Perron test for the dynamic model in analysis A 
 
Table note: The supF, UDmaxF and WDmaxF tests indicate at least one structural break at the <0.001 level. 
 
  
l
SupF(l+1|l) 
statistic P-value
Breakpoint 
observation Regimes identified 
0 43.49 0.03 126 R1: May 1996 to October 2006
1 49.55 0.01 181 R2: November 2006 to April 2011
2 21.20 1.00 R3: May 2011 to December 2016
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Table 3.9 Analysis A estimation results with regime interactions 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  R2=1 if date is 
from Nov 2006 to May 2011 and R2=0 otherwise.  R3=1 if date is from May 2011 to Dec 2016 and R3=0 otherwise. 
  
Regime 1 
Dynamic
Regime 2 
Dynamic
Regime 3 
Dynamic
Variable 5/96 to 10/06 11/06 to 04/11 05/11 to 12/16
Fed futures price 1.38*** Fed futures price * R2 -0.39*** Fed futures price * R3 0.08 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.16)
Fed futures price lag 1 0.40*** Fed futures price lag 1 *R2 0.05 Fed futures price lag 1 *R3 0.05 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.15)
Cash corn price -5.35*** Cash corn price * R2 -2.45* Cash corn price *R3 -3.12***
(0.47) (1.27) (1.18)
January 0.52* January * R2 0.06 January * R3 1.35*
(0.29) (0.87) (0.74)
February -0.25 February * R2 1.54*** February * R3 1.67**
(0.37) (0.59) (0.80)
March 0.61 March * R2 0.67 March * R3 2.35**
(0.45) (0.52) (1.16)
April -0.27 April * R2 1.81** April * R3 2.49**
(0.50) (0.74) (1.20)
May -0.52 May * R2 1.88*** May * R3 2.94**
(0.46) (0.56) (1.42)
June -0.11 June * R2 0.91 June * R3 2.97**
(0.37) (0.68) (1.29)
July -0.35 July * R2 1.40 July * R3 1.98**
(0.38) (1.03) (0.93)
August -1.19** August * R2 1.52** August * R3 2.44***
(0.50) (0.62) (0.85)
September -1.23*** September * R2 0.60 September * R3 1.05 
(0.28) (0.51) (0.72)
October -2.05*** October * R2 -0.04 October * R3 0.62 
(0.59) (0.84) (1.09)
November -2.61*** November * R2 1.05** November * R3 -0.36 
(0.27) (0.41) (0.57)
Trend 0.05*** Trend * R2 0.02* Trend * R3 -0.05 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Intercept -21.20*** R2 9.13* R3 2.45 
(2.51) (4.71) (13.17)
SBC 299.04
Joint Chi- square test p-values
Regime intercept shifters 0.15 All regime 2 interaction variables <.0001 All regime 3 interaction variables <.0001
Regime time interactions 0.06 Regime 2 pass-through variables <.0001 Regime 3 pass-through variables 0.01
Base seasonality <.0001 Regime 2 seasonality <.0001 Regime 3 seasonality 0.01
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.04
Kurtosis 0.10
Omnibus 0.03
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.01
Dynamic 0.01
Independence: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Table 3.10 Estimation results when using weighted feeder cattle price and expected fed cattle 
price with basis (analysis B) 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  
Full Period 
Static
Full Period 
Dynamic
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.97*** 1.58***
(0.07) (0.11)
Expected fed price lag1 0.41***
(0.12)
Cash corn price -9.59*** -9.56***
(0.56) (0.54)
January 2.19*** 2.07***
(0.44) (0.44)
February 4.38*** 4.22***
(0.54) (0.51)
March 4.63*** 4.95***
(0.57) (0.58)
April 3.95*** 4.63***
(0.63) (0.67)
May 3.55*** 4.06***
(0.65) (0.67)
June 2.64*** 3.45***
(0.73) (0.76)
July 3.12*** 3.39***
(0.68) (0.70)
August 2.09*** 2.58***
(0.69) (0.72)
September 1.73*** 1.93***
(0.55) (0.50)
October -1.04** -0.33 
(0.44) (0.41)
November -1.73*** -1.25***
(0.42) (0.33)
Trend 0.01** 0.01*
(0.005) (0.01)
Intercept -22.25*** -23.15***
(2.44) (2.53)
SBC 475.40 467.74
Joint Chi- square test p-values
Seasonality <.0001 <.0001
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.90 0.52
Kurtosis 0.34 0.67
Omnibus 0.63 0.75
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.55 0.93
Dynamic <.0001 <.0001
Independence: <.0001 <.0001
Errors stationary: YES YES
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Table 3.11 Static model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for month-to-month fed 
cattle price changes (analysis C) 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ). 
 
  
Full Period 
Static- Base
Full Period 
Static- 
Increase
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 2.04*** Expected fed price*Increase -0.08 
(0.09) (0.05)
Cash corn price -9.65***
(0.51)
January 2.35*** January*Increase -0.73 
(0.49) (1.06)
February 4.69*** February*Increase -1.15 
(0.70) (1.17)
March 5.60*** March*Increase -1.74 
(0.92) (1.54)
April 5.52*** April*Increase -1.74 
(1.48) (1.85)
May 2.74*** May*Increase 1.61 
(0.90) (1.41)
June 4.63*** June*Increase -1.94 
(1.04) (1.43)
July 2.74*** July*Increase 1.10 
(1.05) (1.34)
August 3.22*** August*Increase -1.50 
(1.20) (1.53)
September 2.01*** September*Increase -0.47 
(0.76) (1.26)
October 0.28 October*Increase -1.27 
(1.09) (1.62)
November -1.05 November*Increase -0.64 
(0.99) (1.50)
Trend 0.01 Trend*Increase 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01)
Intercept -24.43*** Increase 2.35 
(3.37) (2.41)
SBC 531.25
Joint Chi- Square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All increase interaction variables <.0001
Increase*seasonality interactions 0.02
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.97
Kurtosis 0.50
Omnibus 0.79
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.93
Dynamic <.0001
Autocorrelation: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Table 3.12 Static model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for year-over-year fed 
cattle price changes (analysis C) 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  
Full Period 
Static- Base
Full Period 
Static- 
Increase YOY
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.88*** Expected fed price*Increase YOY -0.11 
(0.07) (0.12)
Cash corn price -8.62***
(0.64)
January 2.68** January*Increase YOY -1.15 
(1.08) (1.63)
February 5.02*** February*Increase YOY -1.83 
(0.93) (1.21)
March 4.76*** March*Increase YOY -1.30 
(0.93) (1.47)
April 5.37*** April*Increase YOY -3.01**
(1.12) (1.37)
May 3.52*** May*Increase YOY -0.38 
(0.92) (1.44)
June 3.31*** June*Increase YOY -1.64 
(1.03) (1.34)
July 4.33*** July*Increase YOY -2.06*
(1.00) (1.11)
August 3.62*** August*Increase YOY -2.49*
(1.27) (1.47)
September 2.51*** September*Increase YOY -1.32 
(0.95) (1.12)
October -0.09 October*Increase YOY -1.53*
(0.72) (0.92)
November -0.92* November*Increase YOY -1.09 
(0.55) (0.75)
Trend 0.003 Trend*Increase YOY 0.20***
(0.04) (0.06)
Trend^2 0.0002 Trend^2*Increase YOY -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.001)
Trend^3 -0.0000007 Trend^3*Increase YOY 0.00001***
(0.0000009) (0.000002)
Intercept -20.56*** Increase YOY 1.74 
(3.43) (5.56)
SBC 510.62
Joint Chi- Square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All Increase YOY interaction variables <.0001
Increase YOY*seasonality interactions 0.49
Increase YOY*trend interactions 0.0001
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.35
Kurtosis 0.64
Omnibus 0.58
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.63
Dynamic <.0001
Autocorrelation: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Table 3.13 Dynamic model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for year-over-year 
fed cattle price changes (analysis C) 
  
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  
Full Period 
Dynamic- Base
Full Period 
Dynamic- 
Increase YOY
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.53*** Expected fed price*Increase YOY -0.10 
(0.09) (0.12)
Expected fed price lag 1 0.34*** Expected fed price lag 1*Increase YOY 0.01 
(0.10) (0.01)
Cash corn price -8.68***
(0.64)
January 2.44** January*Increase YOY -0.95 
(1.05) (1.52)
February 4.62*** February*Increase YOY -1.42 
(0.94) (1.23)
March 4.68*** March*Increase YOY -0.79 
(0.95) (1.39)
April 5.35*** April*Increase YOY -2.05 
(1.17) (1.43)
May 3.75*** May*Increase YOY -0.10 
(1.02) (1.47)
June 3.81*** June*Increase YOY -1.31 
(1.08) (1.30)
July 4.33*** July*Increase YOY -1.66 
(1.01) (1.09)
August 3.98*** August*Increase YOY -2.37 
(1.33) (1.44)
September 2.40** September*Increase YOY -0.85 
(0.93) (1.00)
October 0.23 October*Increase YOY -1.01 
(0.78) (0.90)
November -0.70 November*Increase YOY -0.74 
(0.56) (0.63)
Trend -0.002 Trend*Increase YOY 0.20***
(0.04) (0.06)
Trend^2 0.0003 Trend^2*Increase YOY -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Trend^3 -0.0000009 Trend^3*Increase YOY 0.000007***
(0.0000009) (0.000002)
Intercept -20.15*** Increase YOY 0.95 
(3.37) (5.64)
SBC 509.36
Joint Chi- Square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All Increase YOY interaction variables <.0001
Pass-through Increase YOY interactions 0.48
Increase YOY*seasonality interactions 0.68
Increase YOY*trend interactions 0.0003
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.83
Kurtosis 0.56
Omnibus 
Homoscedasticity: 0.83
Static 0.93
Dynamic <.0001
Autocorrelation: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
126 
Table 3.14 Static model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for herd expansion over 
last year (analysis D) 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  
Full Period 
Static- Base
Full Period 
Static- 
Expansion A12
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.89*** Expected fed price*Expansion A12 0.12 
(0.07) (0.11)
Cash corn price -7.20*** Cash corn price*Expansion A12 -2.91**
(0.98) (1.26)
January 1.80*** January*Expansion A12 0.92 
(0.57) (0.91)
February 3.42*** February*Expansion A12 2.09*
(0.73) (1.10)
March 4.12*** March*Expansion A12 1.04 
(0.96) (1.35)
April 3.80*** April*Expansion A12 0.42 
(1.05) (1.45)
May 3.30*** May*Expansion A12 0.78 
(1.11) (1.49)
June 2.01** June*Expansion A12 1.71 
(0.89) (1.57)
July 2.14*** July*Expansion A12 2.36 
(0.62) (1.48)
August 0.95 August*Expansion A12 2.66*
(0.70) (1.4)
September 1.12** September*Expansion A12 1.44 
(0.49) (1.19)
October -1.31*** October*Expansion A12 0.77 
(0.49) (0.91)
November -1.69*** November*Expansion A12 0.01 
(0.47) (0.91)
Trend 0.12*** Trend*Expansion A12 -0.15***
(0.04) (0.04)
Trend^2 -0.0005*** Trend^2*Expansion A12 0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Intercept -26.93*** Expansion A12 5.33 
(2.94) (4.63)
SBC 518.42
Joint Chi- square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All Expansion A12 interaction variables 0.003
Expansion A12*pass-through variables 0.07
Expansion A12*seasonality interactions 0.57
Expansion A12*trend interactions 0.0005
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.10
Kurtosis 0.15
Omnibus 0.09
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.61
Dynamic <.0001
Independence: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Table 3.15 Dynamic model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for herd expansion 
over last year (analysis D) 
  
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  
Full Period 
Dynamic- Base
Full Period Dynamic- 
Expansion A12
5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.38*** Expected fed price*Expansion A12 0.04 
(0.16) (0.20)
Expected fed price lag 1 0.53*** Expected fed price lag 1*Expansion A12 -0.01 
(0.15) (0.2)
Cash corn price -7.43*** Cash corn price*Expansion A12 -5.13**
(1.21) (2.02)
January 1.73*** January*Expansion A12 0.70 
(0.58) (0.96)
February 3.28*** February*Expansion A12 1.80 
(0.74) (1.11)
March 4.32*** March*Expansion A12 1.46 
(0.92) (1.32)
April 4.48*** April*Expansion A12 1.08 
(1.08) (1.49)
May 3.88*** May*Expansion A12 1.24 
(1.18) (1.48)
June 2.93*** June*Expansion A12 2.38 
(1.00) (1.47)
July 2.41*** July*Expansion A12 3.09**
(0.70) (1.31)
August 1.57** August*Expansion A12 3.07**
(0.75) (1.41)
September 1.21*** September*Expansion A12 1.91*
(0.45) (0.97)
October -0.39 October*Expansion A12 0.71 
(0.41) (0.87)
November -1.14*** November*Expansion A12 0.12 
(0.37) (0.63)
Trend 0.16** Trend*Expansion A12 -0.60**
(0.07) (0.26)
Trend^2 -0.0008 Trend^3*Expansion A12 -0.000009*
(0.0007) (0.000005)
Trend^3 0.000001 Trend^3*Expansion A12 -0.000009*
(0.000002) (0.000005)
Intercept -29.31*** Expansion A12 23.78*
(3.41) (13.18)
SBC 497.35
Joint Chi- Square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All Expansion A12 interaction variables <.0001
Expansion A12*pass-through variables 0.05
Expansion A12*seasonality interactions 0.59
Expansion A12*trend interactions <.0001
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.28
Kurtosis 0.85
Omnibus 0.55
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.41
Dynamic <.0001
Autocorrelation: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Table 3.16 Static model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for herd expansion year-
over-year (analysis D) 
 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ). 
Full Period 
Static- Base
Full Period Static- 
Expansion YOY
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.72*** Expected fed price*Expansion YOY 0.33**
(0.11) (0.13)
Cash corn price -7.87*** Cash corn price*Expansion YOY -2.16**
(0.94) (1.00)
January 2.23*** January*Expansion YOY -0.74 
(0.82) (1.26)
February 3.81*** February*Expansion YOY 0.53 
(0.72) (1.17)
March 4.67*** March*Expansion YOY -0.93 
(0.98) (1.35)
April 3.64*** April*Expansion YOY 0.19 
(0.99) (1.35)
May 3.04*** May*Expansion YOY 0.68 
(0.95) (1.33)
June 2.25** June*Expansion YOY 0.60 
(0.99) (1.28)
July 2.39** July*Expansion YOY 1.11 
(0.99) (1.16)
August 1.20 August*Expansion YOY 1.50 
(0.99) (1.20)
September 2.08** September*Expansion YOY -1.14 
(0.82) (1.08)
October -0.44 October*Expansion YOY -1.20 
(0.57) (0.86)
November -1.36*** November*Expansion YOY -0.67 
(0.46) (0.83)
Trend 0.02*** Trend*Expansion YOY -0.01 
(0.003) (0.01)
Intercept -14.78*** Expansion YOY -8.87 
(5.31) (5.67)
SBC 518.65
Joint Chi- Square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All Expansion YOY interaction variables <.0001
Expansion YOY*pass-through variables 0.002
Expansion YOY*seasonality interactions 0.0003
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.18
Kurtosis 0.03
Omnibus 0.03
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.97
Dynamic <.0001
Autocorrelation: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Table 3.17 Dynamic model estimation results for asymmetric pass-through for herd expansion 
year-over-year (analysis D) 
Table note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Newey-West adjusted standard errors are shown in ( ).  
Full Period 
Dynamic- 
Base
Full Period 
Dynamic- 
Expansion YOY
Variable 5/96 to 12/16 5/96 to 12/16
Expected fed price 1.47*** Expected fed price*Expansion YOY 0.09 
(0.21) (0.21)
Expected fed price lag1 0.27 Expected fed price lag 1*Expansion YOY 0.35 
(0.27) (0.26)
Cash corn price -7.93*** Cash corn price*Expansion YOY -2.12**
(0.94) (1.01)
January 2.25*** January*Expansion YOY -0.66 
(0.78) (1.14)
February 3.91*** February*Expansion YOY 0.43 
(0.82) (1.18)
March 4.81*** March*Expansion YOY 0.40 
(1.00) (1.25)
April 4.05*** April*Expansion YOY 1.19 
(1.17) (1.39)
May 3.34*** May*Expansion YOY 1.45 
(1.08) (1.30)
June 2.62*** June*Expansion YOY 1.99*
(0.99) (1.04)
July 2.37** July*Expansion YOY 2.09*
(1.06) (1.11)
August 1.36 August*Expansion YOY 2.51**
(1.02) (1.11)
September 1.88** September*Expansion YOY 0.13 
(0.90) (1.02)
October -0.15 October*Expansion YOY -0.19 
(0.59) (0.89)
November -1.16** November*Expansion YOY -0.07 
(0.47) (0.63)
Trend 0.01 Trend*Expansion YOY 0.05 
(0.02) (0.03)
Intercept -14.91** Expansion YOY -17.71***
(5.93) (6.50)
SBC 511.11
Joint Chi- Square test p-values
Base seasonality <.0001 All Expansion YOY interaction variables <.0001
Expansion YOY*pass-through variables 0.0002
Expansion YOY*seasonality interactions 0.007
Expansion YOY*trend interactions 0.004
Misspecification test p-values
Normality: 
Skewness 0.09
Kurtosis 0.01
Omnibus 0.01
Homoscedasticity:
Static 0.42
Dynamic <.0001
Autocorrelation: <.0001
Errors stationary: YES
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Chapter 4 - Impacts of retail and export demand  
on U.S. cattle producers 
Over the past 40 years, consumer food preferences and perceptions of agriculture and 
meat production have been changing.  U.S. consumers are increasingly interested in knowing 
both the physical attributes (e.g., nutrition, health, and safety) of their food as well as how it is 
produced (e.g., sustainable, animal welfare, and natural).  Similarly, production segments of the 
U.S. food supply chain are keenly interested in economic impacts of these changes.  The beef 
industry is no exception, experiencing dramatic changes in consumer demand over the past 
several decades (Tonsor, 2017).  The beef industry has invested considerable resources to 
provide consumers with beef products possessing attributes they prefer as well as in product 
development and promotion (Kaiser, 2015; Tonsor, Schroeder, & Mintert, 2014).  While existing 
research provides extensive insights into meat demand (see Bryant & Davis, 2008 and Gallett, 
2010 for reviews), the literature on how changes in consumer demand impact producers is 
comparably limited.  As such, the beef industry is interested in knowing how changing primary 
beef demand is shared among consumers, retailers, packers/processors, feedlots, cow-calf 
producers, and other production and marketing channel members.   
Increased interest in food production, together with food industry positioning and product 
promotion, influence consumer demand.  Conceptually as consumer demand varies, the impacts 
are passed down through the marketing chain to producers through derived demand.  Despite this 
well-known concept, empirical efforts to quantify these effects are limited and dated.  The 
objective of this paper is to estimate transmission of retail level and export demand signals 
through the U.S. beef industry to cattle producers. 
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How demand changes are transmitted to other levels of vertical supply chains is 
important to quantify.  These estimates are utilized in policy analysis and estimating impacts of 
new technologies (e.g., Balagtas & Kim, 2007; Pendell, Brester, Schroeder, Dhuyvetter, & 
Tonsor., 2010; Weaber & Lusk, 2010; Okrent & Alston, 2012).  Similarly, price-transmission 
estimates are essential when quantifying distributional impacts of events in industries comprised 
of multiple segments (Kinnucan, Hsia, & Jackson, 1997; Wohlgenant, 1993) such as the U.S. 
beef industry.  A recent example was the effort to initiate a second checkoff program in the U.S. 
beef-cattle industry (U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2014).  This in large part has 
arisen following a long-standing discussion about who benefits from investments in enhancing 
consumer beef demand.  The need for this study was highlighted by Wohlgenant (2006): “For the 
most part, research has not focused on one very important aspect of estimating the rates of return 
to advertising – the retail-to-farm price transmission.” (p. 2). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. consumer preferences rapidly changed and consumer 
demand for beef declined (Genho, 1998; Purcell, 1989; Schroeder, 2000; Marsh, 2003; 
Schroeder, Marsh, & Mintert, 2000).  To better understand how to respond to this precipitous 
decline, the beef industry needed more information about how beef packers, cattle feedlots, and 
cow-calf producers were impacted. Marsh (2003) is the most definitive quantification of how 
retail beef demand impacted farm level derived demand from 1970 to 1999.  Up until his study, 
the econometric linking of shifts in retail beef and farm level demands, supplies, and revenues 
was overlooked (Marsh, 2003).  The implications of retail demand shifts for beef marketing 
channel members are perhaps even more important today.  However, no study has continued 
Marsh’s work which is now more than a decade old in an industry that has experienced massive 
changes in demand as well as supply. 
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One notable change in the U.S. beef industry is the increased role of exports.  From the 
early 1980s to 2013 beef export volume grew ten-fold from around 1% to about 10% of 
production (Livestock Marketing Information Center [LMIC], 2017).  The heightened 
importance of exports in the beef market were especially evident in late 2003 and 2004 when 
foreign markets halted imports of U.S. beef due to discovery of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. beef herd.  Marsh, Brester, and Smith (2008) concluded “the 
demand for U.S. beef was affected to a much greater degree by the reactions of foreign 
governments to the BSE announcements than by the reactions of U.S. households” (p. 136).  The 
future role of beef exports is expected to increase reflecting global economic growth and 
expanding meat protein demand.  The Economic Research Service projects that U.S. beef exports 
will grow by over 10% by 2026 with a large increase in beef demand coming from China and 
Hong Kong (USDA, 2017b).  Furthermore, in June 2017 the U.S. and China reached an 
agreement to allow U.S. beef exports back into China following the ban in 2003 (USDA, 2017a).  
In 2016, China imported nearly $2.5 billion in beef (USDA, 2017a).   
 Model development and data 
Our conceptual model uses the Marsh (2003) model as a foundation, however it is 
changed and expanded in multiple ways reflecting the evolving structure of the beef industry. 
 Demand indices 
A key component in Marsh (2003) is the integration of a price based beef demand index 
(1970=100) into the econometric system to represent annual shifts in U.S. retail domestic beef 
demand.  Demand indices are preferred to using beef prices only to measure changes in primary 
demand, because prices reflect both shifts in supply and demand (Marsh, 2003; Brester & Marsh, 
1983; Wohlgenant, 1989).  Indices allow the isolation of demand shifts.  Brester, Bekkerman and 
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Tonsor (2017) used simulations to compare quantity and price based meat and energy demand 
indices.  They found quantity based indices produce more accurate changes in demand than price 
based indices.22  Following Brester, Bekkerman and Tonsor (2017) we construct a quantity based 
index as: 
 𝐼𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 = (
𝑄𝑡
𝑄𝑡
𝑒) ∗ 100 =
𝑄𝑡
𝑄0 + {𝑄0 ∗ [(
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃0
𝑃0
) ∗ (
%Δ𝑄
%ΔP)]}
∗ 100 (43) 
where 𝑄𝑡 is the actual per capita quantity of beef consumed in quarter 𝑡.  𝑄𝑡
𝑒, the denominator, is 
the expected per capita consumption that would occur if there is no change in demand in quarter 
𝑡.  𝑄0 is the base quarter quantity.  𝑃𝑡 is the price in quarter 𝑡, while 𝑃0 is the base quarter price.  
%𝛥𝑄
%𝛥𝑃
 is the own-price demand elasticity.  Thus, the quantity based index is a ratio of the actual 
quantity demanded to the expected quantity demanded.  The expected quantity reflects price 
changes and an assumed elasticity, thus isolating changes in demand from changes in supply.  If 
the actual quantity demanded is larger (smaller) than expected, then the index increases 
(decreases).  
For the U.S. retail beef demand index, 𝑃𝑡 is the choice retail beef price in $/lb, deflated 
by the consumer price index.  𝑄𝑡 is the retail per capita disappearance (assumed consumption) 
consumption in lbs.  The base year is 1996 to reflect availability of other data used in the models. 
The demand elasticity is assumed to be -0.542 (Tonsor, 2010).  The quarterly U.S. retail beef 
demand index for 1996 QT1 to 2016 QT3 is shown in Figure 4.1 (1996 QT1=100).  From 1996 
to 2003, U.S. retail beef demand generally declined.  From 2004 to 2007, beef demand 
strengthened, potentially due to popularity of the Atkins diet.  However, beginning around the 
                                                 
22 Both price based and quantity based indices were calculated, but quantity based indices were more well behaved.    
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recession in 2008, beef demand declined through 2012.  In more recent years, beef demand has 
notably improved as the U.S. economy has recovered from the recession.  
Additionally, we create an index for U.S. beef export demand by the rest of the world.  𝑄𝑡 
is the rest of world per capita consumption of U.S. total beef and veal, and variety meat exports, 
in lbs.  𝑃𝑡 is the nominal beef export price in $/lb.  The assumed elasticity of demand is -0.42 
(Zhao, Wahl, & Marsh, 2006).  The quarterly U.S. export beef demand index for 1996 QT1 to 
2016 QT3 is shown in Figure 4.2 (1996 QT1=100).  From 1996 to mid-2003 export demand for 
U.S. beef increased.  However, the dramatic crash of export demand following the BSE 
discovery is evident in late 2003.  After 2004, export demand steadily increased, reaching pre-
BSE level around 2010.  In 2014 and 2015, export demand slightly declined.  The retail and 
export demand indices are central to answering how changes in U.S. retail and export beef 
demand have impacted farm level cattle prices and quantities in the last 20 years. 
 Conceptual model  
The U.S. beef industry is comprised of multiple segments.  In a simplistic version, feeder 
cattle suppliers (cow-calf, stocker, and backgrounder operations) supply feeder calves to 
feedlots.  At the feedlot, animals are fed to harvest weight and then sold to the packer.  After 
harvest, the packer distributes the wholesale beef through multiple outlets including traditional 
domestic retail outlets and beef for exports.  Given the vertical nature of the beef supply chain, 
derived supply and demand theory can be applied to the U.S. beef industry.  Whenever 
exogenous factors increase (decrease) primary demand, derived demands are also expected to 
increase (decrease) (Tomek & Robinson, 2003).  Figure 4.3 illustrates changes to derived 
demand and supply curves due to an exogenous, autonomous increase in U.S. retail level 
demand.  An exogenous increase in retail beef demand induces retailers to increase demand for 
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wholesale beef from packers, resulting in an upward shift from 𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒 to 𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒′.  This increased 
demand for beef at the live cattle level, causes feedlot operators to demand more feeder cattle 
from suppliers (shifting 𝐷𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 upward to 𝐷𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 ’).  Upward shifts in demand will result in 
higher prices and quantities at the live and feeder levels.  The numerical increase in prices and 
quantities is an empirical question of central interest in this study.   
We use a simultaneous equations system of inverse demand and supply equations for the 
U.S. live and feeder cattle sectors as the conceptual model of the U.S. beef industry. The 
conceptual model of quarterly live and feeder cattle demand and supply is: 
Live cattle inverse demand:   
 𝑃𝑡
𝐿,𝐷 = 𝛹1(𝑄𝑡
𝐿,𝐷 , 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡, 𝐸𝐼𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) (44) 
Live cattle supply:  
 𝑄𝑡
𝐿,𝑆 = 𝛹2(𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐿,𝑆], 𝑃𝑡−2
𝐹 , 𝑃𝑡−2
𝐶 , 𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) (45) 
Live cattle market clearing:  
 𝑃𝑡
𝐿,𝐷 = 𝑃𝑡
𝐿,𝑆 = 𝑃𝑡
𝐿;  𝑄𝑡
𝐿,𝐷 = 𝑄𝑡
𝐿,𝑆 = 𝑄𝑡
𝐿 (46) 
Feeder cattle inverse demand:  
 𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝐷 = 𝛹3(𝑄𝑡
𝐹,𝐷 , 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿,𝐷], 𝑃𝑡
𝐶 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) (47) 
Feeder cattle supply:  
 𝑄𝑡
𝐹,𝑆 = 𝛹4 (
𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝑆, 𝐸𝑡−8[𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝑆], 𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊 , 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8 , 𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹,𝑆 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 ,
𝑄𝑇3𝑡, 𝑄𝑇4𝑡
) (48) 
Feeder cattle market clearing:  
 𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝐷 = 𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝑆 = 𝑃𝑡
𝐹;  𝑄𝑡
𝐹,𝐷 = 𝑄𝑡
𝐹,𝑆 = 𝑄𝑡
𝐹 (49) 
Retail demand index:  
 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝛹5(𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡, 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡, 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) (50) 
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Export demand index:  
 𝐸𝐼𝑡 = 𝛹6( 𝐸𝑋𝑡, 𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡, 𝑄𝑇2𝑡, 𝑄𝑇3𝑡, 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) (51) 
A variable list and descriptions can be found in Table 4.1.  The quarterly lag structure 
was based on biological considerations of the time required for a steer to be born, fed, and 
harvested.   
Equation (44) is derived inverse live cattle demand where live cattle price at time t (𝑃𝑡
𝐿,𝐷) 
is a function of live cattle quantity (𝑄𝑡
𝐿,𝐷
), retail beef demand quantified by the beef demand 
index (𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡), export beef demand quantified by the export index (𝐸𝐼𝑡), food marketing costs 
(𝑀𝑡) to capture wholesale and retail input costs, the BSE shock (𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡), and seasonality 
(𝑄𝑇2𝑡, 𝑄𝑇3𝑡, 𝑄𝑇4𝑡).  Including the beef and export demand indices allows for shifts in primary 
demand to impact beef packer derived demand.  A linear time trend (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) is included to 
account for technological changes.  
Live cattle supply, equation (45), is a function of the expected output price (𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐿,𝑆]) at 
time of placement, assuming a two quarter feeding window. The input prices are feeder cattle 
(𝑃𝑡−2
𝐹 ) and corn price (𝑃𝑡−2
𝐶 ) at placement.  All corn is assumed to be purchased at placement.  A 
lagged dependent variable (𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿 ) is included to account for asset fixity.  The BSE shock (𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡) 
and seasonality (𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡, 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) are also included.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is included to account for 
technological changes in cattle feeding over time in the absence of a better technology variable.  
Equation (46) is the live cattle market clearing condition.  
Equations (47) through (49) are feeder cattle inverse demand, supply, and market clearing 
equations.  In equation (47), feeder cattle price (𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝐷
) is a function of feeder cattle quantity 
demanded by feedlots (𝑄𝑡
𝐹,𝐷
), the expected live cattle price (𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿,𝐷]) at time t (expected price 
the animal will sell for at the end of the two quarter feeding period), and corn price at time t 
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(𝑃𝑡
𝐶).  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, used as a proxy for technology in cattle finishing, the BSE shock (𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡), and 
seasonality (𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) are also accounted for.  Retail and export demand implicitly 
enter this equation through 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿,𝐷].   
Equation (48) is feeder cattle supply.  The contemporaneous feeder cattle price at time 𝑡 
(𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝑆
) represents the decision to sell the animal now or to retain the calf for backgrounding.  
𝐸𝑡−8[𝑃𝑡
𝐹,𝑆], the expected feeder cattle price at time 𝑡 − 8, represents the opportunity cost of 
heifer retention for a breeding animal to replace an aging breeding animal or expand the herd.  
𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊  represents the opportunity cost of retaining a cow versus culling. 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡 is used to 
proxy pasture conditions and the decision to sell the yearling now, or wait and sell next period.  
𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8 can be used to judge pasture conditions and a potential indication of herd size (poor 
pasture conditions generally decrease the herd size). 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 is a proxy for technology.  Asset 
fixity (𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹,𝑆
), and seasonality (𝑄𝑇2𝑡, 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡) are also important determinants of feeder 
cattle supply. 
Equations (50) and (51) are used to account for the endogeneity of retail and export beef 
demand.  Retail beef demand is a function of U.S. consumer sentiment (𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡), the BSE shock 
(𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡), and seasonality (𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡).  Export beef demand is a function of the exchange 
rate (𝐸𝑋𝑡), export competitors beef price (𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡), the BSE shock (𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑡), and seasonality 
(𝑄𝑇2𝑡, 𝑄𝑇3𝑡, 𝑄𝑇4𝑡).  These variables will be used as exogenous variables and instruments in the 
econometric model.  Here the consumer sentiment index measures consumer confidence in the 
U.S. economy (University of Michigan, 2017).  Generally, when consumers feel the U.S. 
economy is doing well, beef demand is stronger.  Seasonality is important in U.S. beef demand 
because of holiday seasons associated with higher beef demand and summer grilling season.  The 
BSE shock is included in both the retail demand and export demand equations because of the 
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high risk of consuming beef if it is contaminated with BSE.  Controlling for the BSE event in 
export markets is especially critical because many counties banned U.S. beef following the BSE 
discovery.  The exchange rate index accounts for how expensive U.S. goods are relative to goods 
from other countries on foreign markets (The Federal Reserve, 2016).  The higher the index 
value, the stronger the U.S. dollar and thus the more expensive U.S. goods are to other countries.  
The price of Australian beef to Japan is used to gauge competition from other beef exporters 
(Meat and Livestock Australia, 2017).  
 Data  
Quarterly data for 1996 quarter 1 to 2016 quarter 3 were collected from multiple sources 
(Appendix C).  Descriptive statistics of variables for this analysis can be found in Table 4.2.  
Note, all prices (unless otherwise noted) and the marketing cost index were deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI where 1982-84=100) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017).  
Specific details regarding data sources and data manipulations are provided in Appendix C.  As 
is common when working with time series data, the natural log transformation of all variables 
were checked for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests  (Dickey & Fuller, 
1979).  In addition to the traditional ADF tests, ADF tests accounting for seasonality were also 
conducted (Appendix C).  For some of the variables, stationarity is rejected.  Including variables 
with unit root does not bias coefficient estimates, but may impact standard errors (Pouliot & 
Sumer, 2014).  However, following Pouliot and Sumer (2014), all models are conducted with 
level variables but model residuals are checked for stationarity using ADF tests.  Residuals for 
all models are stationary and thus all variables are in level form and not differenced.   
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 Econometric model 
The literature is mixed regarding whether naïve or forward looking expectations most 
closely mimic producer behavior (Antonovitz & Green, 1990).  For example, Kastens and 
Schroder (1994) found evidence for naïve expectations, determining that cattle feeders view past 
actual profit as more important in placement decisions than live cattle futures.  Conversely, 
Kastens, Jones and Schroeder (1998) found that using deferred futures plus historical basis yields 
the greatest forecast accuracy for major grains, slaughter steers, slaughter hogs, feeder cattle, cull 
cows, and sows.  Furthermore, Antonovitz and Green (1990) found that no one price expectation 
model outperforms other specifications and found evidence of heterogeneous price expectations 
in live cattle supply.  Therefore, two econometric models are presented below to account for 
different types of price expectations.  The first is based on naïve expectations and the second 
incorporates forward looking expectations whenever data are available.   
If naïve expectations are assumed, the four-equation model (Equations (52) through (55)) 
below can be estimated using three-stage least squares in log-log form: 
Live cattle inverse demand:   
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐿 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐿,∗ + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡
∗ + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐼𝑡
∗ + 𝛼5 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼6 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛼7 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐵2005 + 𝛼10𝑄𝑇2𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝑄𝑇3𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑄𝑇4𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
1  
(52) 
Live cattle supply:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐿 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑡−2
𝐹 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑇2𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑇3𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑄𝑇4𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡
2 
(53) 
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Feeder cattle inverse demand:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐹 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐹,∗ + 𝛾3 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐿,∗ + 𝛾3 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑡
𝐶 + 𝛾4𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
+ 𝛾6𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑆𝐵2005 + 𝛾8 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑄𝑇3𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑄𝑇4𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑡 
3  
(54) 
Feeder cattle supply:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐹 = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐹,∗ + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−8
𝐹 + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊 + 𝛿5𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿6 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8
+ 𝛿7𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹 + 𝛿8𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿9𝑆𝐵2005𝑡 + 𝛿10𝑄𝑇2𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑄𝑇3𝑡
+ 𝛿12𝑄𝑇4𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
4  
(55) 
The * superscript indicates an endogenous variable.  Most variable descriptions are as before. 
Specific to the naïve model are 𝑃𝑡−2
𝐿 , the live cattle price lagged two quarters, in equation (53), 
𝑃𝑡
𝐿, the current live cattle price in equation (54), and 𝑃𝑡−8
𝐹 , the feeder cattle price lagged 8 
quarters, in equation (55).  Two dummy variables are used to account for the BSE shock. 
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 equals one for the 2003 QT1 and zero otherwise, and 𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 equals one for 2004 
QT1 and zero otherwise.  These two individual dummy variables are included to help with 
normality of the residual terms.23  Additionally, Chow tests (Chow, 1960) in the reduced form 
equations indicated a potential structural break. To help account for this shift, 𝑆𝐵2005𝑡 is added 
to specific equations.  𝑆𝐵2005𝑡 is equal to zero before 2005 QT1 and equal to one beginning in 
2005 QT1 through the end of the sample.  Misspecification testing is detailed more below.   
 Due to the large number of variables and potential degrees of freedom concerns, an 
equation by equation instrumentation strategy is used.  Specifically, 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐿 , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐶 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 , 𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡, 𝑆𝐵2005, 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡, 𝐸𝑋𝑡, and 
                                                 
23 Other, less effective, ways of accounting for the BSE shock were explored.   
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𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡 are the exogenous variables and instruments in the live cattle demand equation (52).  
All variables in equation (53) are exogenous.  For equations (54) and (55), 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐶 , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−8
𝐹 , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊 , 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8, 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 , 𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 , 𝑆𝐵2005,
𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , and 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 are the exogenous variables and instruments.   
If forward looking expectations are assumed, the four-equation model (Equations (56) 
through (59)) is estimated using three-stage least squares in log-log form: 
Live cattle inverse demand:   
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐿 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐿,∗ + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡
∗ + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐼𝑡
∗ + 𝛼5 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡 + 𝛼6 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛼7 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐵2005 + 𝛼10𝑄𝑇2𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝑄𝑇3𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑄𝑇4𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
1  
(56) 
Live cattle supply:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐿 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐿] + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑡−2
𝐹 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑇2𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑇3𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑄𝑇4𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡
2 
(57) 
Feeder cattle inverse demand:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐹 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐹,∗ + 𝛾3 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ] + 𝛾3 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑡
𝐶 + 𝛾4𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
+ 𝛾6𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑆𝐵2005 + 𝛾8𝑄𝑇2𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑄𝑇3𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑄𝑇4𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑡 
3  
(58) 
Feeder cattle supply:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐹 = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐹,∗ + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−4[𝑃𝑡
𝐹] + 𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊 + 𝛿5𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛿6 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8 + 𝛿7𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹 + 𝛿8𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿9𝑄𝑇2𝑡 + 𝛿10𝑄𝑇3𝑡
+ 𝛿11𝑄𝑇4𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
4  
(59) 
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In the forward looking model, 𝑃𝑡−2
𝐿  is replaced by 𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐿], which is the expectation in period 
𝑡 − 2 (placement) of the live cattle price in period 𝑡 (finish).  This price is created using the 
expected price formula, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 + ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠.  The 
deferred CME live cattle contract for six months in the future is used for deferred futures.24  A 
four-year historical average basis is used for the five market area (Tonsor, Dhuyvetter, & 
Mintert, 2004).25 In equation (58), 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ] is the expected live cattle price at placement time 𝑡 
for finish time 𝑡 + 2.  In equation (59), 𝐸𝑡−4[𝑃𝑡
𝐹], is the expected price of today’s feeder cattle 
from one year ago.  This is created using the expected price formula.  The CME feeder cattle 
futures contract for one year out and a four year historical Kanas basis are used.26  The 
exogenous variables and instruments for equation (56) are 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡 ,
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐿], 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐶 , 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡, 𝐸𝑋𝑡, 𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 , 𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 , 𝑆𝐵2005, 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 
and 𝑄𝑇4𝑡.  The exogenous variables and instruments for equations (58) and (59) are 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ], 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐶 , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−8
𝐹 , 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊 , 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡 , 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8, 𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡, 𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡 , 𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡 , 𝑆𝐵2005,
𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , and 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 .  
                                                 
24 Live cattle future contracts are traded for February, April, May, June, August, September, October, and 
December.  Accordingly, 𝐸𝑡  [𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ] uses the nearby fed cattle contract price for the contract corresponding to six 
months in the future.  For example, if the steer is placed in December, it is assumed to finish feeding in June, so the 
June futures price in December is used.  However, if the steer is placed in January, it will finish feeding in July.  
There is no July futures contract and hence the August futures contract price in February is used.  These monthly 
expected prices are then aggregated to the quarterly level.  This value is then lagged two quarters to arrive at 
𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐿]       
25 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 
26 Feeder futures contracts are not available or are thin for more than one year out.  
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 Misspecification testing 
Following McGuirk, Driscoll, and Alwang (1993) and McGuirk, Driscoll, Alwang, and 
Huang (1995) equation by equation individual and joint misspecifications tests are conducted 
using the reduced form equations.  However, due to limited degrees of freedom, system wide 
misspecification tests can not be conducted.  The D’Agostino third sample moment tests, the 
Anscombe and Glynn fourth sample moment test, and D’Agostino-Pearson 𝐾2 omnibus tests are 
used to test for normality (Anscombe & Glynn, 1983; D’Agostino, Belanger, & D’Agostino 
1990).  Functional form is tested using the Ramsey RESET 2, 3, and 4 tests.  Static and dynamic 
homoscedasticity are examined using a RESET2 test and autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test, respectively.  Independence is checked using the following 
auxiliary regression: 
 𝜀?̂? = 𝛽0
′ 𝑿𝑡 + Λ
′𝜀𝑡−1̂ + 𝜐𝑡 (60) 
where 𝑿𝑡 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of independent variables, 𝜀𝑡 is the residual from the original model 
and 𝜐𝑡 is the estimated residuals from the auxiliary regression (McGuirk, Driscoll, & Alwang, 
1993).  If Λ is significant then independence is rejected.  Structural change is tested using the 
chow test (Chow, 1960).  P-values for the misspecification tests are show in Table 4.3.  These 
results are much improved from initial models.  However, we were not able to correct for or fix 
all misspecification issues.  We attempted to correct for autocorrelation following Berndt and 
Savin (1975), but were unsuccessful.  Alas, we do not live in a perfect econometric utopia! The 
models presented below represent the final specification which best aligned with economic 
theory and the fewest misspecification issues. 
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 Results and discussion 
 Naïve model specification  
Coefficient estimates from the naïve model are in Table 4.4.  Generally, signs are 
consistent with what economic theory and cattle market structure would suggest.  In the inverse 
live cattle demand equation, the quantity of live cattle has a negative and statistically significant 
impact. Due to the log-log specification, -3.38 is also the own-quantity flexibility (or a -0.30 [1/(-
3.38)] demand elasticity).  This is much larger than own-quantity flexibility estimates of Marsh 
(2003), -0.69, and Buhr and Kim (1997), -0.61. The retail demand impact on live cattle price is 
3.18, indicating that a 1% change in retail demand increases the live cattle price by 3.18%.  This 
is much larger than the export demand index impact of 0.20.  However, given that the U.S. 
exports approximately 10% of its production, the relative impact of domestic versus export 
demand is not surprising (USDA, 2017b).  In Marsh (2003), the retail demand index coefficient 
was 0.60.  However, there are many differences between our model and Marsh’s model, 
including the time period under investigation, data frequency (annual versus quarterly data), and 
control variables included.  
The naïve expected live cattle price is not statistically significant and small in the live 
cattle supply equation.  However, both input prices, feeder cattle and corn, have statistically 
significant and negative impacts on the live cattle supply.  Given that the feeder cattle price 
coefficient is nearly four times as large as the corn coefficient, feedlot operators are more 
sensitive to a 1% change in the feeder cattle price than the corn price.  This could potentially be 
related to the relative costs of these two main inputs in live cattle production and impacts on 
profitability.  
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The lagged dependent variable measures asset fixity.  The coefficient, 0.47, indicates 
some rigidity in live cattle supply.  This is similar to Marsh’s (2003) estimate of 0.56.  Using the 
live cattle price coefficient and the lagged dependent variable, the long run live cattle supply 
elasticity is 0.09 [0.05/(1-0.47)], which is inelastic. 
The coefficient estimates in the feeder cattle demand equation are consistent with 
expectations.  As the feeder cattle quantity increases by 1%, feeder cattle demanded decreases by 
0.43%.  This is smaller than the feeder flexibilities of Marsh (2003), Brester and Marsh (1983), 
and Shonkwilier and Hinckley (1985) of -1.35, -1.61, and -1.10.  Potentially, this is due to the 
use of quarterly versus annual data and different time periods analyzed.  Feeder cattle demand is 
more responsive to an increase in the live cattle price.  The 1.61 estimate is slightly larger than 
Marsh (2003), 1.20, Shonkwiler and Hincklet (1985), 1.48, and Buccola (1980), 1.36.  The corn 
price flexibility is also negative and significant.  
Treating the live cattle price coefficient as a transmission flexibility, the impact of 
autonomous changes in retail and export demand on feeder cattle demand can be calculated.  If 
the retail demand index increases by 1% the feeder cattle price changes by 5.12% [1.61*3.18].  If 
the export demand index increases by 1% the feeder cattle price increases by 0.32% [1.61*0.20].  
These transmissions suggest that changes in retail and export demand have a larger impact on 
feeder cattle price than on live cattle price.  The larger transmissions to feeder cattle producers 
are consistent with Ricardian rent theory (see chapter 3; Zhao, Du, & Hennessey, 2011).  Since 
feeder calves are the most scarce and widely traded resource in the beef industry, the benefits 
and losses are largely passed back to the holder of the scarce resource, the feeder cattle 
producers.   
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In the feeder cattle supply equation, the own price supply elasticity is significant and 
positive.  This represents the decision to sell the calf now, or wait.  Thus, the positive estimate 
indicates that if the current price increases by 1% then producers will sell their calves now, 
increasing calves supplied by 0.33%.  Additionally, the feeder cattle price lagged 8 quarters, 
which represents the naïve price expectation at the time of cow breeding and heifer retention 
decisions are made, is significant and positive as expected.  Thus, a higher price two years ago 
results in more calves supplied today.  The negative and significant cull cow price shows the 
opportunity cost of culling the cow instead of breeding.  If the cull cow price one year ago was 
higher, then more cows are likely culled, resulting in fewer calves (-0.23%) today.  The two 
drought variables are used to proxy pasture conditions.  The contemporaneous drought variable 
is positive, indicating that severe drought results in more calves coming to market since the 
opportunity cost (or even inability) of keeping them on pasture is high.  Additionally, the drought 
conditions two years ago impact current feeder calves supplied.  If there was severe drought two 
years ago there are fewer feeder cattle supplied today.  Poor pasture conditions likely caused 
heifers and cows to be sold instead of being retained for breeding.  The lagged dependent 
variable indicates some fixity in feeder supply.  Note, however, that this is lagged four quarters 
whereas the live cattle quantity was only lagged one quarter in the live cattle supply equation 
because of differences in asset fixity in feeder cattle versus live cattle production.  The long run 
feeder cattle supply elasticity is 0.52 [0.33/(1.00-0.36)].  Buhr and Kim (1997) estimated short 
and long run calf crop (feeder cattle) supply elasticities of 0.05 and 0.46, respectively.   
 Forward looking expectations 
Forward looking model coefficient estimates are in Table 4.5.  With a few exceptions, the 
signs and statistical significance of the variables in the forward looking model are similar to the 
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naïve model.  Additionally, the Swartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) value indicate the forward 
looking model provides a better model fit for each equation.  
In the live cattle supply equation, coefficients are generally smaller in magnitude 
compared to the naïve estimates indicating that producers are less responsive to changes in the 
forward looking model than the naïve model.  Notably, the live cattle quantity coefficient 
decreased from -3.38 to -2.63 and the retail demand index coefficient decreased by over half to 
1.41.  However, both of these point estimates are larger than calculated by Marsh (2003).   
The live cattle supply equation includes a forward looking expected live cattle price.  As 
expected, the estimate is positive and statistically significant.  This estimate is larger than the 
equivalent coefficient in the naïve expectations model (0.05 and insignificant).  The feeder cattle 
and corn prices at placement have negative and significant impacts, with coefficients being 
slightly larger in magnitude than in the naïve model.  Conversely, the lagged dependent variable 
is smaller, 0.38.  The long run live cattle supply elasticity is 0.62 [0.20/(1.00-0.38)].  This long 
run supply elasticity is in line with Marsh’s (2003) estimate of 0.59.  
The key coefficient estimates in the forward looking feeder demand equation are smaller 
in magnitude than the naïve estimates.  Using the live cattle price transmission flexibility, 1.45, 
and the retail and export demand coefficients from the live cattle equation, primary demand 
impacts on feeder cattle price can be calculated.  A 1% increase in the retail demand index 
increases the feeder cattle price by 2.04% [1.45*1.41].  If the export demand index increases by 
1% the feeder cattle price increases by 0.23% [1.45*0.16].  As in the naïve model, the retail and 
export demand changes impact the feeder cattle prices more than the live cattle price. However, 
these transmissions are smaller than the naïve model.   
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Differences in the feeder cattle supply estimates across the naïve and forward looking 
models are evident.  The contemporaneous feeder cattle price impact is insignificant.  
Additionally, the expected feeder cattle price is negative and significant.  Thus if today’s 
expected feeder cattle price from one year ago increased, then there are fewer feeder cattle 
supplied today.  This is different than the naïve model, but given the lag structure (t-4 vs t-8) the 
prices used in each model potentially represent different decisions.  Given the one year horizon 
in the forward looking model, the negative coefficient could indicate that cow-calf producers are 
retaining heifers and expanding their herds because of more favorable market conditions.  
However, calves from the retained heifers have not come to market yet, resulting in less feeder 
calves supplied today.  The lagged dependent variable coefficient estimate, 0.34, indicates some 
asset fixity.  The long run feeder cattle supply elasticity is very inelastic, 0.02 [0.01/(1.00-0.34)].   
 Implications 
The implications of model results are demonstrated in two ways below.  First a “what-if” 
analysis is completed for changes in future demand using data from 2016 QT3 by increasing 
values of the retail and export demand indices (Table 4.6).  Second, a decomposition of predicted 
values for key historical time periods of interest is presented (Table 4.7).  
Given that understanding how changes in retail and export demand impact the live cattle 
and feeder cattle prices is core to our analysis, demonstrating how shocks to these indices change 
predicted values is key.  Results are presented for a one index point and one standard deviation 
increase in each index individually.27  Overall, the retail demand index is less variable than the 
export demand index and thus a one index point difference alone does not reflect this.  A four 
                                                 
27 Assuming a normal distribution, a one standard deviation change represents 34.1% of the data above the mean and 
34.1% of the data below the mean.  Hence these changes would be expected to occur over one-third of the time. 
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and 11 point increase in the retail and export demand indices, respectively, are equivalent to a 
one standard deviation increase.28   
Industry wide efforts are made to increase domestic beef demand, such as those funded 
through the beef checkoff program.  While this study cannot speak for what increases retail beef 
demand, it can detail the implications of an increase in retail beef demand on live and feeder 
cattle prices (Table 4.6).  Increasing the retail demand index by one point in 2016 QT3 would 
increase the live cattle price by 3.42% and the feeder cattle price by 5.55% in the naïve model 
and by 1.50% and 2.18% in the forward looking model.  A one standard deviation increase in the 
retail demand index, a four point change, would increase the live cattle price by 14.14% in the 
naïve model and 6.03% in the forward looking model.  The feeder cattle price increases by 
23.69% in the naïve model and 8.85% in the forward looking model. 
A one index point increase in the export demand index has a small impact on the live and 
feeder cattle predicted prices in both the naïve and forward looking model (Table 4.6).  
Conversely, a one standard deviation increase boosts the live cattle price prediction by nearly 
2%, and the feeder steer price by nearly 3% in the naïve model.  In the forward looking model, 
the one standard deviation shock to the export index increases the live and feeder cattle prices by 
just over 1% and nearly 2%, respectively.  Although these might seem like small percentages, 
given the real live and feeder cattle prices were $47.72/cwt ($113.30, nominal) and $59.56/cwt 
($142.67, nominal) in 2016 QT3, increasing live and feeder prices by 1.50% and 2.30% (average 
of naïve and forward looking model estimates) increases prices by $0.71/cwt ($1.70, nominal) 
                                                 
28 The quarter to quarter difference in each index was taken.  Then the mean and standard deviation of these 
differences were calculated.  The mean difference in the retail demand and export demand indices were -0.09 and 
1.52, respectively.  
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and $1.37/cwt ($3.30, nominal).  Holding live and feeder cattle quantities constant 
(8,526,746,200 live pounds and 3,938,100,000 feeder pounds), the increase in prices would 
result in increased real revenue of approximately $60.14 million ($144.91 million, nominal) and 
$53.95 million ($129.99 million, nominal) for the live cattle and feeder cattle sectors, 
respectively.  
Three important time periods in the beef industry were the identification of BSE (2001 
QT3 vs 2006 QT1) in the U.S., the U.S. recession (2007 QT1 vs 2010 QT1), and the period of 
higher cattle prices (2010 QT1 vs 2015 QT1).  The decomposition of predicted live cattle price 
changes from both the naïve and forward looking models over these event periods are detailed in 
Table 4.7 to further illustrate the core drivers of price changes.  The first event, identification of 
BSE, looks at changes to the live cattle price before BSE, 2001 QT3, to two years after BSE, 
2006 QT1.  Over this period the actual live cattle price increased by 2.70%.  The naïve model 
predicts a change of 7.85% and the forward looking model predicts an increase of 11.36%.  We 
can decompose the predicted value to understand how changes in the live cattle quantity, retail 
demand index, and export demand index impacted the predicted live cattle price.  Given this 
adverse BSE shock, one would expect the live cattle price to decease, ceteris paribus. However, 
ceteris paribus doesn’t apply as over this time period.  The live cattle price actually increased.  
Investigating the decomposition, there was a decrease in live cattle quantity by nearly 15%, a 
decrease in the retail demand index by 4.15%, and a decrease in the export demand index by 
62.94%.  Multiplying these decreases by the model coefficients, we can understand their impact 
on live cattle price.  Given the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients, the predicted positive 
impact from the decline in live cattle quantity is larger than the combined negative demand 
impact.  This can be seen in both the naïve and forward looking models.  
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The U.S. recession occurred from December 2007 to June 2009 during which 
unemployment peaked at 10% and consumer spending decreased (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2012).  From 2007 QT1 to 2010 QT1, the live cattle price decreased by 8.00%.  
During this time, the quantity of live cattle and the retail demand index decreased, however, 
export demand improved.  The live cattle predicted value in the naïve model decreased by 
8.96%, but increased by 0.66% in the forward looking model.  In the naïve model, the retail 
demand decrease alone would have caused the live cattle price to decrease by 35.67 percentage 
points.  However, the positive impacts of decreased live cattle quantity and increased export 
demand partially offset the negative retail demand impact.   
From 2010 to 2015 both live and feeder cattle prices increased.  The live cattle price 
increased by 70.11% from 2010 to 2015.  In 2014 and 2015, historically high average net returns 
for feedlots occurred (Tonsor, 2016).  Additionally, cow-calf returns were positive from 2010 to 
2015, especially in 2014 and 2015 (LMIC, 2017).  Both the naïve and forward looking models 
predicted an increase in live cattle price over this time, however, not as much of an increase as 
actually occurred.  A decrease in live cattle quantity explained about 15 percentage points of the 
increase in live cattle prices in the naïve model and about 11 percentage points in the forward 
looking model.  The change in retail demand quantity based index was small.  Export demand 
nearly doubled over this time period.  The increased export demand accounted for about 21 
percentage points of the live cattle price increase in the naïve model and 16 percentage points in 
the forward looking model. 
 Conclusion 
Limited empirical work has quantified how changes in primary demand, retail and export 
beef demand, impact farm level demands.  The goal of this study is to provide current estimates 
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of these price transmissions.  Two systems of equations were estimated to quantify the impacts 
of U.S. retail beef and export beef demand on live cattle and feeder cattle demand and supply.  
One system utilizes naïve price expectations and the other forward looking price expectations.   
In the naïve model, when retail level beef demand increases (decreases) by 1%, inverse 
live cattle demand increases (decreases) by 3.18% and feeder cattle inverse demand increases 
(decreases) by 5.12%.  Additionally, if the export demand index increases (decreases) by 1% the 
inverse live cattle demand increases (decreases) by 0.20% and feeder cattle demand increases 
(decreases) by 0.32%.  In the forward looking model, when retail level beef demand increases 
(decreases) by 1%, inverse live cattle demand increases (decreases) by 1.41% and feeder cattle 
inverse demand increases (decreases) by 2.04%.  Furthermore, if the export demand index 
increases (decreases) by 1% the inverse live cattle demand increases (decreases) by 0.16% and 
feeder cattle demand increases (decreases) by 0.23%.  The larger price transmission at the feeder 
cattle level is consistent with Ricardian rent theory and rents in the beef system being passed to 
cow-calf producers, the holder of the scarce resource (see chapter 3; Zhao, Du, & Hennessey, 
2011).  Therefore, even though cow-calf and stocker/backgrounder producers (primary suppliers) 
are not directly involved in primary domestic and export demand, it is important to understand 
how primary demand changes are transmitted through the supply chain and impact demand for 
their farm level products.   
Promotional efforts like the Beef Checkoff Program aim to increase primary retail 
demand for beef.  The results confirmed that both feedlot operations and feeder cattle producers 
(cow-calf, stocker, and backgrounding) benefit from programs that increase domestic and export 
demand.  Additionally, the price transmission from the live cattle price to the feeder cattle price 
is greater than one.  These implications are timely and should be noted in ongoing discussions 
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around beef checkoff programs (USDA, 2014).  On the other hand, negative shifts at the retail 
level or in export demand also impact farm level demand.  For example, a food safety or 
alternative adverse event, such as BSE, that decreases beef demand will negatively impact farm 
level revenues more than feedlot revenues.   
A “what-if” analysis and decomposition of predicted values was conducted.  The “what-
if” analysis was conducted using data from 2016 QT3 and shocking retail and export beef 
demand.  Overall, a one standard deviation shock in the retail beef demand index had a larger 
impact than a one standard deviation shock in the export beef demand index.  The live and feeder 
cattle price predictions were decomposed over three key time periods; BSE identification in the 
U.S., the U.S. recession in the late 2000s, and the period of cattle price increases from 2010 to 
2015.  Interestingly, the live cattle price increased from 2001 QT3 (before BSE) to 2006 QT1 
(after BSE).  The positive impact on the live cattle price from the decrease in live cattle quantity 
offset the negative impacts from decreased retail and export demand.  
Results are useful in evaluating investment opportunities and impacts of new 
technologies or policies.  If investment is anticipated to increase retail beef demand, an analysis 
can be conducted using our results to determine whether the increase in demand will offset the 
costs of implementing the proposed investment.  Similarly, when new policies are evaluated that 
impact domestic or export demand for U.S. beef our results can be used to assess impacts on live 
and feeder cattle producers.  
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Figure 4.1 Retail beef demand index (QT1 1996=100) 
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Figure 4.2 Export beef demand index (QT1 1996=100) 
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Figure 4.3 Effects of increased beef demand on live and feeder cattle prices and quantities 
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Table 4.1 Variable list and descriptions 
Variable Description 
𝑃𝑡
𝐿 Fed steer price, live basis, 5-market average, total all 
grades, $/cwt 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ] Expected 5-market average price in two quarters, expected 
price= deferred futures+ historical basis, $/cwt 
𝑃𝑡
𝐹 Feeder steer price, weighted price, Kansas, $/cwt 
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+4
𝐹 ] Expected Kansas feeder steer price in four quarters, 
expected price=deferred futures + historical basis, $/cwt 
𝑄𝑡
𝐿
 Live cattle quantity, federally inspected steers and heifer 
harvested, thousands of lbs 
𝑄𝑡
𝐹 Feeder cattle quantity (feeder cattle placements), thousands 
of lbs 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡 Quantity based retail demand index (1996 QT1=100) 
𝐸𝐼𝑡 Quantity based export demand index (1996 QT1=100) 
𝑃𝑡
𝐶  Feed corn price, $/bu 
𝑃𝑡
𝑊 Cull cow price, boning utility, Sioux Falls, $/cwt 
𝑀𝑡 Food marketing cost index (1967=100) 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡 Index of consumer sentiment (QT1 1960=100) 
𝐸𝑋𝑡 Real broad exchange rate index 
𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡 Australian cube roll price from Australia to Japan, cents/lb 
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑡 Dummy variable to indicate severe drought in KS, =1 if 
Modified Palmer Drought Index ≤-2 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 Linear time trend (1997 QT1=1, 1997 QT2=2, etc.) 
𝑆𝐵2005𝑡  Structural break dummy, =1 if year≥2005 
𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 Quarter 2, 3, and 4 dummy variables 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for QT1 1996 to QT3 2016 (n=83) 
 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Coeff of 
Variation
45.89 7.98 35.35 70.11 17.39
46.16 7.53 36.18 68.91 16.31
56.30 13.64 36.08 105.04 24.23
55.91 12.18 38.43 98.23 21.78
8477938.88 487795.20 7322813.33 9521782.67 5.75
4095384.34 413763.77 3004100.00 5185650.00 10.10
91.61 5.46 79.74 104.47 5.96
94.84 29.76 9.45 155.94 31.38
1.66 0.59 0.92 3.14 35.83
27.47 6.76 16.80 48.20 24.60
285.75 3.02 278.37 291.41 1.06
87.15 13.16 57.70 110.10 15.10
94.77 8.41 80.96 112.38 8.87
404.97 131.29 201.26 700.21 32.42
0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 288.49
𝑃𝑡
𝐿
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ]
𝑃𝑡
𝐹
𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+4
𝐹 ]
𝑄𝑡
𝐿
𝑄𝑡
𝐹
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝐶
𝑃𝑡
𝑊
𝑀𝑡
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑡
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Table 4.3 Misspecification tests p-values for reduced form equations 
 
  
Live Demand Live Supply Feeder Demand Feeder Supply Live Demand Live Supply Feeder Demand Feeder Supply
Normality 
Skewness 0.54 0.27 0.67 0.16 0.60 0.23 0.50 0.26
Kurtosis 0.59 0.59 0.71 0.53 0.61 0.56 0.42 0.65
Omnibus 0.71 0.47 0.85 0.30 0.77 0.41 0.57 0.48
Functional Form 
RESET 2 0.03 0.68 <0.01 0.11 0.05 0.52 0.04 0.11
RESET 3 0.09 0.75 <0.01 0.29 0.14 0.51 0.11 0.27
RESET 4 0.03 0.88 0.01 0.45 0.07 0.71 0.22 0.32
Homoscedasticity 
Static RESET2 0.41 0.96 0.08 0.67 0.30 0.95 0.13 0.62
Dynamic ARCH1 0.61 0.28 <0.01 0.33 0.69 0.12 0.82 0.21
Parameter Stability 
Chow- Mean Breaks None Breaks None Breaks None None None
Variance 0.63 0.76 <0.01 0.42 0.75 0.91 0.78 0.82
Autocorrelation
AC1 <0.01 0.24 <0.01 0.66 <0.01 0.37 0.27 0.55
Conditional Mean
All- Joint F <0.01 0.51 <0.01 0.44 <0.01 0.68 0.14 0.37
Parameter Stability 0.03 0.48 0.04 0.44 0.03 0.91 0.55 0.39
Functional Form 0.08 0.53 0.43 0.23 0.08 0.42 0.04 0.20
Autocorrelation <0.01 0.23 <0.01 0.76 <0.01 0.31 0.36 0.62
Conditional Variance
All- Joint F 0.83 0.22 <0.01 0.74 0.76 0.24 0.18 0.65
Parameter Stability 0.89 0.08 0.03 0.62 0.84 0.20 0.06 0.96
Static Homoscedasticity 0.50 0.73 0.64 0.96 0.39 0.84 0.06 0.77
Dynamic Homoscedasticity 0.70 0.18 <0.01 0.35 0.88 0.09 0.82 0.22
Individual Tests
Joint Tests
NAÏVE FORWARD
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Table 4.4 Three-stage least squares naive coefficient estimates (n=75) 
  
Table note: Standard errors in ( ). * p<0.15, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.05 
Variable
Coefficient 
estimate Variable
Coefficient 
estimate Variable
Coefficient 
estimate Variable
Coefficient 
estimate
-3.38*** 0.05 -0.43* 0.33*
(1.21) (0.07) (0.27) (0.21)
3.18* -0.11*** 1.61*** 0.20***
(2.16) (0.05) (0.16) (0.09)
0.20* -0.03*** -0.13*** -0.23***
(0.13) (0.01) (0.03) (0.12)
4.35 0.47*** 0.01 
(3.70) (0.10) (0.02)
0.01*** -0.00003 -0.004*** -0.08**
(0.004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.04)
0.09 -0.15*** -0.27*** 0.36***
(0.16) (0.03) (0.07) (0.14)
0.16 -0.02 -0.06 -0.003***
(0.27) (0.03) (0.06) (0.002)
-0.16 0.06*** 0.03 
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03)
0.05 0.08*** 0.03 0.01 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
0.06 0.06*** 0.16*** 0.08***
(0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
0.002 0.005 0.09*** 0.03 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 17.55 Intercept 8.72*** Intercept 4.48 Intercept 8.51***
(18.57) (1.66) (4.31) (2.35)
SBC -272.91 -526.90 -392.94 -376.61
Errors stationary YES YES YES YES
Inverse Live Cattle Demand Live Cattle Supply Feeder Cattle Demand Feeder Cattle Supply
𝑄𝑇2𝑡 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 𝑄𝑇2𝑡 𝑄𝑇2𝑡
𝑄𝑇3𝑡 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 𝑄𝑇3𝑡
𝑄𝑇4𝑡 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 𝑄𝑇4𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐿
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡
𝑆𝐵2005𝑡
𝑙𝑛[𝑃𝑡−2
𝐿 ]
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐶
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡
𝑆𝐵2005𝑡 𝑆𝐵2005𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐿
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐶
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−8
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐼𝑡
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Table 4.5 Three-stage least squares forward looking coefficient estimates (n=79) 
  
Table note: Standard errors in ( ). * p<0.15, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.05 
Variable
Coefficient 
estimate Variable
Coefficient 
estimate Variable
Coefficient 
estimate Variable
Coefficient 
estimate
-2.63*** 0.20* 0.05 0.01 
(0.58) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05)
1.41 -0.23*** 1.45*** -0.25***
(1.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09)
0.16*** -0.07*** -0.29*** 0.14**
(0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08)
1.32 0.38*** -0.004 
(2.25) (0.09) (0.02)
0.005*** 0.0003 0.002*** -0.03*
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.02)
0.04 -0.13*** 0.08*** 0.34***
(0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
0.19 -0.02 0.03 -0.0005 
(0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.0005)
-0.06 -0.04***
(0.09) (0.01)
0.09** 0.07*** -0.02* -0.02 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.10** 0.07*** -0.05*** 0.09***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
0.02 0.01 -0.06*** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Intercept 31.05*** Intercept 10.05*** Intercept -2.18 Intercept 10.55***
(12.76) (1.48) (1.81) (1.36)
SBC -357.00 -555.26 -517.82 -434.68
Errors stationary YES YES YES YES
Inverse Live Cattle Demand Live Cattle Supply Feeder Cattle Demand Feeder Cattle Supply
𝑄𝑇2𝑡
𝑄𝑇3𝑡
𝑄𝑇4𝑡
𝑄𝑇2𝑡
𝑄𝑇3𝑡
𝑄𝑇4𝑡
𝑄𝑇2𝑡
𝑄𝑇3𝑡
𝑄𝑇4𝑡
𝑄𝑇2𝑡
𝑄𝑇3𝑡
𝑄𝑇4𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐿
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐼𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡
𝑆𝐵2005𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−2[𝑃𝑡
𝐹]
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−2
𝐶
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−1
𝐿
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸03𝑄4𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐸04𝑄1𝑡
𝑆𝐵2005𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑡+2
𝐿 ]
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐶
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡
𝐹
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−4[𝑃𝑡
𝐹]
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡−4
𝑊
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑡−8
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑡−4
𝐹
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Table 4.6 Simulations of how live and feeder cattle prices respond to changes in retail and 
export demand indices 
  
 
  
Percent change 
in      prediction
Percent change 
in      prediction
Percent change 
in      prediction
Percent change 
in      prediction
Changing retail demand 
index by 1 index point
3.42% 5.55% 1.50% 2.18%
Changing retail demand 
index by 4 index points 
(1 st dev)
14.14% 23.69% 6.03% 8.85%
Changing export index 
by 1 index point
0.16% 0.26% 0.12% 0.18%
Changing export index 
by 11 index points (1 st 
dev)
1.73% 2.79% 1.31% 1.90%
FORWARDNAÏVE
𝑃𝑡
𝐹 𝑃𝑡
𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝐿 𝑃𝑡
𝐿
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Table 4.7 Decomposition of model prediction for time periods of interest 
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Appendix A - Survey instrument 
Following is a survey designed to obtain important information from U.S. feedlot operators.  The 
survey is focused on assessing various aspects of risk management including incoming cattle 
purchases and outgoing cattle sales. We want to emphasize that your participation in this survey 
is entirely voluntary and highly encouraged.  All your responses will be kept in strict confidence.  
Typical demographic questions are included to ensure our sample is representative of the U.S. 
feedlot industry and will remain strictly confidential.  If you wish to provide comments please 
use the space at the end of the survey.  We very much appreciate your assistance with this 
important project and look forward to receiving your completed survey. If you have any 
questions or comments regarding this survey, please feel free to contact Melissa McKendree 
(mgsm@ksu.edu) or Dr. Glynn Tonsor by email (gtonsor@ksu.edu) or by phone (785-532-
1518). 
 
Q1A Please  describe your cattle operation by indicating the percentage of your operation 
devoted to each segment of the beef cattle industry (should sum to 100%) 
______ Seed Stock (1) 
______ Cow-calf (2) 
______ Backgrounding/Stocker (3) 
______ Feedlot (4) 
______ Other (please describe): (5) 
 
Q1B Do you play a role in price risk management and/or animal health risk management 
decisions?  
o Yes, both price risk and animal health risk decisions (3) 
o Yes, price risk management decisions (1) 
o Yes, animal health risk management decisions (2) 
o No (4) 
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The following questions will refer to "your operation."  Please answer the questions when 
considering the finishing feedlot(s) in your operation.  If your operation includes multiple 
feedlots, please answer for them collectively.  
 
Q2 Please answer the following questions: 
 Never 
(1) 
Sometimes 
(2) 
About 
half the 
time (3) 
Most of 
the time 
(4) 
Always 
(5) 
How often does your 
operation use futures 
markets to hedge corn for 
feeding? (1)  
     
How often does your 
operation use futures 
markets to hedge feeder 
cattle? (2) 
     
How often does your 
operation use futures 
markets to hedge fed 
cattle? (3)  
     
 
Q3 What is the average placement weight of calves your feeding operation places in March? 
o Under 600 lbs (1) 
o 600 to 699 lbs (2) 
o 700 to 799 lbs (3) 
o 800 to 899 lbs (4) 
o 900 lbs or more (5) 
 
Q4 On average, what percentage of feeder cattle does your operation source from (should sum to 
100%): 
______ Traditional auction (1) 
______ Satellite/video auction (2) 
______ Purchased direct from seller (ranch) (3) 
______ Home raised from own cow-herd (4) 
______ Custom fed, so I did not buy or own animals (5) 
______ Other(please describe): (6) 
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Q5 Compared to calves sourced from auctions with unknown backgrounds, how do you believe 
calves from a single source ranch perform (i.e. average daily gain, feed conversion, morbidity) in 
the feedlot? 
o Much worse (1) 
o Somewhat worse (2) 
o About the same (3) 
o Somewhat better (4) 
o Much better (5) 
 
Q6 In the past 12 months, what do you believe is the average premium paid nationally in the 
market for feeder calves sourced from a single known ranch versus multiple unknown sources? 
o Discount (1) 
o No premium (2) 
o Premium less than $1/cwt (3) 
o $1 to $1.99/cwt premium (4) 
o $2 to $2.99/cwt premium (5) 
o $3 to $3.99/cwt premium (6) 
o $4 to $4.99/cwt premium (7) 
o $5 to $5.99/cwt premium (8) 
o $6 to $6.99/cwt premium (9) 
o $7 to $7.99/cwt premium (10) 
o $8 to $8.99/cwt premium (11) 
o $9 to $9.99/cwt premium (12) 
o Premium greater than $10/cwt (13) 
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Q7 In the past 12 months, what percentage of finished cattle did your operation market as 
(should sum to 100%):  
______ Live weight, negotiated price (includes auctions) (1) 
______ Live weight, formula price (2) 
______ Live weight, forward contract (3) 
______ Dressed weight, negotiated price (4) 
______ Dressed weight, formula price (5) 
______ Dressed weight, forward contract (6) 
______ Grid (dressed, grade and yield) (7) 
______ Other (please describe): (8) 
 
Q8 In the past 12 months, what percentage of the following pricing methods did your operation 
use for marketing finished cattle (should sum to 100%): 
______ Spot cash market (1) 
______ Forward contract or marketing agreement (2) 
______ Futures hedge (3) 
______ Options hedge (4) 
______ Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) Insurance (5) 
______ Livestock Gross Margin (LGM) Insurance (6) 
______ Other (please describe): (7) 
 
Q9 How do you think the August 2017 live cattle futures contract will settle (at expiration in 
August)?  
o Settle price will be higher than today's trading price (1) 
o Settle price will be lower than today's trading price (2) 
o Settle price will be the same as today's trading price (3) 
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Display This Question: 
If What are your price expectations for fed cattle between now and August 2017?  Prices will 
increase Is Selected 
Q9-A By how much do you expect the August 2017 live cattle price to increase by settle (at 
expiration in August)? 
o increase by less than $2/cwt (1) 
o increase by $2 to $4/cwt (2) 
o increase by $4 to $6/cwt (3) 
o increase by $6 to $8/cwt (4) 
o increase by $8 to $10/cwt (5) 
o increase by more than $10/cwt (6) 
 
Display This Question: 
If What are your price expectations for fed cattle between now and August 2017?  Prices will 
decrease Is Selected 
Q9-B By how much do you expect the August 2017 live cattle price to decrease by settle (at 
expiration in August)? 
o decrease by less than $2/cwt (1) 
o decrease by $2 to $4/cwt (2) 
o decrease by $4 to $6/cwt (3) 
o decrease by $6 to $8/cwt (4) 
o decrease by $8 to $10/cwt (5) 
o decrease by more than $10/cwt (6) 
 
Q10 What is the historical nearby August fed cattle basis ($/cwt) in your area?  (Please slide the 
purple circle to the appropriate basis)  Note: Basis = local cash price - futures price 
______ August basis ($/cwt) (1) 
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CV1  
The following two questions look similar but importantly are different.  Please complete both 
questions carefully.  Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to pay in 
hypothetical situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you 
were actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.   
 
Q11.1 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot. Suppose it is February 15th.  You are looking to buy feeder steers 
for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale.  A sale lot of 150 feeder steers, 
which will weigh approximately 800 lbs each at placement, are available for purchase from a 
single known ranch for a premium of $ 0 /cwt over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown 
sources. Of the 150 head of feeder steers available from the single source ranch, how many 
would you purchase? 
 
Q12.1 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot. Suppose it is February 15th.  You are looking to buy feeder steers 
for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale.  A sale lot of 150 feeder steers, 
which will weigh approximately 800 lbs each at placement, are available for purchase from a 
single known ranch for a premium of $ 0 /cwt over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown 
sources. The August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0/cwt (CME contract is for 
40,000lb of live cattle).  The expected local August basis is $ 0 /cwt.  Of the 150 head of feeder 
steers available from the single source ranch, how many would you purchase? 
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Display This Question:  
If Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally considered 
less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and lower 
morbidity at... Text Response Is Greater Than  0 
Q12B.1 Of the ${q://QID22/ChoiceTextEntryValue} feeder steers purchased, how many would 
you place under a futures hedge using the CME live cattle contract given the above information? 
Recall: The August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0/cwt (CME contract is for 
40,000lb of live cattle).  The expected local August basis is $ 0 /cwt.   
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CV2  
The following two questions look similar but importantly are different.  Please complete both 
questions carefully.  Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to pay in 
hypothetical situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you 
were actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.   
 
Q11.2 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot.  Suppose it is February 15th.  You are looking to buy feeder steers 
for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale.  A sale lot of 150 feeder steers, 
which will weigh approximately 800 lbs each at placement, are available for purchase from a 
single known ranch for a premium of $ 0 /cwt over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown 
sources. Of the 150 head of feeder steers available from the single source ranch, how many 
would you purchase? 
 
Q12.2 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot. Suppose it is February 15th.  You are looking to buy feeder steers 
for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale.  A sale lot of 150 feeder steers, 
which will weigh approximately 800 lbs each at placement, are available for purchase from a 
single known ranch for a premium of $ 0 /cwt over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown 
sources.  The August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt.  A forward contract 
(with typical specifications for your area) is currently being offered with a basis of $ 0 /cwt tied 
to the August futures contract. Of the 150 head of feeder steers available from the single source 
ranch, how many would you purchase? 
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Display This Question: 
If Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered... Text Response Is Greater Than  0 
Q12B.2 Of the ${q://QID24/ChoiceTextEntryValue} feeder steers purchased, how many would 
you place under a forward contract (with typical specification for your area) given the above 
information? Recall: The August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt.  A 
forward contract (with typical specifications for your area) is currently being offered with a basis 
of $ 0 /cwt tied to the August futures contract.  
  
  
182 
CV3  
The following two questions look similar but importantly are different.  Please complete both 
questions carefully.  Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to pay in 
hypothetical situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you 
were actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.   
 
Q11.3 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot.  Suppose it is February 15th.  You are looking to buy feeder steers 
for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale.  A sale lot of 150 feeder steers, 
which will weigh approximately 800 lbs each at placement, are available for purchase from a 
single known ranch for a premium of $ 0 /cwt over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown 
sources. Of the 150 head of feeder steers available from the single source ranch, how many 
would you purchase? 
 
Q12.3 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot. Suppose it is February 15th.  You are looking to buy feeder steers 
for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale.  A sale lot of 150 feeder steers, 
which will weigh approximately 800lb each at placement, are available for purchase from a 
single known ranch for a premium of $ 0 /cwt over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown 
sources. The August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt (CME contract is for 
40,000lb of live cattle).  The expected local August basis has a ${e://Field/Percent1} % chance 
of being less (weaker) than $ 0, and a 100% chance of being  greater (stronger) than $ 0. Of the 
150 head of feeder steers available from the single source ranch, how many would you purchase? 
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Display This Question: 
If Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally considered 
less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and lower 
morbidity at... Text Response Is Greater Than  0 
12B.3 Of the ${q://QID47/ChoiceTextEntryValue} feeder steers purchased, how many would 
you place under a futures hedge using the CME live cattle contract given the above information?  
Recall: The August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt  (CME contract is for 
40,000lb of live cattle).  The expected local August basis has a ${e://Field/Percent1} % chance 
of being less (weaker) than $ 0, and a 100% chance of being  greater (stronger) than $ 0. 
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CV4  
Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to participate in hypothetical 
situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you were 
actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.  
 
Q11.4 Suppose it is February 15th. You just purchased a lot of 150 feeder steers weighing 
approximately 800 lbs each for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale. The 
August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt  (CME contract is for 40,000lb of 
live cattle). How many head would you place under each of the following output pricing 
strategies?  
______ A futures hedge with an expected local August basis of $ 0/cwt. (1) 
______ A forward contract (with typical specifications for your area) with a basis of $ 0 /cwt tied 
to the August futures contract. (2) 
______ Other output pricing strategy (e.g., options, Livestock Risk Protection, formula pricing, 
etc.) (3) 
______ I would accept the local cash price at time of sale in August (4) 
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CV5  
Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to participate in hypothetical 
situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you were 
actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.  
 
Q11.5 Suppose it is February 15th. You just purchased a lot of 150 feeder steers weighing 
approximately 800 lbs each for March placement with an expectation of August finish/sale. The 
August CME live cattle futures contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt (CME contract is for 40,000lb of 
live cattle).  How many head would you place under each of the following output pricing 
strategies?  
______ A futures hedge where the expected local August basis has a ${e://Field/Percent1}% 
chance of being less (weaker) than $ 0, and a 100% chance of being  greater (stronger) than $ 0. 
(1) 
______ A forward contract (with typical specifications for your area) with a basis of $ 0 /cwt tied 
to the August futures contract. (2) 
______ Other output pricing strategy (e.g., options, Livestock Risk Protection, formula pricing, 
etc.) (3) 
______ I would accept the local cash price at time of sale in August (4) 
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CV6  
Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to participate in hypothetical 
situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you were 
actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.  
 
Q11.6 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot. Suppose it is February 15th.  You just purchased a lot of 150 
feeder steers weighing approximately 800 lbs each for March placement with an expectation of 
August finish/sale.  The steers were sourced from a single known ranch for a premium of $ 0/cwt 
over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown sources.  The August CME live cattle futures 
contract is trading at $ 0/cwt  (CME contract is for 40,000lb of live cattle).  How many head 
would you place under each of the following output pricing strategies? 
______ A futures hedge with an expected local August basis of $ 0 /cwt. (1) 
______ A forward contract (with typical specifications for your area) with a basis of $ 0 /cwt tied 
to the August futures contract. (2) 
______ Other output pricing strategy (e.g., options, Livestock Risk Protection, formula pricing, 
etc.) (3) 
______ I would accept the local cash price at time of sale in August (4) 
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CV7  
Research studies have found people to overstate their willingness to participate in hypothetical 
situations, such as this survey. It is important that you make your selection as if you were 
actually facing these choices in operation of your feed yard.  
 
Q11.7 Single source feeder calves, originating from a single ranch of origin, are generally 
considered less risky than calves with unknown histories due to their better performance and 
lower morbidity at the feedlot.  Suppose it is February 15th.  You just purchased a lot of 150 
feeder steers weighing approximately 800 lbs each for March placement with an expectation of 
August finish/sale.  The steers were sourced from a single known ranch for a premium of $ 0/cwt 
over cattle purchased at an auction from unknown sources.  The August CME live cattle futures 
contract is trading at $ 0 /cwt (CME contract is for 40,000lb of live cattle). How many head 
would you place under each of the following output pricing strategies? 
______ A futures hedge where the expected local August basis has a ${e://Field/Percent1}% 
chance of being less (weaker) than $ 0, and a 100% chance of being  greater (stronger) than $ 0. 
(1) 
______ A forward contract (with typical specifications for your area) with a basis of $ 0 /cwt tied 
to the August futures contract. (2) 
______ Other output pricing strategy (e.g., options, Livestock Risk Protection, formula pricing, 
etc.) (3) 
______ I would accept the local cash price at time of sale in August (4) 
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Q13 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements.  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
disagree 
(3) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(4) 
Somewhat 
agree (5) 
Agree 
(6) 
Strongly 
agree 
(7) 
I usually like “playing it 
safe” (for instance, 
“locking in a price”) 
instead of taking risks for 
market prices for fed 
cattle. (1) 
       
When selling/marketing 
fed cattle, I prefer 
financial certainty to 
financial uncertainty. (2) 
       
When selling/marketing 
fed cattle, I am willing to 
take higher risks in order 
to realize higher average 
returns. (3) 
       
I like taking financial 
risks with my feeding 
operation. (4) 
       
I accept more risk in my 
feedlot than other feedlot 
operators. (5) 
       
With respect to the 
conduct of business, I 
dislike risk. (6) 
       
 
Q14 What was the average cost of gain for feeder cattle placed over the past 12 months on your 
operation?  
o Less than $60/cwt (1) 
o $60 to $64.99/cwt (2) 
o $65 to $69.99/cwt (3) 
o $70 to $74.99/cwt (4) 
o $75 to $79.99/cwt (5) 
o $80 to $84.99/cwt (6) 
o $85/cwt to $89.99/cwt (7) 
o Over $90.00/cwt (8) 
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Q15 How important are the following traits for the feeder cattle you buy? 
 Extremely 
important 
(13) 
Very 
important 
(14) 
Moderately 
important 
(15) 
Slightly 
important 
(16) 
Not at all 
important 
(17) 
Weaned at least 30 days (1)      
Weaned at least 45 days (2)      
Vaccination history (3)      
Third-party health verified 
(4) 
     
Animal care/handling 
practices (5) 
     
Castrated (6)      
Dehorned (7)      
Implanted (8)      
Specific sire/genetic 
information (9) 
     
Breed background 
information (10) 
     
Reputation of seller (11)      
Weight (12)      
Frame (13)      
Condition (14)      
Number of head in a lot 
(15) 
     
Uniformity of head in a lot 
(16) 
     
Sex of animal (17)      
Age and source verified 
(18) 
     
Naturally raised (19)      
Organically raised (20)      
Non-hormone treated (21)      
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Q16 In what state does your operation primarily feed cattle? 
o Alabama (1) o Alaska (2) 
o Arizona (3) o Arkansas (4) 
o California (5) o Colorado (6) 
o Connecticut (7) o Delaware (8) 
o Florida (9) o Georgia (10) 
o Hawaii (11) o Idaho (12) 
o Illinois (13) o Indiana (14) 
o Iowa (15) o Kansas (16) 
o Kentucky (17) o Louisiana (18) 
o Maine (19) o Maryland (20) 
o Massachusetts (21) o Michigan (22) 
o Minnesota (23) o Mississippi (24) 
o Missouri (25) o Montana (26) 
o Nebraska (27) o Nevada (28) 
o New Hampshire (29) o New Jersey (30) 
o New Mexico (31) o New York (32) 
o North Carolina (33) o North Dakota (34) 
o Ohio (35) o Oklahoma (36) 
o Oregon (37) o Pennsylvania (38) 
o Rhode Island (39) o South Carolina (40) 
o South Dakota (41) o Tennessee (42) 
o Texas (43) o Utah (44) 
o Vermont (45) o Virginia (46) 
o Washington (47) o West Virginia (48) 
o Wisconsin (49) o Wyoming (50) 
 
Q17 For the feeding operation I am the: 
o Owner and manager (1) 
o Owner (2) 
o Manager (3) 
o Other (please specify): (4) ____________________ 
 
Q18 I am ________ years old.  
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Q19 The best description of my educational background is: 
o Did not obtain high school diploma (1) 
o High school graduate (2) 
o Some college (3) 
o Technical training (Certification or Associates Degree) (4) 
o Bachelor's (B.S. or B.A.) College Degree (5) 
o Graduate or Professional Degree (M.S., Ph.D., D.V.M., Law School) (6) 
o Other (please describe): (7) ____________________ 
 
Q20 What percentage of the cattle fed on your operation in the last 12 months were (should sum 
to 100%): 
______ Commercial beef cattle (1) 
______ Dairy cattle (2) 
______ Beef and dairy cross cattle (3) 
______ Other (please describe): (4) 
 
Q21 How many fed cattle were sold on your operation in the last 12 months? 
o Less than 1,000 head (1) 
o 1,000 to 1,999 head (9) 
o 2,000 to 3,999 head (2) 
o 4,000 to 7,999 head (3) 
o 8,000 to 15,999 head (4) 
o 16,000 to 23,999 head (5) 
o 24,000 to 31,999 head (6) 
o 32,000 to 49,999 head (7) 
o More than 50,000 head (8) 
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Q22 Of the animals placed on feed in the last 12 months, what percentage of calves placed did 
your operation own (as opposed to someone outside the operation retaining ownership)? 
o 0% (1) 
o 1 to 20% (2) 
o 21 to 40% (3) 
o 41 to 60% (4) 
o 61 to 80% (5) 
o 81 to 100% (6) 
 
Q23 What is the one-time capacity of your feedlot? 
o Less than 1,000 head (1) 
o 1,000 to 1,999 head (9) 
o 2,000 to 3,999 head (2) 
o 4,000 to 7,999 head (3) 
o 8,000 to 15,999 head (4) 
o 16,000 to 23,999 head (5) 
o 24,000 to 31,999 head (6) 
o 32,000 to 49,999 head (7) 
o More than 50,000 head (8) 
 
Q24 How easy were the survey questions to understand?  
o Extremely easy (20) 
o Somewhat easy (21) 
o Neither easy nor difficult (22) 
o Somewhat difficult (23) 
o Extremely difficult (24) 
 
Q25 Thank you for your participation!  Please leave any additional comments here: 
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Appendix B - 𝝓𝟏 and 𝝓𝟐 descriptive statistics and plots 
Table B.1 Ricardian rent theory 𝝓𝟏 and 𝝓𝟐 descriptive statistics  
 
 
  
RRT RRT RRT RRT RRT RRT RRT RRT
Mean 1.59 -7.16 1.56 -6.93 1.61 -7.41 1.63 -7.41
Median 1.60 -7.18 1.56 -6.94 1.62 -7.34 1.63 -7.45
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.56 0.04 0.51 0.04 0.51
Kurtosis -0.60 -0.43 -0.91 -0.39 -0.80 -0.72 -0.43 -0.36
Skewness -0.17 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.27 -0.28 -0.13 0.53
Range 0.27 2.96 0.23 2.76 0.15 2.16 0.19 1.99
Minimum 1.46 -8.54 1.46 -8.33 1.55 -8.54 1.54 -8.32
Maximum 1.72 -5.58 1.68 -5.58 1.70 -6.38 1.72 -6.33
Count 253 253 131 131 54 54 68 68
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Full period 
12/95 to 12/16 12/95 to 10/06 11/06 to 04/11 05/11 to 12/16
𝜙1 𝜙1 𝜙1 𝜙1𝜙2 𝜙2 𝜙2 𝜙2
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Figure B.1 Monthly 𝝓𝟏 hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory using data from Focus on 
Feedlots from December 1995 to December 2016 
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Figure B.2 Monthly 𝝓𝟐 hypothesized by Ricardian rent theory using data from Focus on 
Feedlots from December 1995 to December 2016 
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Figure B.3 𝜙1 histogram 
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Figure B.4 𝜙2 histogram 
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Appendix C - Data sources and stationarity tests  
Table C.1 Data sources 
Variable Description Source 
𝑄𝑡
𝐿
 Live cattle quantity, federally inspected steers and 
heifer harvested, thousands of lbs 
LMIC, catsltr file, sheet C, using the sum of FI Steer Slaughter and 
Heifer Slaughter as number of head times FI weight, updated 12-5-16 
𝑄𝑡
𝐹 Feeder cattle quantity (feeder cattle placements), 
thousands of lbs 
LMIC, COFWTS file, sheet B, using total calves placed in US 
(column AU) times the midpoint of each weight category, updated 
12-5-16 
𝑃𝑡
𝐿 Demand and supply prices of fed steers, live basis, 5-
market average, total all grades, $/cwt 
LMIC, Mo180-5MktAvgFats.xls, sheet LV steers, column V 
“average”, updated 12-6-16 
Fat futures CME live cattle futures prices, $/cwt, used in creating 
expected price 
LMIC, fatfutures.xlsx, updated 12-6-16 
𝑃𝑡
𝐹 Kansas feeder steers, weighted price, $/cwt LMIC, wkancatl.xlsx, sheet D, using feeder steer prices for 500-600, 
600-700, 700-800, 800-900 weights.  To create weighted price, 
multiple by percent of placements in that weight category from KS 
that month from COF report (COFWTS.xlsx) and sum up, updated 5-
30-17 
Feeder futures CME feeder cattle futures, $/cwt, used in creating 
expected feeder cattle price 
LMIC, feederfutures.xlsx, updated 1-14-17 
𝑃𝑡
𝑊 Slaughter cow price, boning utility, Sioux Falls, $/cwt LMIC, WklyCow-Bull.xls, sheet SF-monthly, column V (boning, 
800-1200 lbs), updated 12-6-16 
𝑃𝑡
𝐶  Feed corn price, $/bu LMIC, feedpr.xls, sheet B, column C (Corn price), updated 12-6-16 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑡 Quantity based retail demand index (1996 QT1=100)  
𝐸𝐼𝑡 Quantity based export demand index (1996 QT1=100)  
𝑀𝑡 Food marketing cost index (1967=100) Contact with  Howard Elitzak, Agricultural Economist, Economic 
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, updated 1-2-17 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 Time trend Where QT1 1997=1, QT2 1997=2, etc. 
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𝑄𝑇2𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇3𝑡 , 𝑄𝑇4𝑡 Quarter 2, 3, 4 dummy variables  
𝐸𝑋𝑡 Real broad exchange rate index Federal Reserve Bank, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/summary/indexbc_m.ht
m, Price-adjusted Broad Dollar Index 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 Consumer price index Bureau of labor statistics, Go to http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables. 
Under database, Click on top picks (it is a star) under the first row. 
click on  U.S. All items, 1982-84=100 - CUUR0000SA0 which is top 
box, Downloaded 12-5-16. 
Per capita US 
beef 
consumption 
Per capita U.S. beef consumption used in RDI LMIC, sumq.xls, sheet A, column M, retail consumption, updated 1-
8-17 
Nominal choice 
beef price 
Nominal choice beef price used in RDI, $/cwt LMIC, Retmt.xls, sheet C, Column C (new series beef MO), updated 
1-8-17 
Export quantity Total beef and veal+ variety meats beef, pounds LMIC, file EXPVALUE.xls, sheet B, sum of columns B and C, in  
metric tons so multiply by 2204.62 to get pounds, updated 1-9-17 
Export value Total value of beef and veal + value of variety meats 
beef, thousands of $ 
LMIC, file EXPVALUE.xls, sheet B, sum of columns I and J, 
updated 1-9-17 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡 Index of Consumer Sentiment (QT1 1960=100) http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/tables.html, quarterly excel, updated 1-
18-17 
PMDI- used to 
create drought 
dummies 
Modified Palmer Drought Index (PMDI), Positive 
values of the indices indicate wet conditions and 
negative values dry conditions, with more  
extreme values indicating more extreme anomalies 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-and-
precip/drought/nadm/indices/palmer/div#select-form, click on 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring-content/temp-and-
precip/drought/nadm/palmer/pmdi-us-div.txt, averaged all the 
divisions for KS each month US-DIV01401 to US-DIV01409, 
updated 1-18-17 
𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑡 Australian cube roll price from Australia to Japan, 
cents/lb 
MLA market information, Australian beef export prices to Japan, 
Quarterly, USc/lb, cube roll chilled 
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Table C.2 Dickey Fuller unit root tests 
 
 
Table notes: Optimal lag length selected using minimum SBC.  NOSA means no seasonal dummy variables were included.  SA means seasonal dummy variables 
were included.  
Variable Name
Lag 
length
Test 
Statistic
Lag 
length
Test 
Statistic
Lag 
length
Test 
Statistic NOSA Conclusion
Lag 
length
Test 
Statistic
Lag 
length
Test 
Statistic
Lag 
length
Test 
Statistic SA Conclusion Overall Conclusion
3 0.00 4 -2.28 4 -3.43 Reject Unit Root 0 -3.10 0 -3.36 0 -3.93 Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
3 -0.30 3 -1.31 3 -3.46 Reject Unit Root 3 -1.07 3 -1.39 1 -9.30 Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
0 0.17 0 -1.87 0 -2.71 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 0.85 0 -1.75 0 -2.55 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
0 0.25 0 -1.71 0 -2.08 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 -3.89 0 -1.45 0 -1.65 Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
0 0.60 0 -2.07 0 -2.23 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 -1.10 0 -1.96 0 -2.05 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
0 0.67 0 -1.93 0 -1.59 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 0.19 0 -1.90 1 -2.47 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
0 -0.09 4 -3.11 4 -4.00 Reject Unit Root 0 4.04 0 -1.70 0 -1.64 Fail to Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
0 -1.35 0 -1.69 1 -2.94 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 -0.27 0 -1.56 1 -2.81 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
0 -0.91 0 -1.82 0 -1.79 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 -0.85 0 -1.32 0 -1.27 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
3 -0.47 0 -3.94 0 -4.35 Reject Unit Root 0 -1.54 0 -3.20 0 -3.33 Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
0 -0.23 0 -3.32 0 -3.43 Reject Unit Root 0 -3.74 0 -3.01 0 -3.13 Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
0 0.72 0 -1.09 0 -1.21 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 0.97 0 -1.07 0 -1.20 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
0 -0.01 0 -1.74 0 -1.84 Fail to Reject Unit Root 0 1.61 0 -1.64 0 -1.71 Fail to Reject Unit Root Fail to Reject Unit Root
2 1.29 2 -0.96 0 -3.83 Reject Unit Root 0 1.31 0 -1.20 0 -3.08 Fail to Reject Unit Root Reject Unit Root
DF Critical Values -1.61 -2.58 -3.15 -1.61 -2.58 -3.15
TrendNo Intercept Intercept Trend No Intercept Intercept
